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Archive for November, 2005

Wednesday, November 23rd, 2005

A DEMONSTRATION IN THE ART OF HORIZONTAL THINKING

Dan of tdaxp has a graphics rich mini-magnum opus entitled ” Globalization is Water: The Magic Cloud“. In it Dan discusses ( and illustrates) the complex connections between:

The Magic Cloud
Fuzzy Logic
Clausewitzian Friction
Darwinism
Analogical Thinking
Tipping Points
Perception
Fundamentalism as a cognitive frame
Phase Dominance
Boydian strategy
PNM Theory
Dynamic vs. Static Modelling
Cognitive Theory
IR Theory
Horizontal Thinking
Insight

Dan left out the kitchen sink and Bayesian Probability analysis but that was about it :o)

Wednesday, November 23rd, 2005

THE PAPER TRAIL OF THE “PAPER OF RECORD”

The New York Times prides itself on being ” the paper of record” for our nation. On foreign policy though their editorial record is not one of consistent principle – unless partisanship and historical amnesia constitute principles. Where the Times stands on a given issue depends a great deal on who is standing in the Oval Office. That is as true today for the Iraq War as much as it was yesterday for the war in Vietnam.

Marc Schulman of The American Future is running a three part series that meticulously traces the evolution of the Times in regard to Iraq and it is a devastating portrait:

“A war can be lost because public opinion turns against its continued prosecution. The New York Times – the self-described “newspaper of record” – is among the world’s most influential opinion leaders. As shown by the cited quotations, the newspaper’s stance on Iraq underwent a complete transformation during the decade separating 1993 and 2003. While its editors never lost their fear of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their prescription for countering the threat posed by the weapons was altered beyond recognition. In 1993, by arguing that cease-fire violations nullified U.N. protection, the Times affirmed the right of a victorious party to resume hostilities at its sole discretion if the party it defeated did not abide by the terms of the agreement to which it affixed its signature. Ten years later, the Times reversed its stance, asserting that the United States should not go to war without the approval of the United Nations. In so doing, the Times implicitly argued that going to war with the approval of a multilateral institution took precedence over the use of military force to expeditiously eliminate the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD.

This post, which covers the eight years of the Clinton administration, is the first of three that employ the Times’ editorials to trace and analyze the evolution of the newspaper’s position on Iraq. The second will cover the pre-invasion Bush administration, while the third will deal with the period from the fall of Baghdad to the present.”

Continue reading…

This is an example of blogging at its best, not just citizen-journalism but citizen-history – and I will be linking to each part in Marc’s series.

Tuesday, November 22nd, 2005

CHET RICHARDS REVIEWS BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION

Dr. Chet Richards, Editor of Defense & The National Interest has posted a review of Blueprint For Action by Thomas P.M. Barnett. This was a very important review, one well worth reading in full; tough but fair and frequently laudatory, written by someone in the small circle of theorists and defense intellectuals who can reasonably be considered a peer of Dr. Barnett’s.

It was, unlike most book reviews, informed commentary.

For those not familiar with Dr. Richards, a mathematician by training, he was the long-time associate of the great military strategist Colonel John Boyd, of whose ideas Richards is the
” universally acclaimed keeper of the flame” and authorized briefer since Colonel Boyd’s death. Richards is himself the author of several books on strategy including A Swift Elusive Sword and numerous articles. In addition, Richards operates the Belisarius and DNI sites, both of which I recommend highly to anyone interested in strategy or military history.

Several excerpts of Dr. Richards review of BFA ( my comments are in regular text):

“His recommendations for the Department of Defense have finally reached the “radical” level. Essentially, he wants to shrink it down to the special operators (SEALs, Green Berets, Rangers, etc.) plus airpower and put the rest of the Army and Navy and the entire Marine Corps into a new Department of Everything Else. In other words, all of the Marine Corps and about 95% of the Army would become part of Sys Admin. I am truly in awe.”

I have watched this evolution in Dr. Barnett’s thinking since the publication of The Pentagon’s New Map where he introduced the Leviathan-System Administration dichotomy. Initially, the borders were fuzzy between the two and Dr. Barnett leaned toward the conservative side of structural transformation of the armed services, chiding me for including some serious “ trigger pullers” in the Sys Admin category. Ultimately in BFA, Dr. Barnett envisioned something far more radical by making the Marine Corps the ” Mini-Me Leviathan” of the Sys Admin force. This incidentally returned the Marines to their historic role as the undisputed masters of Small Wars, a mission that is a good cultural fit for the Corps.

“Pattern for success

Like John Boyd, whom he references several times in the book, Barnett considers the range of human conflict from the national aim or vision down to tactics. Putting Barnett’s scheme into Boyd’s pattern would give us something like:

Vision: End “terrorism” and war as we know it; alleviate suffering and poverty world wide.

Grand Strategy: Shrink the Gap – connectivity everywhere.

Strategy: Six point process for “processing politically bankrupt states” (to be critiqued below) featuring internationally-sanctioned preemption when necessary.

Grand Tactics: Build support among a designated group of Core states to sanction attack for removing offending regime and funding reconstruction.

Tactics: Airpower-intensive network-centric warfare (NCW) to take out organized military forces and eliminate or capture indicted members of regime; then, actions to preclude fourth generation warfare including armed counterinsurgency and timely reconstruction of state with connectivity and “New Core” status.

Dr. Richards is laying out the cornerstone for a grand synthesis of strategic thinking that really needs to be considered more deeply. PNM, Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict, 4GW, NCW, Global Guerillaism all contain at least some principles that can be extrapolated to every level of the Boydian Taxonomy. Some of these theories are more versatile in this regard than others -i.e. they are more fully developed comprehensive paradigms – and most excel or exhibit greater detail at a particular level.

PNM ‘s locus is at the level of Vision and Grand strategy and grows sketchier as you move downward toward the practical, concrete, operational application in limited scenarios. Barnett is leaving an ” open system” for practitioners of warfare to fill in details by trial and error. The other theories seldom reach the Grand Strategy level, much less articulate a coherently persuasive Vision that becomes the basis of a new moral authority the way PNM/BFA does. That in essence is the ” secret” of the power behind the appeal of PNM theory; Dr. Barnett’s vision is not a recipe for blowing things up with greater efficiency than the other guy -it is a moral argument for why we should act.

The potential for finding complementary interactions here is large. And discovering the underlying dynamics that give all these theories their varying degrees of validity – which I expect we will find through a better understanding of the behavior of complex networks and in applying such principles as resilience, emergence and phase transitions to analyzing strategy.

“Iraq and the non-case for Sys Admin

Now let’s turn to the one acknowledged failure – Iraq. For Iraq not to blow his case out of the water, Barnett has to declare it a “no-test,” the term used in programs like missile defense when you don’t want an obvious disaster to end support for the project. Barnett’s explanation for Iraq is that we didn’t follow his six-step formula, so it doesn’t represent a failure of it. He is obviously correct that there was no Sys Admin (it was 2 months after the capture of Baghdad before we cut orders for the first military police unit) – but this observation is not conclusive. The fact that we had no Sys Admin and Iraq is a debacle does not imply that having such a force would have led to a more favorable outcome.

…Is there any reason to suspect that with enough troops on the ground, we couldn’t have precluded an insurgency? Against this is the argument that the occupying force itself is a catalyst for insurgency and so one of the ingredients in successful counterinsurgency is keeping as small a footprint as possible. A large Sys Admin force, particularly a multinational one with varying proficiency in handling insurgency – and comprising different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds – adds complexity, increases the potential for misunderstandings and provocative events, and provides a target-rich environment. For these reasons, 250,000 largely non-Muslim Sys Adminers, some with experience fresh from Chechnya, might not have been the panacea Barnett claims. [And I have to admit that this is a significant change from my own critique of Map here on DNI, where I argued for such a force.] “

Well, there are a great deal of variables to play with here in terms of a thought experiment entitled ” Iraq with Ideal Sys Admin conditions”. Simple advantages in numbers do gain the security effect of proximity when you hit ” X” personnel per 100,000 – it simply becomes that much more difficult of a task to pull off insurgent attacks when occupation forces are spread ” thick” rather than thin. Higher levels of security means more basic services which in turn reduces grievances but the pivotal aspect will be the political skill with which such a larger force is employed. A considerable portion of America’s problems in Iraq are of our own making – an insurgency composed only of foreign jihadis is nothing more than the Baader-Meinhoff gang in a khaffiyeh.

Much food for thought here. A very stimulating review of a superior book.

Monday, November 21st, 2005

RECOMMENDED READING [ UPDATED]

Have not done one these, at least a longer one, in some time. Overdue:

The consistently superb Eide Neurolearning Blog explores the intrinsic limitation of psychological self-referentiality in understanding others in “The Tyranny of Our Thinking Styles

Jeff at Caerdroia – who was kind enough to put me on his coveted quote banner space today – has a highly sensible piece entitled ” The Military and Political Implications of Disclosing Strategy“. Churchill and FDR understood such things but back then the media did as well.

Dr. Von posts on “Thinking Out Loud About Emergent Behavior…Those Power Laws

Military analyst and writer Ralph Peters, always worth reading, in a NYPost op-ed ” How To Lose A War” ( Hat Tip: Memeorandum)

John Hagel of Edge Perspectives reflected on the contributions to society of the late Peter Drucker who died just shy of his 96th birthday last week.

String theorist Lubos Motl points his readers toward Seed Magazine

Check out the new Threat’ s Watch organized by Bill Roggio, Steve Schippert and Marvin Hutchins. Zenpundit wishes them all success with their new venture.

That’s it.

UPDATE WITH SOME POLITICAL ANALYSIS:

The Murtha -Troop Withdrawal vote battle in the House of Representatives reignited the fury of the Swift Boat Veterans against former Democratic presidential nominee Senator John Kerry. John O’Neill, a swift boat Vietnam Veteran and was the author of Unfit For Command had an op-ed today blasting Kerry for his comments regarding Murtha’s Republican critics given his own rhetorical history. ( Full text courtesy of Bruce Kesler)

To reiterate an analysis I gave over at The Duck of Minerva, the ” coward” shot at Congressman Murtha by Rep. Jeane Schmidt was out of line – ridiculous actually. Murtha is no coward but the Democratic anger in the House had less to do with a nasty remark to that effect than with the GOP leadership seizing on Murtha’s poorly conceived proposal to:

a) Short-circuit an incipient antiwar ” drumbeat” media strategy to build the political momentum to *force* troop withdrawals from Iraq over Bush administration opposition.and

b) Get the Democrats on record for a highly unpalatable vote.

This was a two-fold debacle for antiwar Democrats. Here’s why it happened:

Setting aside a debate over the intrinsic merits of troop withdrawal, the Republicans outplayed the Democrats politically because the Democratic leadership is still trying to force-fit the Iraq War into the politics of the Vietnam War paradigm of their boomer youth ( or the boomer youth of their activist base at least) despite this script being a repeated failure with the general public, even one disillusioned with Bush’s handling of the war. Why do they keep doing it then ? Because this is the only frame of the Iraq issue that the Moveon.org screamers/ activist base will tolerate.

The Iraq War is many things but it is *not* the Vietnam War. President Bush incidentally, as I read a lot of military-related boards, sites and journals, has no shortage of critics within the uniformed military and civilian defense community on Iraq, but proposals like Murtha’s are not a form of opposition to which many of them would sign-on.

If only the Republicans were half as effective in neutralizing the Iraqi insurgency…perhaps Bush will luck out by having Pat Leahy and Nancy Pelosi form an LBJ Martyr Brigade and then the White House can conduct operations against them.

Monday, November 21st, 2005

WHY BARNETT AND ROBB SEE DIFFERENT CHINA PATTERNS

Link preface:

No Longer a One-Sided Fight To Demonize China” and “ Perfect NYT Trifecta” by Dr. Barnett

Fooling Yourself” by John Robb

The Globalization Bull in the China Shop” and ” Will China’s New Left be a Force to be Reckoned With?” by Zenpundit

“China’s Time Bombs ” , ” China’s Time Bombs: Gray China“, ” China’s Time Bomb: One More Word on The Pension System“, ” China’s Time Bombs: The Banking System” by Dave Schuler of The Glittering Eye

Post Communist China” by Simon of Simon World

President Bush’s much publicized trip to China does not have the austere Cold War gravity of the Soviet-American summits or the epochal significance of Richard Nixon’s flight to Beijing but the normality itself is an important sign. The leaders of China and the United States are trying to navigate a relationship of significant magnitude and one with enormous room for future positive growth – but they are doing so bereft of mutual understandings on many important subjects in bilateral and international relations ranging from Taiwan to proliferation of WMD technology.

Sino-American relations are really at a critical moment as we stand at the root of a multifaceted decision tree whose branches spread outward into a fog of future scenarios we cannot clearly discern. Part of the problem is the paradoxical position of the Chinese state which is strong and weak, resililient and fragile, resurgent and fading all at once makes gaming China’s outcomes difficult at best. Minxin Pei described China’s elite in Foreign Policy in these terms:

“But China’s isn’t just any government. It is one that rests on fragile political foundations, little rule of law, and corrupt governance. Worse, it has consistently placed the highest value on economic growth and viewed all demands for curbing its discretion and power as threats to its goal of rapid modernization. The result? Social deficits in education, public health, and environmental protection. But it is hardly surprising, since promoting high growth advances the careers of government officials. Thus, China’s elites devote most of their resources to building glitzy shopping malls, factories, and even Formula One racing tracks, while neglecting social investments with long-term returns. So for those who wonder how, if China’s political system is so rotten, it can deliver robust growth year after year, the answer is that it delivers robust growth year after year, in part, because it is so rotten.

But the Chinese Communist Party knows that the people will tolerate only so much rot. Corruption is a rising concern. The party’s inability to police its own officials, many of whom are now engaged in unrestrained looting of public assets, is one of Beijing’s greatest worries. These regime insiders have effectively privatized the power of the state and use it to advance personal interests. Their loyalty to the party is questionable, if it exists at all. The accelerating effect on the party’s demise resembles that of a bank run; more and more insiders cannot wait to cash in their investment in the party.”

On the other hand, much the same could have been said ( and was said in Europe) of the America of Boss Tweed, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Credit Mobilier, Mark Hanna, The Whiskey Ring, Jay Gould, The Homestead Strike and Teapot Dome. With great effort at reform the United States managed to impose the rule of law in matters of both market and politics. It was a bitter struggle though, which took decades and was done in an era when, except for the flow of investment capital, the United States needed little from overseas and derived its economic growth primarily from its own vast internal market.

China’s leaders today do not have quite the same luxury of time as did American leaders in the 19th century. While vast, China’s potential consumer market lacks purchasing power and as a result China’s growth is export-driven; as such, the deep temptation for the Politburo, due both political and profit incentives, is to reinvest endlessly in current growth sectors than in basic services, infrastructure and educational opportunities for the 600-800 million peasants lagging behind. China has an array of future-altering national decisions to make in the next twenty years that most advanced nations, by comparison, made over several centuries – and China’s leaders, lacking intrinsic legitimacy, need to get all of them right to avoid a popular explosion.

Thus it is possible to look at China, as does Dr. Barnett and see where all the nonzero sum economic trends are pointing and forecast a hopeful future worth creating for China, the United States and the world. Certainly, the United States can influence some of these outcomes for good or ill and Dr. Barnett is trying to nudge policy makers toward choosing the strategic good.

It is also possible to look at China’s numerous political and economic contradictions as does John Robb and Dave Schuler and see a China that is going to walk the narrowest, most self-absorbed, zero-sum path for fearing of falling off the tightrope. As countries are driven by their own internal dynamics this scenario is a very possible one.

And it is also possible – though far more unrealistic – to look at China’s defense establishment and diplomacy and assume that China represents a strategic threat to the United States on the revisionist, anti-status quo model of the great totalitarian powers of the 20th century. China, like most states, has a strand of angry ultranationalism and ethnocentrism in it’s political culture and there are factions in the PLA and the CCP who periodically play this card during internal power struggles. They play this card because they are not in the driver’s seat in China but would like to be. Treating China like it is already our enemy empowers these fringe ultranationalists.

China is a great power in a state of societal flux. All our policies in Asia need to be bent toward guiding China to a peaceful rise that does not conflict with critical American interests.


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