The caveat is that this relationship with the enemy is a dynamic feedback loop – we are evolving as well to match their responses. In order to control the process instead of being controlled by it it is crucial that fluid creativity in operations and policy, not systematization – and the military loves systematic procedures, doctrines and predictable outcomes – be our primary governing principle.
Rule #11: Our individual plays unfold with utmost speed, but in ignoring any “game clock“
We remember that our strength is our inevitability. America’s strategic tempo in this global war on terrorism must be deliberate, not rash. We need to line up allies before we strike, not be forced to bribe them afterwards. We want to make clear every time we act, what rule sets we are upholding or proposing. In sum, it is a “rash” U.S. military establishment the advanced world fears most: reckless, trigger-happy, and prone to unilateralism. An inevitable military Leviathan, on the other hand, is what the global system needs most: decisive in its power projection, precise in its targeted effects, and thorough in its multilateralism. So while we will strike with amazing speed, and coordinate our operations with eye toward rapidly dominating any enemy we take on, our strategic choices must be made with great care. Living in an interconnected world, America must understand that almost any time it intervenes militarily overseas, it sets off a series of horizontal scenarios both good and bad. The rest of the Core will invariably have to live with all those resulting scenarios, so they cannot just be forewarned, these countries must be consulted, enlisted, and convinced to the best of our abilities, and that takes effort up front. So tactical and operational speed are doubleplusgood because they save our soldier’s lives¸ but strategic speed is fundamentally bad because of its negative effect on the global security rule sets we seek to enhance with every intervention we undertake.
The Bush administration should read this section of the Deleted Scene as some valid criticism. Desiring to “lock in” a forward posture on the WOT so that another administration – perhaps of a liberal, New England Democrat – cannot undo the general direction of policy, merely slow the tempo, the Bush people have hurriedly missed a great number of diplomatic opportunities. I’m not talking the hopeless cases on Iraq like France and Germany but India, the Turks, Russia and China who have been alienated in part by clumsy gaffes or brusque treatment. Or by neglecting to push general WOT moral positions, like proposing a strong Anti-Terror Convention.
It’s fine to punish your enemies – the Bush administration has that down pat – but you also need to reward your friends. “Friends” means allies like Australia, Italy, Poland and most of all Britain – not simply our creatures like Allawi and the devious Chalabi brothers. We need more carrots. Not compromises on important points of strategy but carrots given freely, not grudgingly and tardily. We need to sell the positives not just duty and obligation in defending Western Civilization – because to be frank, most of our allies decided to get out of the defense business in terms of power projection. We need to cherish the few who remain useful.
It is better to be feared than loved but take care not to make yourself hated.
Rule #12: Our efforts to dissipate horizontal scenarios will invariably trigger unintended consequences that take on a life of their own.
In the Y2K scenarios, we called this the “Iatrogenic Zone.” Iatrogenic refers to “unexpected side-effects that result from treatment by a physician.” People who own computers know this one instinctively, whether they realize it or not. Iatrogenic is when you try to download this nice little program from the web to fix this itsy-bitsy problem on your computer, and three hours later you are looking at a complete wipe of your hard drive for your troubles. America’s occupation of post-Saddam Iraq places the global war on terrorism in the Iatrogenic Zone. The USA Patriot Act, in many critics’ minds, places the Justice Department squarely in the Iatrogenic Zone, where they fear the new powers to fight terrorism will represent a cure worse than the disease. But again, while I cite this rule I see no need to slavishly submit to its logic. All “slippery slope” arguments end up pushing you toward inaction versus action, defense versus offense, and disparate tactics instead of real strategy, so you do not want to go too far with this one
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