By *universal agreement and practice* the law of war draws a distinctionbetween the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerentnations7 and also between [317 U.S. 1, 31] those who are lawful andunlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture anddetention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawfulcombatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for actswhich render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly andwithout uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time ofwar, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly throughthe lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life orproperty, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemednot to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but* to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals*.

[ emphasis mine]

Nor is the United states alone in this view. Singapore dealt with a case of sabotage by Indonesian soldiers out of uniform in 1966 that was very similar to that of the Nazis in Ex Parte Quirin. The Federal Court of Singapore took a view nearly identical to that of SCOTUS, ruling in Krofan and another v. Public Prosecutor , that:

However, the position of members of the armed forces caught out ofuniform while acting as saboteurs in enemy territory is not dealt with bythe Hague Regulations. In the Saboteur’s Case (Ex parte Quirin & Ors.)(1) the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. in 1942 treated disguised saboteursas being in the same position as spies. This view is also held by theauthors of the Manual of Military Law Part III an official publication in1958 of the United Kingdom War Office at paragraph 96 page 34 where it isstated “Members of the armed forces caught in civilian clothing whileacting as saboteurs in enemy territory are in a position analogous to that of spies.” We are of the opinion that this view does not offendagainst the rules of the law of nations respecting warfare and indeedstates the position under customary international law. It seems to us tobe consistent with reason and the necessities of war to treat a regular combatant in disguise who acts as a saboteur as being in the sameposition as a regular combatant in disguise who acts as a spy. Both seek to harm the enemy by clandestine means by carrying out their hostile operations in circumstances which render it difficult to distinguish them from civilians. In the case of the “soldier” spy it is universallyaccepted that he loses his prisoner of war status and need only betreated as any other spy would be treated. There seems no valid reason therefore why a “soldier” saboteur, who by divesting himself of his uniform cannot readily be distinguished from a civilian, should not also be treated as any other saboteur would be treated. Both, by reason oftheir having purposely divested themselves of the most distinctivecharacteristic of a soldier, namely his uniform, have forfeited their right on capture to be treated as other soldiers would be treated i.e. as prisoners of war.

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