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  1. Curtis Gale Weeks:

    Yes, please: MORE!!!

    During the news conference, I found myself saying of Baker: “I love this man!” Literally.

    A pretty impressive group; but I think they have doomed their plan to failure.

  2. mark:

    I’ll try to have a rough breakdown up tonight – it is 160 pages ;o)

  3. Fabius Maximus:

    Another perspective: it is mostly delusional.

    What is this “Iraq Gov’t” they keep talking about? If they did the Readers Digest “Word Power” exercise each month, they would know what “reification” means.

    Also, why do “our” Iraq forces need years of training while the “enemy” Iraq forces get along just fine by watching re-runs of “Combat” (for you youngsters, that was a 1960’s TV show). Esp. since “our” guys have such an advantage in hardware (except, of course, for all “our” hardware that “they” now have).

    I’ll bet it proves to have little impact. Perhaps gets a paragraph when Halberstam or van Creveld write the history of this long exercise in futility.

  4. Fabius Maximus:

    Mark, you could write something much better than the ISG rpt. Even I could.

    In fact, I am going to … right now. The ISG rpt resulted from — guessing — 5 man-years of effort, including staff time.

    I’ll have the first cut — a strategic summary — up in a few days, and the recommendations in a week or 2.

    Not 160 pages, but no fluff. Perhaps 6,000 words — 20 pages.

  5. Anonymous:

    I think you’ve got it just right, Mark.

    We will need more like you in the coming weeks to keep the conversation focused on the real issue – what we need to do in Iraq – and away from the backbiting and petty political points that have been so prevalent.

    I haven’t read the report yet…maybe today…

    CKR

  6. mark:

    Hi Fabius & Cheryl

    Fabius:

    I agree- you or I or both or many others could do a better job of making recommendations than did the ISG. However, my gut instinct is that the elite simply want reasonable coverage in order to extricate themselves from entrenched political positions without too much embarrassment; once this is done and the USG is actually moving, the report is going to be thrown out the window, having served its purpose.

    Cheryl:

    Thank you very much. The report is going to look familiar to anyone who followed DoD ” transformation”, IC ” reform” and ” public diplomacy” issues. A lot of cut and paste here. Not all of it is bad either and probably will eventually be implemented someday -though inclusion here is just to make the ISG report more substantive.

  7. Dan tdaxp:

    Great news.

    In spite of a number of recommendations which are for appearences, 5, 10, 35, 40, 41, 42, and 43 seem to be the most critical.

    After 3.5 painful years of appeasing our enemies, it looks like we will finally stop screwing the Iraqi people.

  8. lester:

    the fatal flaw is expecting Israel to help us in any way.

  9. Curtis Gale Weeks:

    In other words, Mark, the ISG report was a 4GW maneuver?

    I agree- you or I or both or many others could do a better job of making recommendations than did the ISG.

    The problem is this: How many of those policy makers within the U.S. — heck, within Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria… — are going to be able to go through the report and isolate the good from the bad from the frivolous as neatly as Dan has?

    While I agree that the report may have ‘broken the ice’ for the domestic U.S. scene, I think viewing the ISG report outside the context of everything else is unwise. It will be used, and used in various ways by different interpreters of it, and I very much doubt that your effect b — or even, a — is going to occur as neatly and beneficially as you suggest. At the very best, a new and better plan may emerge from the friction after much more wandering in the desert of the ISG report and within Iraq; at worst, the friction (domestic political as well as foreign preemption attempts) will only intensify as a result of it.

  10. Lexington Green:

    Mark, your assessment of what the ISG Report signals, what it IS, rather than the far less important consideration of what it says, is the most sensible thing I have seen about it yet.

  11. mark:

    Hey Curtis –

    Characterizing the ISG report as a 4GW manuver is very interesting. Not inaccurate either, though the intent is benign – to get the political class out of paralysis.

    I’m not sure if it will work – the report/commission manuver is a different bird from thirty years ago when only .002 % of the population read it. Everyone went on the NYT spin as gospel -meaning the foreign policy establishment’s spin. Now everyone actually can read it -it’s already at Barne’s & Noble as well as online! Foreign policy cannot actually be conducted under a 24/7 live feed.

    Lex,

    Thank you very much. I appreciate the compliment.