GLOBALIZATION AND WAR: BRUCE KESLER

Mr. Bruce Kesler has been active in American politics for forty years. An early member of Vietnam Veterans for a Just Peace, Mr. Kesler has also worked for The Foreign Policy Research Institute and today he writes occasionally for The Augusta Free Press, The Democracy Project and The American Enterprise Online .

A Foreign Policy Needs a Domestic Policy

By Bruce Kesler

There is no “foreign policy” separate from domestic policy. There is no “doctrine” separate from its actual implementation. A doctrine is a statement of important guiding principle. But in the absence of integration in a comprehensive winning strategy, it is little more than an inadequate public relations campaign.

In 1971, when working at an eminent foreign policy think tank, I was tasked to analyze the Nixon Doctrine[1]. After assessing reams of commentary that Delphically delved into the administration’s arguments, I concluded that there was no Nixon Doctrine. “Strength through partnership,” I argued, was a public relations coping mechanism designed to change the vocabulary of discourse in order to preserve continuity and flexibility of American foreign policy. I pointed out that it also contained a dangerous component of existential defeatism, meant to rally forces to slow the eventual perceived defeat of the West, rather than a prescriptive guidance to achieve larger goals abroad.

Learned, experienced, and respected elders privately agreed. But they then accepted the Nixon Doctrine as a practical alternative to the strong assault of the McGovernite opposition. To declare that the emperor had no clothes wasn’t realistic or politically sound.

In the context of the domestic political situation faced by Nixon and Kissinger, I didn’t question the need for such a public relations “doctrine,” at least in the short-term. But I did question whether it sowed longer-term seeds that would leave the U.S. self-absorbedly reactive and overly self-restrained.

Being raised in a Dean Acheson world, his message from a December 9, 1964 speech at Amherst College is worth revisiting: “The end sought by our foreign policy, the purpose for which we carry on relations with foreign states, is as I have said, to preserve and foster an environment in which free societies may exist and flourish. Our policies and actions must be tested by whether they contribute to or detract from achievement of this end. They need no other justification or moral or ethical embellishment.”

This was nicely followed at the time by the comments of Paul Warnke and Leslie Gelb, on the consequences of failing to deal with foreign threats: “Our own society could become a cloistered citadel of fear and repression. These events would, in turn, deeply challenge our lives and our security.” The domestic consequence of a non-engaged, reactively-protective foreign policy would eventually lead to domestic policies averse to Americans’ cherished liberties and comforts and weaken our determination to make their defense our primary goal.

With the partial exception of President Reagan’s revival of an assertive foreign policy, America spent much of the last 30 years coasting with veiled eyes as the threat to U.S. and global security brewed in the Middle East. For most of us, September 11 tore that veil away.

For 60 years, Commentary magazine educated the vital center in America about present and potential dangers from an inertial, outdated 1930s liberalism and from consequent excesses. Its current issue continues that invaluable service, publishing a symposium on the Bush Doctrine by three dozen of the most penetrating minds in foreign policy.

The contributors agree that the Bush Doctrine is about preempting potentially disastrous threats through force and preventing future ones by building more benign democratic states. They also agree that there are such threats.

Disagreements are expressed over the concept of preemption, the practicality of democratization, Iraq as a proper location for application of the doctrine, and the Bush administration’s policies toward Iran and North Korea. As to Iraq—thanks to 20/20 hindsight—most agree that there have been some serious failings in the planning and execution of the war. However, they agree on little else, one adding some more salt, another a bit more pepper, another a dollop of honey to the mix. All agree that the outcome in Iraq, more promising to some than others, will determine the ultimate judgment of the Bush Doctrine.

Richard Perle, a key player in all things Iraq, minces few words:

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