The first possibility is that the Islamists will consolidate into a more unified, coherent, disciplined movement as I suggested above and become a less decentralized foe in hopes of seeking recognized leadership as defenders of the Ummah. Zaqawri’s recent ” pledge of allegience” to Osama bin Laden may be evidence of this trend taking place. If this is the case their political legitimacy in Muslim eyes will come to depend less on their ideological militancy and spectacular gestures of resistance to America through Terror and more on their military competence to rack up some credible, lasting victories.

The second possibility is fratricidal infighting as radical factions engage in cut-throat, sectarian battles for power, prestige and leadership of the Islamist movement. This will lower the effectiveness of Islamists in carrying out high-magnitude terror operations against the United States on the level of 9/11 by diverting resources. But it will also spur them through competition to attempt more, lower-level, horrifying assaults like we saw in Beslan to garner attention for themselves and their groups. We can also expect that an ” entropic ” outcome is bad for Muslim Gap states that already teeter on Failed State status as competing Islamist groups migrate to places of weak authority in order to conduct their internecine struggles. We could easily see the replay of 1980’s Lebanon and 1990’s Somalia in Iraq and Pakistan under such a scenario.

This is why connecting the Arab-Islamic world Gap states is of overriding importance. Connectivity reduces room for the enemy to manuver under either scenario, mitigates some causes of discontent and gives room to non-Islamist civil society to provide alternatives to both Islamism and status quo authoritarian regimes.

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