Third, if you are going to kill lots of civilians, there needs to be a realizable, acheivable, end-goal in mind. Pushing Hezbollah’s rocket line back in terms of geography is meaningless because either Hezbollah will tweak their rockets to improve the range or Iran and Syria will provide better rockets. What happens when Hezbollah launches rockets from north of Beirut ?

The only meaningful strategic goal here for Israel was the total demilitarization of Hezbollah, an objective that coincided with the national interests of not just the U.S. but that of France, and therefore, in a languidly trailing and desultory way, the EU. The key to that objective was Syria, not Lebanon, and making the hapless and ineffectual Lebanese government instead of the “strong”, generally unpopular and very “targetable” Syrian regime the focus of Israeli wrath – followed by real negotiations of things Damascus is interested in talking about – was a mistake. Carrots and sticks. Much more efficient use of Israeli political capital than bombing Lebanon or engaging in bloody house to house fighting in the Bekaa ( the only way to actually root out Hezbollah’s fighters). A better route for Israel to have taken if it wanted an EBO campaign.

And of course, in five or six years, if Nasrallah were to have an accident, by then Israel will probably only be one of the suspected culprits. Perhaps not even at the top of the list.

OTHER INTERESTING LINKS ON THIS SUBJECT:

Abu Aardvark

American Footprints ( Haggai)

American Future

Arms and Influence

Armchair Generalist

Aqoul ( Tom Scudder)

Austin Bay ( Bill Roggio guest post)

Bliss Street Journal

Bruce Kesler

Caerdroia

Collounsbury

Counterterrorism Blog

Dan Drezner

DefenseTech

DEJA VU

Don Surber

Fabius Maximus (DNI)

John Robb

Juan Cole

Lexington Green

Live From the FDNF !New !

Martin Kramer

Memeorandum

Middle East Perspective

Sic Semper Tyrannis

Sun BinNew !

SyriaComment.com

The Glittering Eye

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