The Core has to come together on rewriting the Rule-set for handling 4th Generation warfare opponents like al Qaida and this will mean engagement with our real( Britain, Japan, Israel, Australia), putative (France, Germany) and potential( Russia, China, India) allies. The Bush administration has been great at identifying the new rules we need and rebuffing outrageously stupid demands from the implicit villain community by indentifying their conduct for what it is – hostile. Now however the next step is demonstrating the same diplomatic finesse with Europe and at the UNSC that put together a regional consensus for six power talks on North Korean nuclear weapons programs. The great redeeming value of some of the implicit villains overseas is that many of them as a result of their corruption and cynical self-interest can be bought off, rather cheaply in fact as Saddam demonstrated.

Recall the case of Admiral Darlan and Operation Torch. Let’s buy some of the decadent ones off long enough to diplomatically isolate those implicit villains who are ideologically the immovable objects in our path so we can get on with the business of winning the war the making a future worth creating.

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  1. Andrew:

    “Rule #8: Vertical scenarios are invariable followed by horizontal scenarios that generate preconditions for future shocks.”

    I find this rule fascinating. If it is our policy to create vertical shocks (system perturbations) in order to effect rule set changes horizontally, how do we manage/limit the negative effects of future shocks?
    For example, our invasion of Iraq was meant to set off shocks horizontally, and it has. The problem is that we have no means of reliable means of controlling, prediciting, or limiting the effects of resulting horzontal scenarios.
    If we are to adopt this policy of creating system perturbations (if we have not done so already) then we must have mechanisms, institutions, and policies that can be adapted to an multitude of outcomes. As it stands, with the way our government, military, and diplomatic services are structured we are not capable of dealing with the horizontal scenarios of the vertical shocks we create. Such a policy would require a new way of thinking about our federal government and its approach to foreign policy.

  2. Dave Schuler:

    I’ve posted my reactions here.

    I would like to provide an alternative status for France and Germany which you have characterized as “putative allies”. I think a more apt characterization would be &#147hostile non-belligerent”. Have they every been allies? Are we operating under the same rule-sets?

    Since your last post I’ve been working on an alternative formulation for the Core-Gap dichotomy which I’ll leak to you here. I’m calling it the “Wave Theory of Rule-Sets” Example: some signals are so strong they tend to fill the environment. Some other issues: noise, heterodyning, jamming, signal attenuation.

  3. Dave Schuler:

    I’ve posted my reactions here.

    I would like to provide an alternative status for France and Germany which you have characterized as “putative allies”. I think a more apt characterization would be &#147hostile non-belligerent”. Have they every been allies? Are we operating under the same rule-sets?

    Since your last post I’ve been working on an alternative formulation for the Core-Gap dichotomy which I’ll leak to you here. I’m calling it the “Wave Theory of Rule-Sets” Example: some signals are so strong they tend to fill the environment. Some other issues: noise, heterodyning, jamming, signal attenuation.

  4. Anonymous:

    Dave

    I attempted to answer the first part of your question in a new post. On the second I strongly encourage you to develop the ” Wave ” critique of PNM – sounds good because I – and so far just me – see a lot of parallels between physics and PNM as descriptors of how the world works

  5. Dave Schuler:

    I realize it’s not common to think of Imperial Russia as an economic power but Tsarist RussiaNot for me. Before the Revolution Russia was the breadbasket of Europe. Just as pre-Saddam Iraq was the rice producer of the Middle East.

  6. mark:

    Andrew wrote;
    “If we are to adopt this policy of creating system perturbations (if we have not done so already) then we must have mechanisms, institutions, and policies that can be adapted to an multitude of outcomes. As it stands, with the way our government, military, and diplomatic services are structured we are not capable of dealing with the horizontal scenarios of the vertical shocks we create. Such a policy would require a new way of thinking about our federal government and its approach to foreign policy.”

    Check out the CSIS homepage, they have an audio up on the embryonic start of the USG restructuring toward a ” system administration” force with an office of post-conflict/failed state planning

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