“Best Practices” of Military Command for the 21st Century

Smitten Eagle:

September 2nd, 2008 at 7:19 pm

I generally agree.
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The problem with so much networking of sensors and subordinates is that it requires a large investments in education of commanders on how to use such a network.  I am not speaking of technical education on networked operations, but rather more philosophical aspects of WHY we network forces, and determining when the networking of a force is more of a hindrance than a help, as well as limitations of network-derived knowledge, data, and intelligence.
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Another aspect of this is the nature of the current fights in Iraq and Afghanistan:  We generally work from fixed bases, with burned-in, highly reliable communications and digital connectivity.  When we shift to a more maneuver-centric fight, I wonder how many of today’s Lieutenant Colonels who will be the Generals of that future maneuver fight will expect such perfect communications and connectivity, with all of its myriad chatrooms, emails, and powerpoint-driven decision-making.  Will these future generals clam up and remain inactive when connectivity is degraded by weather, enemy action, and friction?  Will they remain inactive while network connectivity is degraded?  Will they require ever-increasing amounts of data to arrive at a decision to finally act?  Methinks the answer is ‘YES’ to all three questions, and that is disturbing.
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zen:

September 3rd, 2008 at 1:47 am

Hi SE,
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Great points! Having read Cebrowski’s early papers on NCW I always wondered how his relativelt fluid concept later became so rigid, dogmatic and narrow in application and the erosion point might have been at the command level as you just suggested. Without education in both the concept and the systems themselves, commanders end up with a pragmatic, lowest-common denominator understanding of what to do with networking. Partially empirical, partially memorization of repetitive ppt brief buzz words, networked units end up being used unimaginatively based upon what worked previously somewhere else. I think this is a pattern that can be seen in the collision of bureaucracies and technology everywhere – make the tech fit what we habitually prefer to do!
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For your second point, regarding cultivating a dependency on technological connectivity, the only answer is heavy gaming in limited information scenarios and case studies where such equipment is absent from the game or conditions presuppose their degradation ( perhaps from an enemy EMP burst) to keep adaptive thinking and problem solving at the mental forefront.

Smitten Eagle:

September 3rd, 2008 at 11:30 am

Heavy Gaming:  I agree.  Also, more games like Millennium Challenge 2002, where LtGen Van Riper played the non-networked Red Force and was rapidly defeating the networked Blue Force, until the rules were changed on him….
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Such games might reveal how an adaptive, thinking enemy were to act against our well-networked but marginally-commanded networked force.
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Here’s another point:  The network might give the impression to some commanders that they are able to directly influence the command climate through the network, thus obviating (to them, anyways) the necessity to actually visit those units.  I hate to wave around Abu Ghraib, but a part of me thinks that had leadership been a bit more active from Camp Victory, that disaster may have been averted.  This also brings to mind the "chateau generals" of WWI, who worked tens of miles behind the lines coordinating their armies with telephones, but not really leading those armies.

Seerov:

September 5th, 2008 at 1:14 am

Some of you have brought up the very important point of what happens when the networks go down or the censers stop working.  This is correct to point out, and military personal will still need to train on "the basics" in case this happens. 
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But networks or not, the most important aspect of any kind of military organization is leadership.  We need leaders who can make decisions and accomplish the mission no matter what situation they face. Instead of a network-centric military, we need a leader-centric military.
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During OIF I we had terrible intelligence and really had no idea of the real enemy situation during most of the war.  During the train up in Kuwait, we were preparing to fight a mechanized force with tanks and APCs.  While some units did face this kind of force, most engagements were against small teams of infantry and militias. 
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I thought this lack of information was just how it was at the small unit level. But after reading the book "Take-down: The 3rd Infantry Division Twenty-One Day Assault on Baghdad" I realized that no-one really knew what waited for them the next town over.  In Al Samawah, there was literally a parade planned for the unit moving there (This information came from a CIA officer that was in country weeks before the war).  When the unit got there, it found itself in one of the fiercest battles of the war.
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And this is how it was during the whole run to Baghdad.  We would receive a FRAGO on the next objective and no-one had any idea what kind of enemy we would face.  There were some units in 3rd ID that were literally minutes away from being over-run.  The Iraqis were more than willing to die and had no problem throwing waves of men and trucks at 3rd ID.  Despite what some might think, air support isn’t always available.
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While we did have the technological edge, what stuck out in the book was the decision making and leadership of the officers and NCO’s.  This was especially true of the Company Commanders, Battalion Commanders, and Senior NCOs.  Because I seen the war at such a micro-level, this book literally opened my eyes at how important leadership was for our success.  Many people have said our success was due to technology.  But these same people forget that US forces were literally out numbered at least 5 to 1 on the ground and even more important, we were fighting on the Iraqis "home turf."  Its also important to remember that we held the technological edge in Vietnam and it didn’t really matter.  
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While it may sound cliche, I just can’t emphasize enough how important it is for our military to have well trained leaders.  And this is especially true since small unit leaders will be expected to do more and more.  Today, a squad is counted on to do what a platoon did in Vietnam and what a company did in WWII.  Because of this, we need squad leaders who are as competent as company commanders were 70 years ago.  
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Major Vandergriff has probably done the most to address the quality of leadership in the Army in the last 10 years.  Most of his ideas are geared towards officers so we also need to think about NCO’s and solders.  The military needs to attract the best talent this country has, and this isn’t going to be done by paying privates $900.00 a month.  Attracting the best talent, and then giving them the best training possible is much more important than any weapon system we have.  There’s no reason why an E6 squad leader in the Army shouldn’t be making $60.000-$70,000 a year?  Right now, the military has dropped its standards and my connections on Sand Hill (Infantry Basic Training) are telling me that it shows.  
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I could go on but I think you get my point.  I’m not saying we shouldn’t go net-centric but we need a leadership-centric force first.  Remember what John Boyd said:
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"Machines don’t fight wars, people do, and they use their brains to do it."
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zen:

September 5th, 2008 at 2:20 am

Hi Seerov,
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That was a very powerful comment on your part. Very well said! 
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Regarding your overriding point of a leadership-centric force, the Germans went that route with the Reichswehr under von Seeckt in the aftermath of WWI ( after considering about four possible paradigms) as Versailles left them very few options other than developing their personnel and testing new ideas (ironically, the first blitzkrieg experiments were secret joint Reichswehr-Red Army military exercises carried out deep inside the Soviet Union). Likewise, the U.S. Army, badly starved of funds by Congress and without armor as pigheaded cavalry officers had deliberately dismantled tank units, underwent the " Ft. Benning Revolution", revamping infantry tactics under George Marshall’s watchful eye .
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Sometimes, plentiful resources and endless time does organizational quality more injury than would sharp constraints.

Seerov:

September 5th, 2008 at 6:31 am

Zen, thank you for the kind words.
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I was aware of the Germans placing a lot of emphasis on leadership, but did not know of the "Ft. Benning Revolution."  Most historians agree that the Germans were probably the best Army tactically during WWII, but fell short strategically.  Besides having some good thinkers that developed combined arms maneuver warfare, their tactical prowess was also due to them allowing small unit leaders more room for decision making.  This seems counter intuitive, as it would seem that authoritarian States would give less power to small unit leaders?  And actually, if we think about it, the Germans most likely fell short strategically and operationally becuase at this level, they were the exact opposite (The couldn’t even move a unit to Normandy before Hitler woke-up!). Despite their strategic mistakes, lack of materials, and having a smaller force, the Germans held out for a good while becuase of their small unit leaders.
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So I think we can agree that leadership must be given top priority.  As I said above, the US military is always going to be fighting on the enemies home-turf, and in most cases, will have less manpower compared to the enemy (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq).  The problem of course is that training soldiers to be effective leaders can not be done in EVERY Congressional district in America.  So when its between building the next fill-in-the-blank_______ weapon system,  or spending resources on training and recruiting talent, I think we know what going to happen. 
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This country’s political leadership had better start thinking about this.  WAR IS TOO GODDAMN SERIOUS, and if our foreign policy makers are serious about fighting the "Long War," then they better stop playing politics.   And I don’t care what "Conservatives" say,  if we need to raise taxes to do it; then DO IT!!   If they have to give tax cuts, then give them to soldiers and new recruits.  Let this money "trickle down" if that’s what they want. 

Smitten Eagle:

September 5th, 2008 at 12:44 pm

Seerov-
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I agree completely.