The Human Face of War, a second review
Storr asserts that successful modern commanders are most likely intuitive thinkers and possess the ability to learn from experience. He suggests further the “tendency to learn is more critical. It implies a tendency to reflect on experience and to learn from it, to maximize the benefit of the experience.” This tendency is key to the development of “skills”. He encourages a “permissive man-management regime that allows those who can learn rapidly from their experience to do so.” At the opposite end, Storr makes clear the unsuitability of many leaders who use bullying tactics and fear to motivate.
Storr concludes by observing that “institutional conservatism” inhibits armed forces from improving significantly during times of peace; that “the current size and shape of Western armies reflect issues that are not primarily related to warfighting effectiveness.” He insists that doctrine should be explicit, relevant,(descriptive and where appropriate, prescriptive), coherent, and practical. The short tours common in western armies harm team integrity—which is “huge”. Innovation is vital, and in many cases military members aren’t with a unit long enough to have the experience necessary to truly innovate. Storr advocates “experience is the best way to achieve practical coordination and overcome the fog of war, as long as the experience gained is positive.” He discourages the common use of lieutenant-colonels in jobs where a captain or major could function/thrive/learn; as these junior officers will have less experience when they are promoted and will have probably developed the habit of “referring decisions upwards, and hence develop little initiative.”
According the Storr, the “human” aspect of war should take prevalence over technology. He acknowledges the utility of technology, but asks the reader to “…pause and look for a moment at the Vietnam War, which suggests that superior technology is not always the deciding factor.” [9-11 is illustrative of this point on the “terror” side; determination and box cutters wreaked havoc.]
My review does not do justice to the wealth of information, insight, and counsel in Storr’s book and I quote him frequently because his style is better than a summary. This book was aimed at a narrow audience, hence the high price. When I began, I was concerned about Storr’ opinions concerning John Boyd’s OODA loop; but in late 2009 I rejected Boyd’s deterministic underpinnings of OODA—Storr’s pragmatic and partial empiricism makes more sense. OODA remains, in my humble opinion, a valuable and versatile methodology in both the military/law enforcement and business arenas.
This book is highly recommended; particularly for junior officers and NCO’s—the price is high, but what you will gain will be worth the cost.
UPDATE 11.17.2011: Jim Storr contacted me and confirmed the issue of a paperback for about $40.
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Kdogg:
November 17th, 2011 at 12:21 am
Paperback copy for $31 coming out in December….
J.ScottShipman:
November 17th, 2011 at 1:43 am
Hi Kdogg,
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Many thanks for the update! I’m sure Storr’s book will get a much wider audience once the price drops below $100…
Kdogg:
November 17th, 2011 at 2:09 am
yes, according to Barnes and Noble anyway….i also put in a request for a NookBook version so that could drop it even more if they do go that route
zen:
November 17th, 2011 at 4:37 am
Excellent review Scott!
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"Storr asserts that successful modern commanders are most likely intuitive thinkers and possess the ability to learn from experience. He suggests further the “tendency to learn is more critical. It implies a tendency to reflect on experience and to learn from it, to maximize the benefit of the experience.” This tendency is key to the development of “skills”. He encourages a “permissive man-management regime that allows those who can learn rapidly from their experience to do so.” At the opposite end, Storr makes clear the unsuitability of many leaders who use bullying tactics and fear to motivate. "
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The ironic thing, is aside from the snarky OODA bits, much of what Storr has written would have met with Boyd’s approval, IMHO.
seydlitz89:
November 17th, 2011 at 1:20 pm
I like the book, and think that Storr has done a bang up job in developing a general military theory for conventional warfare . . . still a few comments . . .
He simplifies Clausewitz’s approach to strategy as simply "a dialectic of aims and means" when it is much more than that. He translates Zweck into "aim" as in military aim on page 59 but then gets around to what purpose actually means only on page 76. He’s assuming that his readers have a good grasp of Clausewitzian strategic theory, but is that a valid assumption? I’m leery of this approach since I know what happened when Harry Summers did it with the remarkable trinity years back and we’re still trying to clear away the confusion from that simplified version of Clausewitz . . .
Storr’s goal is to "seek an approach to tactics that is empirical, systemic and historically based" (page 107). Fine, but how much of the current spectrum of conflict consists of conventional warfare? How many of the conflicts over the last 40 years have consisted of conventional armies slugging it out? I think we need to be ever mindful of the actual limits of what Storr is talking about.
Finally, he uses Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigms to argue and give merit to his own approach. I think this confuses what Kuhn’s concept actually refers to. Kuhn was doubtful whether the concept could be applied to social science at all since there usually is no dominate school of thought in any social science, rather a host of competing schools, so we’re not really talking about paradigms as Kuhn defines them. What would be the current paradigm in military theory? Storr tries to enlist Luttwak’s principle of paradoxical logic as the current paradigm, but it is hardly that, only a principle of strategic thought which has its uses. Storr attempts repeatedly through out the book to refute Luttwak, but only shows how in fact no paradigm in military theory exists at all. Being able to refute the principle of paradoxical logic is in itself paradoxical . . .
J.ScottShipman:
November 17th, 2011 at 3:22 pm
Hi Seydlitz,
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Agree with your comments w/respect to Kuhn.
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Hi Zen,
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Agree that Boyd would have enjoyed Storr’s book. His treatment of OODA is fairly typical, but doesn’t diminish the importance of the work.
zen:
November 17th, 2011 at 3:55 pm
Interesting comment Seydlitz – I pinged Colonel Storr to see if he wanted to join in the discussion – I think Summers was not at all focused on how his methodology might have secondary effects, given the context of the time but that was an accurate critique
Joseph Fouche:
November 17th, 2011 at 7:11 pm
He points out that “when staff numbers are reduced, the effectiveness of HQ improves.” “Reducing staff numbers would increase speed with which they could get things done.” [Amazingly, Storr quotes a work from 1998 that reports a typical Western division commander has 600 people supporting!—and that number has, I’m sure increased in 10 years.]
That presumes the primary mission of a Western division is instrumental (i.e. successfully waging war) instead of institutional (i.e. employing staff). If you assume that employing staff, interrupted by passing annoyances like combat, is the primary mission, than Western divisions are more than fulfilling their role.
J.ScottShipman:
November 17th, 2011 at 7:55 pm
Hi Joseph,
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When I read that portion of Storr’s book, I had to go back and re-read. 600 people! I believe you’re right about "employing staff" btw.