Recommended Reading
Why do I see a problem with any or all of these? I will hit on the basic philosophical issue first and then hit on each situation individually.
A really good, thought-provoking, post. I don’t agree with all of it as Schmedlap has purposefully staked out an extreme position on the interrelationship of democracy, citizenship and military service but he raises good arguments that challenge contemporary assumptions ( or even assumptions held by a historical military figure of such unimpeachable personal rectitude as George C. Marshall).
AFJ: Col. Joseph Collins – The way ahead in Afghanistan
….First, there will no doubt be some key players who favor continuing with the U.S. plan that is still unfolding. Given the protracted nature of such conflicts, and barring unforeseen surprises, the battlefield situation in December is not likely to be radically different than it is now. Conservatives will prefer to keep up the full-blown counterinsurgency operation for a few more years and move slowly on the transition to Afghan responsibility for security.
….A second option would be to reduce over a year (July 2011-July 2012) most of the 30,000 soldiers and Marines in the surge combat forces and make security assistance and capacity building – not the provision of combat forces – ISAF’s top priority. Remaining ISAF combat units could further integrate with fielded Afghanistan National Army units. Maximum emphasis would be placed on quality training for soldiers and policemen. To build Afghan military capacity, ISAF commanders would also emphasize the development of Afghan combat enablers, such as logistics, transportation and aviation. In this option, the focal point of allied strategy would be on the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and not on allied combat forces.
….A third option – compatible with the options noted above, either sequentially or concurrently – is for the Afghan government, with coalition and U.N. support, to move out smartly on reintegration of individuals and reconciliation with parts of or even the entire Afghan Taliban. To do this, Karzai first will have to win over the nearly 60 percent of the Afghan population that is not Pashtun. These groups – Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazarras and others – were treated poorly by the Taliban and today often live in areas outside Taliban influence. They will want peace, but not at a price that threatens their regions or allows the “new” Taliban much latitude.
SEED – Suicidal Tendencies
Are higher IQ people more prone to suicide?
Coming Anarchy: Curzon –The Changing Role of the US Secretary of State
And what role do….women play here?
Thomas P.M. Barnett – Mattis becomes Central Command boss
More on Mattis.
In Harmonium – Ethics, honour and the dangers of over-ritualization, part 1 and Ethics, honour and the dangers of over-ritualization, part 2
Newscientist.com – Google should answer some searching questions
Is Google shaping your search results to benefit Google?
RECOMMWNDED VIEWING:
Benoit Mandelbrot on the complexity of “roughness”
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Schmedlap:
July 12th, 2010 at 3:03 pm
Which one of my points puts me at odds with Marshall?
tdaxp:
July 12th, 2010 at 3:46 pm
FM’s central mistake is that he compares a welfare state to a planned economy. Indeed, IIRC in The Road to Serfdom Hayak advocated state aid to those who suffered from unforseeable calamities.
zen:
July 12th, 2010 at 4:00 pm
Hi Schmedlap,
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Ironically, the bright line between politics and the military, at least at the highest level that Marshall occupied.
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I grant you that Marshall would have vigorously agreed with what you have written and was personally a model of scrupulous nonpartisanship, but that standard of separation was impossible to execute in reality once Marshall became FDR’s then Truman’s closest military then later foreign policy adviser. Marshall essentially moved out of being merely a general or chief of staff and became a senior statesman, an architect of national policy for the POTUS. Political and military variables, even the domestic political considerations that Marshall openly despised, are deeply interwoven and Marshall had to deal with that on a daily basis as Churchill, FDR, Truman, Chiang, the US Congress and others forced those variables into the equation and, at times, also forcing Marshall to take essentially political moves in order to negotiate the formation of US policy in directions he thought to be most wise. Not voting, at that point, is irrelevant. Marshall may have been unwilling to recognize his actions then as being "political" but that too is irrelevant.
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What you are arguing for is ethically possible up to a brigade commander and maybe a theater commander but above that level it gets murky through no fault of the military personnel because national policy can’t really be compartmentalized into neat divisions between the military and political ( I’d argue that attempting to do so partly explains our inability to create coherent and effective strategies). A better standard for military statesman, and one that fits with our traditions, might be eschewing personal political ambitions when their level of authority reaches that of a Marshall, Grant, Ike, Powell, Petreaus etc. because their job inevitably involves the political in the most serious degree.
Joseph Fouche:
July 12th, 2010 at 5:24 pm
Maybe what we need are more politicians who become generals. Where did you go Benjamin F. Butler? America turns its lonely eyes to you.
Schmedlap:
July 12th, 2010 at 5:32 pm
Zen,
I need to refine what I wrote in order to make it clearer. I actually agree with what you wrote, but did not adequately address it. My issue is people who choose to hold political office and serve as military officers. Both at once is inappropriate. If they do both at different times, then it is less problematic, but how problematic is determined by the time lag and manner in which they go about it.
And then there’s the voting thing, which I have little hope of convincing many people of.
zen:
July 12th, 2010 at 10:05 pm
To address both your point and Joseph Fouche’s, it is interesting to look at the contrast with the Roman Republic.
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In the Republic military command above the level of a centurion was originally a prerogative of the Patrician class members who were senators. Military praetorship, drawn from the senators who were elected to be magistrative praetors, became a prerequisite for holding proconsular and consular offices as well as a number of other offices more obscure ( a specialist would be able to tell where command experience was a legal requirement and where it was informally needed so as to have the auctoritas to serve as a realistic candidate in Roman politics). Competition for the right of command (imperium) was keen, partly for glory and pragmatically because as Rome expanded former commanders became provincial governors and conquest and governance allowed them to amass large fortunes to fund their political careers, take care of their veterans and ensure a comfortable retirement.
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The system worked well when Rome was limited to the Italian peninsular area and had a true citizen army. Military experience was well distributed among plebian citizen and patrician elite alike and there were fewer material spoils over which to fight. More served out of patrotism and civic duty than for ambition and a far greater percentage of the male population had this common experience than in the late Republic and certainly the Empire or late Antiquity. The early Roman Republican system was a supremely effective war-making machine that did not require individuals of great genius in command to regularly steamroll over opponents most of the time.
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But as more plebians became landless and unable to afford their arms, and more allies demanded Roman citizenship ( Social Wars), the Legions became longer serving "semi-professional" forces while the Senate expanded to a size where only a small minority of senators would have a reasonable chance at command, and thus consulship, in their careers. Long-serving Legions also required more competent commanders and were more expensive to replace if defeated. This increasing scarcity of command and the enormous political and financial rewards made Roman politics, always ruthless, bitter and eventually factional and lethal with Marius and Sulla’s rivalry. Sulla’s bloodily draconian efforts to reverse this trend only delayed a reemergence of this dangerous dynamic for about a generation ( of a youthful, dandyish, Julius Caesar, old Sulla correctly discerned " He contains many Mariuses") which led to the end of the Republic and the formal start of the Empire under Augustus’ principate, which in a few generations fell into the hands of the legions themselves.
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America is trending in a different direction. The divergence between the top political and military elite in America, unlike Rome, is growing wider rather than fusing. This is already having a negative effect on strategy. What will the effect be on civilian control over the military in twenty, thirty, fifty years? It is hard to control what you do not yourself comprehend or understand. Our American extreme may end up having the same deleterious result as the opposite Roman one. We need a happy medium for long term stability.
slapout9:
July 12th, 2010 at 11:34 pm
James Galbrith on how to restore the economy by restoring the rule of law? As in put the Tali-banksters in jail(Justice) and then use modified Keyensian economics to restore long term growth.
http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/76146/tremble-banks-tremble?page=0,0
T. Greer:
July 13th, 2010 at 5:46 am
The League of Ordinary Gentleman <a href="http://www.ordinary-gentlemen.com/2010/07/a-response-to-paul-krugman/">published a reasoned critique</a> of Krugman and his article on Hayek & Keyenes. Krugman’s argument has a few inherent limitations built in, and the author does a good job of pointing these out. I recommend it to those interested in such things.
onparkstreet:
July 14th, 2010 at 7:21 am
Most of you have probably already seen this, but here’s a link to The Road to Serfdom as a comic book:
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http://americandigest.org/mt-archives/enemies_foreign_domestic/the_road_to_serfdom_in_ca.php
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Some of us need books with pictures in them, I’m afraid.
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Thanks for that link, T. Greer. Looks interesting.
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– Madhu