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Top Billing! SWJ Small Wars Journal El Centro Senior Fellow Dr. Robert Bunker Wins The Elihu Root Prize
The Elihu Root Prize is an annual award by the US Army War College for the best article (or articles) published in Parameters on the topic of Strategic Landpower. The Quarterly’s Editorial Board selects nominees from a given volume year (Spring-Winter) and evaluates them based on the degree to which they enhance the understanding of any aspect of Strategic Landpower, whether within a historical or contemporary context. Any article published on any theme related to Strategic Landpower is automatically considered, but winners will be selected based on analytical depth and rigor. The prize(s) include an award certificate and honorarium, and are presented by the Commandant of the US Army War College at an annual ceremony.
Friend of ZP blog, Robert Bunker’s prize-winning article “Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors.”
Parameters 43, no. 4 (Winter 2013-14): 57-65
Hearty congratulations to Dr. Bunker!
Infinity Journal – Jim Storr Warfare and Strategy
….The definition of warfare seems quite simple. In essence, it is ‘how it is done’. So, for example, much military history is the history of warfare; how wars have been fought. That could refer to war at: the national level; the theatre or campaign level; or the battlefield, tactical level. Much of the history of warfare looks very much at the mechanics of the tactical level: for example, studying trench warfare in the First World War; or the tactics of the Battle of Britain.
A separate aspect of warfare refers to how armed forces can, do or should operate. That is the non-historical part. In war, history is often our only guide to the future; so the history of warfare really should inform future practice. It could be said that the only real value of the study of the history of warfare is how it informs practice (other than as an interest in itself). Many people, mostly men, do find it intensely interesting. I do. However, to reiterate, the only real value of the study of the history of warfare is in how it informs practice. (I restrict myself largely to land warfare simply because that is what I know most about).
The definition of strategy seems more problematic. Let us take the three options above. They are intended to be broad and cover a range of areas. So, if you don’t agree that strategy is one of the above, please ask yourself whether it is close to one of them.
When defining strategy as (1) ‘the art of generals’, we open up a can of worms. Firstly, ‘art’ probably should mean ‘craft’. It probably doesn’t mean ‘art’ as opposed to ‘science’ so as to differentiate it from the technical aspects. It probably means ‘craft’ as in ‘what generals do’.
If one defines strategy as ‘the artistic or creative bit’ you run into problems. Do you, for example, imply that the creative aspects of a Brigadier General’s plan in, say, the Western Front in the First World War is strategy? Probably not. It’s probably better to consider ‘what generals do’ as an aspect of warfare, recognising that some aspects of warfare are intensely human and therefore involve creative and inspirational elements
James Joyner – Hagel’s Fate was Sealed Long Ago
….In both instances, the qualities that got them chosen made them poor fits. In an administration that sees foreign policy as an extension of domestic policy, simply asking “What’s in the US national security interest?” isn’t enough. In case after case, the administration chose half measures that would appease the Democratic base while minimizing criticism from Republicans on the “weakness” front. So, they announced a military surge in Afghanistan that was far less than requested by the commanding general while simultaneously announcing a premature deadline for withdrawal. They authorized military action against the Gaddafi regime in Libya, the Assad regime in Syria, and against ISIS in Iraq and Syria but without any obvious consideration of the strategic consequences.
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