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Top Billing!SWJ Blog – Finding Petraeusism in Naglandia

What one SWJ editor calls “their most controversial article ever”:

….Today, we could use the term “Petraeusism” to mean “U.S military efforts conceived in disregard or ignorance of U.S. military limitations.” Likewise, we could use the name “Naglandia” to describe Afghanistan, a place where, much like Ford had attempted to do in the Amazon, the U.S. has attempted to establish a “New America,” albeit with the modern and contradictory political correctness that comes with our current obsession with “absolute tolerance” and our culturally-biased interpretation of Galula’s population-centricity in counterinsurgent activities. As if in some kind of twisted Shakespearean comedic tragedy, the U.S. military, traditionally an organization filled with political conservatives and Peace Corps-doubting Thomas’s, has turned itself into an organization that believes there is a Thomas Jefferson inside every Afghan and the solution to jump-starting an economy is to throw money at it. If only our losses could be capped in another seven years at the similar $240 million (inflation-adjusted figure) of Ford’s Amazon experiment.

Regardless of what General Petraeus’ and John Nagl’s concept for countering an insurgency actually was when they wrote the Army’s Field Manual on Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, the manifestation in the military was one that had tactics dictating strategy, gave nation-building as the only option, and forced upon us all an assumption that has since become dogma: that bad governance is at the root of all discontent, followed closely by disgruntlement at not having a job. In addition, instead of stressing supporting a government’s internal defense when they align with our objectives and a population centricity that means an understanding- and not a protection- of the people, the U.S. went the opposite direction: emphasizing our own objectives and a “for their own good” attitude towards protection of the people. This operational paradigm does not, in and of itself explain all of our failures in Afghanistan-the lack of a clear goal and plan in the beginning probably holds most of the blame for that-but in the absence of a strategy in 2009 and after the very public vindication of General Petraeus’ textbook execution of FM3-24 in Iraq, it makes sense that the military brass turned very quickly to something they like at least slightly better than no plan: a bad plan.[4]

In defense of Henry Ford, in 1922, long before the advent of synthetics, naturally grown rubber along with oil was a natural resource of critical strategic military value with a high market price due to a British-Dutch-Belgian imperialist rubber oligopoly that left US producers eking out a market share from subpar plantations in Central American banana republics. Afghanistan isn’t quite as valuable as that.

John Hagel – Cognitive Biases in Times of Uncertainty

The rise of threat based narratives

But, there’s more.  Zero sum mindsets naturally lead us to focus on threat, rather than opportunity. If there’s only a fixed set of resources and rewards, there’s limited upside. Our attention shifts to protecting what we already have, however little it might be.  In a zero sum world, we are constantly vulnerable to the efforts of others to grab our share of the pie.

Threat based narratives take root – enemies are gathering force and intent on destroying or appropriating what we have.  We need to be vigilant and band together to protect our interests.  A quick look at the political narratives dominating the discourse in the US – whether on the Right or the Left – reveals the growing prevalence of threat based narratives.  Threat based narratives lead to polarization – if you’re not with us, then you must be against us.

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