FPRI: COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE-PART II.

This post is a continuation of Part I. and I find myself in greater disagreement with the author here; particularly in regard to DHS. Without slamming any individual employee or alphabet agency of that vast department, the whole concept needs to be rethought with a clear focus on counterintelligence and counterterrorism with an eye toward radical streamlining.

Foreign Policy Research Institute

50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation

1955-2005 www.fpri.org

COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE

by Frank G. Hoffman

January 6, 2006

Continued from Part I.

U.S. NAVY

The recently retired Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),

Admiral Vernon Clark, admitted the Navy is neither balanced

nor optimal for the ongoing GWOT or against future irregular

adversaries. The capabilities found in today’s 300 ship

fleet makes it extremely potent for conventional fights in

deep “blue water.” America’s carriers can threaten four

times as many deep strike aim points than a decade ago, and

the strike potential of the total fleet has increased three

times over. Yet,the Navy continues to add to its combat

punch. The fleet has too much strike capacity, paid for at

the expense of expeditionary and littoral combat assets that

are more relevant againstá irregular maritime threats.The

outgoing CNO was right, we do not have a balanced fleet.

The Navy’s Mahanian lusting for a future Trafalgar or Midway

is reflected in its devotion to large, expensive ships.

This creates an unaffordable shipbuilding plan with a new

$14Bá aircraft carrier, the CVN-21, and Virginia-class

submarines estimated at $2.5B each, and a DD-X destroyer

that costs around $3B.á The Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship

(LCS) fits the bill with innovative hull designs, modular

mission packages, and superior speed (up to 50 knots). Just

as important, theLCS or Street Fighter provides the

requisite capability packages to á deal with irregular

threats, at one-tenth the cost of a DD-X. Accordingly, in a

world withoutá a blue water opponent, this analysis leans

towards the LCS as the new platform of choice. The DD-X

however, is retained as the sole frame for surface

combatants.

The Navy should reduce its focus on aviation-based power

projection andá emphasize littoral and expeditionary forces.

Reducing carrier battle groups from 11 to 9, while

preserving a robust amphibious force as a maneuverable form

of presence and cooperation is a good way to posture U.S.

forces for irregular contests.It should also increase the

number of LCS and other innovative hull forms for “green

water” operations against irregular forces increases the

utility of the Navy.

The Navy’s new shipbuilding plan for 333 ships is like the

Army’s plan, too conventional and completely unaffordable.

The alternativeá outlined here is fleet is achieved, and

better shaped for littoral warfare, countering anti-access

threats, interdicting criminal activity and suppressing

piracy and interference toá sea lines of communication. It

provides both the green and blue water platforms the United

States needs to counteract irregular warfare at sea. Just

as important, this fleet provides both persistent and

periodic forms of presence, maneuvering at sea, without

absorbing the political and military vulnerabilities of

fixed ports and airfields.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

One of the most cost effective and relevant capabilities in

America’s arsenal is the elite “quiet professionals” of U.S.

special operations forces (SOF). While the U.S. SOF

community has been augmented, much more can be done. Its

current optempo is too high. We currently have 80% of our

assets iná two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, which former

SOF veteran Mike Vickers calls “a two-country solution to a

60 country problem.”To address the lack of robust

capability, we should:

* Increase the SOF by three battalions

* Increase SOF’s organic intelligence and UAV assets

* Increase SOF’s HUMINT resources by 33%

* Increase SOF’s organic stealthy aviation assets

In world of persistent conflict, we should consider

further institutionalizing SOF as a distinct Service-the

Special Operationsá Force (SOF). Creating a Service, to

include JCS representation, would further strengthen its

representation in key planning circles in Washington. Most

importantly, it would give SOF ownership of the personnel

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