The Perils of Surprise

We were not. Japan however, paid dearly for their stupendous triumph at Pearl Harbor. They reaped the whirlwind. So too did Germany. While Joseph Stalin may have been the only person in the world who was surprised when Hitler unleashed the blitzkrieg on the Soviet Union, he was the one person who mattered most. In the long run, it meant Germany’s utter ruin. Tactical surprise is a great advantage but it is hard. Converting tactical surprise into strategic success is a lot harder. While both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are enthusiastic regarding the potential of surprise, it is mostly on the tactical level and only rarely, as Clausewitz admitted, is it parlayed in the “higher provinces of strategy”. Instead we can expect, too often as he cautioned, “a sound blow in return”.

Why is this?

The reason is that humans are adaptive. If the blow by surprise is not lethal enough to finish them off or convince them to accept terms, after the initial shock and confusion subsides a thirst for revenge may come to the fore. Perhaps even at the expense of rational interests or self-preservation. They may be willing to change forever from what they were to become what can win.

Surprise is perilous.

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  1. Cheryl Rofer:

    I have been thinking about the value of surprise in relation to Vladimir Putin’s moves in Ukraine. Surprise always gives a temporary advantage, which, as you note, vanishes and even reverses quickly.
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    Something I would add to what you said is that it can’t be used twice, particularly in rapid succession. So taking Crimea was easy, the Donbas not so much.
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    And now Putin seems not to know what to do next. Others have pointed out that he’s much better at tactics than he is at strategy.

  2. Lexington Green:

    “They may be willing to change forever from what they were to become what can win.”
    Protracted wars often lead to the brutalization of the combatants.
    There is a great scene in War and Peace, where Andrei Bolkonsky, who was always a rationalistic person influenced by the Enlightenment, says the entire French Army, which destroyed his home and killed his father, should be killed to the last man, and for the Russians to take no prisoners. A vivid example of this process.

  3. zen:

    Hi Cheryl,
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    The Donbas is also something Ukraine is less able to concede as Crimea was Ukranian in about the same way Konigsberg is Russian and the Donbas is too economically important to give up. nor are the Russian-speakers there nearly as keen to join the Russian Federation.
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    I agree with you Putin’s move into Donbas was more tactical than strategic. There’;s no natural frontier or political stopping point, or exit strategy. Had Putin done a ju-jitsu move of appearing magnaminous and patching things up quickly with Kiev, or going through such motions, the Euros would have been contented with grumbling over Crimea and the Russian economy would not be getting kicked in the gut right now.

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    Hi Lex,
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    Great example. I also think about the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War and their increasing ruthlessness, hubris and cruelty, having begun the war on the diplomatic-moral high ground and with a strategy of restraint. Likewise, Sparta was transformed by victory from the preeminent power of the Greek world into a hollow shell which was rolled up and humbled permanently by Thebes a few short years later

  4. larrydunbar:

    “I also think about the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War and their increasing ruthlessness, hubris and cruelty, having begun the war on the diplomatic-moral high ground and with a strategy of restraint.” In that context, do you also think about the CIA torture report? What do you think about the ignorance-is-no-excuse coming from the Bush Whitehouse? It should give the Conservatives a few more points from their base. Probably not enough to give the Neo Conservatives more power, but still a definite weakness to the Progressives. Makes Rand Paul and his Spartan support of committing 80,000 troops to the cause inviting.

  5. T. Greer:

    In 135 BC the Han court convened a war council. The topic at hand: the Xiongnu. The chanyu wanted to the renew the existing heqin treaty. The young Han Wudi was not willing to treat the barbarian chanyu as an equal anymore.

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    The emperor’s will did not carry the day. Voices arose arguing that a war without he Xiongnu would be too long, too hard, too costly. The empire had nothing to gain from starting a conflict it could not finish.

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    The next year the court convened again. A young official named Wang Hui came forward with a plan. A merchant friend of his had relations with the Xiongnu. H eoculd lead the Xiongnu to a Han city on the pretense that its leader had been killed and its goods would be open for the looting. Han armies would lie hidden in armies near by. When the chanyu and his forces came into the valley the trap would be sprung, the armies would rush out, and the problem would be solved. It would hardly cost anything.

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    The emperor agreed to the plan. The trap was laid, and according to plan the Xiongnu and his troops appeared at the edge of the valley. They noticed something strange, however — there were no farmers tending their fields. The Xiongnu sent out scouts until they found a Han guard post. The captured soldier revealed the plan and the Xiongnu retreated back to the grassland. Wang Hui did not follow them.

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    The surprise attack of Mayi was a failure. The battle that was supposed to end the war in one fell swoop never happened. The war that was supposed to be prevented was instead started. It would end eighty years later.

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    And Wang Hui? Wudi ordered his head chopped clean off. He committed suicide before the executioner had the chance.

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    Perilous indeed.

  6. zen:

    Hi T. Greer
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    Most excellent story. The Chinese are often a pragmatic people.
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    BTW caught your OODA request, trying to answer it in a post
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    Hi Larry,
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    Yes, the CIA Report – albeit drive-by, intellectually lazy and partisan (and within the Dem side, factional) – does throw a bright spotlight on the own-goal moral debacle of having the US officially approve the use of torture. And in a (very) small way that is akin to the moral decline of the Athenians.
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    The problem here is the principle of the thing, not its efficacy. I would not be surprised if in some instances, torture or torture in combination with carrots and persuasion yielded some useful information. If we were able to get useful info *every* time the CIA tortured a captive it would not mitigate the self-inflicted damage, though it might explain the temptation better than the often crap results we really had. Basically, we threw away a longstanding global reputation of being different from the Russians, the Egyptians, the South Africans or even the French. It’s never coming back.
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    And for what? The small positive fear reaction in some unlettered tribal goof when a red-faced Army captain threatened to “send you to Guantanamo!” ? So what? By 2009 any midlevel or higher bad guy knew that was an empty bluff.
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    Stupid and malicious in a small way. If torture was the key to victory, Algeria would still be French