units until the Future Combat System is fielded. In theory

the FCS will use better computers, sensors, and networks to

compensate for traditional firepower, but the program will

not deliver anything until at least 2015.

To rebalance the Army for an era of Complex Irregular War, 7

heavy brigades should be traded for more medium and infantry

BCTs. Adding 3 Stryker Brigades and third infantry

battalion to the 18 IBCTs provides more balance for

irregular warfare. In effect, by reversing the shift to

create additional brigades and their overhead, a net total

of 13 maneuver battalions can be created, within the Army’s

current manpower totals.This would represent a significant

increase in true combat power, adding “boots on the ground,”

and enable “full spectrum operations” and the ability to win

the peace as well as the fighting phases.

AIR FORCE

America’s airpower dominance will have to be reshaped to

provide relevant strategic and operational effects. This

will require the Air Force to expand its missions in space

and cyberspace, as well as provide a modernized strategic

strike capability. The $200 million F-22 “Raptor” may be a

technological marvel, but it’s an investment that reflects a

misappropriation of funds for an irregular world.Thus, it

should be cancelled with its funding shifted to new long-

range bombers. A bomber with a range in excess of 2,000

miles is needed. The Air Force buy for the Joint Strike

Fighter can be cut in half, and those funds shifted towards

investments in the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles.

MARINES

To adapt for the 21st century, the Marines should shift its

orientation from major combat operations and amphibious

assaults to focus on protracted Small Wars. They should

achieve more modularity by shifting away from the separate

Marine Division and Aircraft Wings to standing Expeditionary

Maneuver Brigades,with roughly 15,000 Marines each. Each

of these would be supported by new units for Information

Warfare, Special Operations, andá Security

Cooperation/Foreign Military Training tasks.

Considering the nature of a second Small Wars era, the Corps

should terminate or sharply reduce plans for the V-22 Osprey

and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). The tilt-rotor

Osprey is too expensive and too fragile for expeditionary

employment. The Marines are making too many operational

compromises in their ground systems to get around the

limitations of the $80 million V-22. The $8 million EFV

affords seamless high-speed transition from sea to deep

inland objectives for forcible entry operations. It is too

optimized for very rare ship-to-shore maneuver, and is not

adequate for tactical maneuver of Marines during Small Wars.

The resources allocated to the V-22 and EFV programs should

be applied to simpler, less vulnerable, and more rugged

modes of air and ground mobility.

END PART I.

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