

The Eagle and the Bear
First World Armies in Fourth World Insurgencies

The Soviet Union

We have lost the fight for the Afghan people.

Marshal Akhromeev, Chief of the
General Staff, Soviet Armed Forces

November 1986, seven years into the
Soviet ground war in Afghanistan

Governing question: To whom do the people of the country devote their primary allegiance?

- I. Soviet Grand Strategy 1979-1989
 - i. National Strategic Endstate
 1. Unclear
 - a. Access to warm-water port?
 - b. Set Communist anchor in Central Asia?
 - c. Retaliation for Heart uprising?
 - d. Support proletariat brothers in need?
 - e. Stand up to Americans?
 - i. Insurgent forces
 - ii. Brzezinski claims to have sucked Soviets into their own Vietnam by arming mujahedin
 - ii. Backdrop and world situation
 1. Iranian Revolution
 - a. American hostages
 2. Brezhnev Doctrine

- a. Must assist Communist brothers in need

3. Carter Doctrine

- a. Carter extremely weak
- b. Direct response to Soviet invasion
- c. Fight Soviet dominance in central Asia
- d. Protect Middle Eastern oil

- i. 1973-74 Oil shock and OPEC cartel stranglehold

4. Cold War in full swing

Brezhnev to Carter December 1979:

“You accuse us of not consulting with the U.S. government on Afghan issues; did you consult us prior to initiating a massive concentration of naval forces in the waters near Iran, as well as in many other cases?

(Invasion) is exclusively the business of USSR and Afghanistan.”

5. Olympic Games boycott

iii. Fundamental dissonance of situation [Soviet vs. mujahedin]

1. The ultimate first-world command industrial economy vs. fourth-world hand-to-mouth peasants
2. Dominant world player vs. tiny geopolitical pawn.
3. State-run economy vs. freewheeling bazaar
4. Atheist Communists vs. devout Muslims
5. Rigid oligarchy vs. tribal free-for-all
6. Complete faith in state vs. complete faith in tribe
7. Soldiers in hated remote deployment vs. soldiers willing die for love of cause and people
8. Slavs vs. Arab/Persian tribes

9. Men who fight for pay vs. men who fight for pride
10. Highly trained soldiers vs. illiterate, violent, fearsome warrior tribes
11. Sophisticated equipment vs. WWI-era rifles
12. Highly technical modern army vs. barefoot warrior clans
13. Power flows from top of society vs. power flows from bottom

b. Soviet leaders

- i. Heavily influenced by intelligence and black operations backgrounds
- ii. Brezhnev
 1. Unilateral decision to invade
 - a. Dacha memo December 1979
 2. Ailing
 3. Mentally unstable
- iii. Andropov
- iv. Chernenko
- v. Gorbachev
 1. Appalled at expense of Afghan war
 2. Appalled at loss of life
 3. Demands endgame
 4. Demands to know why Soviets have been involved so long with so little to show

c. Geostrategy

- i. Proxy war?
 1. Soviets vis a vis Pakistan
 2. Soviets vis a vis United States

3. Soviet preeminence Communist world

- a. Cuba
- b. Vietnam
- c. Angola

II. Soviet Strategy

- a. Seven years into the war, Gromyko insists that Soviets must come up with a strategy
- b. KGB
 - i. Backgrounds of Premiers
 - ii. Backbone of Soviet state control
 - iii. A country in which people do not have a voice
 - iv. A country in which problems can be made to go away
 - v. A KHAD-style organization resonates with these men
- c. Afghanistan: the only Muslim client state
 - i. Muslims vs Communists: no love lost
 - ii. Propping up thugs, murderers and dictators
 - 1. Tarzi
 - 2. Amin
 - 3. Najibullah
- d. Proletariats of the world, unite!
 - i. The resonance of east vs West
 - 1. Afghans telling patron state what they want to hear
 - 2. March 1979 Taraki to Kosygin

3. "In our country as in yours (USSR), the power belongs to the working class and the peasants, who tore it from the hands of aristocracy and feudal lords..."
4. "USA understands that...Afghanistan is finally lost for the West"
5. "We will never be as close with anyone as with you."

e. The Enemy

- i. Honor, revenge and hospitality
- ii. Pashtunwali
- iii. Tribe bonds supersede borders drawn by Westerners
- iv. The rise of Osama Bin Laden
 1. Millionaire: eliminates funding problem
 2. The cave-dwelling Muslim authentic
 3. Soviet invasion allows him first entry to world stage
 4. Begins leadership of Muslim brotherhood of fighters
 5. Warrior clans and tribes drawn to him
 6. Every brutal step of the Soviet Union built resonance for his message

III. Soviet Operations

a. *Phase I* *Scorpions in a Jar*

- i. Year of 1979
- ii. Arm the Afghans, let them fight it out
- iii. Give them "Some piece of equipment...that would solve all problems"
Waghelstein
 1. March 1979: Taraki:

- a. "We would like to receive armored helicopters, armored personnel carriers and combat vehicles, as well as modern communications means..."
- iv. 1979: Soviets initially tried simply arming and training an Afghan force, to include training 400 Afghan officers inside the USSR.
 - 1. This failed
 - 2. Afghan pilots training in Soviet Union
 - a. Beginning late 1970s
 - b. 16 jet pilots
 - c. 13 helicopter pilots
 - d. Soviets offered to *accelerate* their training
 - i. Precisely wrong idea

b. *Phase II* *Elephant among the Mice*

- i. Soviets enter the country
 - 1. Christmas day 1979: a Tuesday in Washington
 - a. This day means nothing to Communists or Muslims
 - b. But...it does mean that American government is shut down
 - 2. Soviet:
 - a. Infantry
 - b. Mechanized forces
 - c. Aviation forces
 - d. Rockets and artillery
 - e. Logistics
 - f. Communications

3. Do what worked in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary
 - a. Work from heavily-defended operating bases
 - b. Dominate the savages with attack helicopters
 - c. Execute reign of terror
 - i. Killing civilians
 - d. Dominate the landscape
- c. *Phase III Avoiding the Stinger*
 1. Americans, through ISI in Pakistan, begins arming the resistance
 - a. Up to 200,000 fighters from all over Muslim world flock to the fight
 - b. Young firebrand named Osama bin Laden is among them
 2. Stinger missile changes the war
 - a. "I wait for skinny helicopter to go past. Then I shoot fat helicopter."
 - b. Hind is now useless: must stay above 13,000 feet (second-gen SAM range)
 - c. Soviets now lead with infantry and attack helicopters stay overhead or even follow
 - d. This negates the Soviet combined-arms advantage
- d. *Phase IV 1985-1987 Dead, but Too Dumb to Lie Down*
 - i. Gorbachev comes to power (1985 CPSU)
 - ii. Appalled at waste of money, troops and time
 - iii. Remarkable Politburo memo of 13 November 1986.

Akhromeev :

Afghan Army has 160,000 people; the (police) have 135,000.

There is not one piece of land unoccupied by the Soviet soldier.

Nonetheless, the majority of territory remains in insurgent hands.

Military results are not being reinforced with political ones.

We control Kabul and the provincial centers, but on the captured territory we cannot establish power.

We have lost the fight for the Afghan people.

1. Gorbachev:

- a. "We have now been fighting for six years...without changing approaches, we will be fighting there for twenty to thirty more years...we haven't found the keys to solving this problem"
- b. "We must tell our military that they have learned poorly in this war."
- c. I want everyone out: 50% next year, the rest the following year.

2. Gromyko:

- a. "Social conditions in Afghanistan made it impossible to solve the problem..as many draftees join the Afghan army as there are deserters."
- b. "The military path of the past six years has not produced a solution."

3. Shevardnadze:

- a. ***"We are now harvesting the fruit of badly thought-out prior decisions."***

4. Gromyko:

- a. We must pose a strategic goal....

e. *Phase V* *1987-1989* *Phase I in Reverse*

- i. Withdraw brutal but competent Soviet troops
- ii. No Soviets left behind to advise, train or fight

- iii. Prop up the Afghans with equipment
 - 1. 24 jets: MiG and SU
 - 2. 8 MLRS
 - 3. 25 missile launchers with 600 missiles
 - 4. Bombs, rockets, missiles
 - 5. 122mm howitzers and rounds
 - 6. Tanks
 - 7. Flamethrowers
 - 8. Napalm, fougasse and FAE weapons
 - 9. Training for tank crews
 - 10. Salary for the defenders of Jelalabad
- iv. Focus on the cities and arteries
 - 1. Kabul
 - 2. Jelalabad
 - 3. Khost
 - 4. Kandahar
 - 5. Bagram airfield
 - 6. Khairaton-Kabul road
- v. *Redraw* the 2380 kilometer Afghanistan-USSR border to “make more precise.”
- vi. Convince selves that Najibullah government can handle the country
 - 1. “Republic of Afghanistan has everything necessary for (fighting) counter-revolution.”
 - 2. “Military-political leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan is stably controlling the situation in the country.”

- vii. Ignore Najibullah pleading for stay-behind Soviet trainers and officers
- viii. Convince Najibullah government that USSR stands ready to assist with “all-encompassing support of Afghan friends” when things get tough.
- ix. Recommend Najibullah declare martial law
- x. Get Afghans ready for incursions from Pakistan side
- xi. Assist in border control... from Soviet side of border
- xii. Recommend that Afghans “seize initiative against armed opposition.”
- xiii. Invite in UN
 - 1. Japanese to fund relief efforts
 - 2. Javier Perez de Cuellar (Secretary General) agrees
- xiv. Establish “air bridge” of supplies into Kabul, beginning March 1989
 - 1. Weapons
 - 2. Rounds
 - 3. Flour
- xv. Establish Afghan forces
 - 1. Top forces: “Ministry of State security”
 - a. Roughly ~ 20,000
 - b. Afghan version of KGB
 - c. Formerly KHAD
 - d. Loyalty most important
 - e. Competence next in importance
 - f. Best-armed force in country
 - g. Best-trained force in country
 - h. Spetsnaz template...but without the talent base

- i. Not a palace guard, but very similar to regimes worldwide with best forces used as leader's hip-pocket weapon
 - i. ARVN armies like this
 - ii. African leaders same
 - iii. Soviets same
- j. Provide for strike and terror capability
- k. Give a veneer of competence to an overall incompetent force.

2. Next down the list: Defense Ministry

- a. Much larger force
- b. Quantity over quality
- c. Afghan Army
- d. Moderate training
- e. Moderate equipment

3. Last on list: Ministry of Internal Affairs

- a. Police forces
- b. Least-trained
- c. Least-equipped
- d. And...closest to the people
- e. Recipe for failure

f. Weaponry

i. Aviation

1. The critical point: airplanes are worthless without competent pilots
2. Airplanes also worthless without competent maintenance.

3. Soviet Sukhoi (Su) fighter-bombers and Mikoyan-i-Gurevich (MiG) fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft are notoriously unstable and difficult to fly
 - a. For example, helicopter rotors turn opposite those on Western helicopters. This means all control inputs are reversed for those trained on Western aircraft.
 - b. Instrumentation all in Cyrillic
 - c. Manuals in Russian
 - d. Even American jet and helicopter pilots have trouble with these aircraft when first learning them.
 - e. A good pilot will always win over a good plane.
 - f. Bare competence in complicated military aircraft requires several years of intense training, and a very bare minimum of 20 hours per month in the air.
 - g. These aircraft were therefore worthless.
4. Task Force 58 destroyed all these aircraft on the ground in November 2001.
 - a. They hadn't been moved in months, perhaps years.
 - b. Even if aircraft had been operable, deep strike aircraft cratered the runways first.
 - c. Waghstein: "Just give us this piece of equipment...."
5. Fixed-wing attack
 - a. SU-
 - b. MiG
6. Rotary-wing attack
 - a. Hind
 - b. Soviet pilots

- c. Afghan pilots
 - i. Literacy
 - ii. Numeracy

IV. Soviet Tactics

- a. Leveling villages is easy
- b. Dropping bombs is easy
- c. Killing men who are armed with World War I Lee-Enfield rifles is easy
- d. Killing civilians is easy
- e. Winning over a population is hard
 - i. Tax
 - 1. Agency that can collect tax controls country
 - ii. Control of cities does not equal control of country
 - 1. 1986: estimate 5 million of 18 million Afghans under government control
 - 2. Now: estimate Karzai controls 30% of the country
- f. Controlling an insurgency is hard
 - i. Melts into caves
 - ii. Coalesces and then disbands, mission by mission
 - iii. Narrative resonates with natives
- g. The Stinger
 - i. Changed entire war
 - 1. Began Soviet obsession with attack helicopters' flying only where ground troops have been
 - 2. Led to (later) defeat in Grozny:

- a. Passive and timid attack helicopter tactics lead to tactical defeat.
 - b. Tactical defeat reflected upward to operational confusion.
 - c. With no strategy beyond military crushing of rebellious republic, operational confusion led to geostrategic humiliation
- ii. Stinger suddenly cancelled out Soviet combined-arms advantage
 - iii. Changed course of history

The United States and NATO

Governing question: To whom do the people of the country devote their primary allegiance?

V. American Grand Strategy 2001-2010

a. Backdrop and world situation

i. Afghanistan has seven current challenges

1. Powerful and growing insurgency
2. Weak and corrupt *central* government
3. Complete lack of competent *local* civil institutions
 - a. Provinces are gifts to powerful men
 - b. These men often from other parts of country
 - c. Provinces are carved out as gift for loyalty
 - d. This is precisely what South Vietnamese mandarin class did for their loyal generals and supporters
 - e. Afghans no loyalty to province or town
4. Complete lack of tradition of state governance
 - a. Karzai is only latest in string of incompetent symbols
5. Very slow pace of Western-led reconstruction
6. Powerful drug trade
7. Disjointed international aid and military effort

b. 9/11

i. Initial U.S. invasion driven by retaliation

- ii. Military lashing out into Muslim hold lands
 - 1. Hard power response to soft power question
 - 2. Precisely what Bin Laden wanted us to do
 - 3. Delivered our lines clearly in Bin Laden's narrative

c. National Strategic Endstate

"The core goal in Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan."

December 2009

President Obama, Generals Eikenberry (retired) and McChrystal

- i. This endstate is unrealistic
- ii. Metrics will be difficult or impossible to define or monitor
- iii. Blurring and double-counting of four distinct, overlapping opponents
 - 1. The Taliban
 - 2. Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan
 - 3. Al Qaeda transnational forces, as a transnational clearinghouse for terror
 - a. Global jihad
 - b. Resonance in Muslim world
 - i. 1980: "Come join the fight"
 - 1. Soviets out in the open to shoot at
 - ii. 2010: "Come join the fight"
 - 1. Americans out in the open to shoot at
 - 4. Global terror networks

- a. Global jihadists all use terror
 - b. Global terrorists are not all part of jihad
 - c. Terror is what the jihad *does*, but not what it *is*
 - d. American targets are the easiest and most lucrative
- iv. A terror group wants to *destroy*
- 1. September 11, 2001
 - 2. Ku Klux Klan
 - 3. Red Brigade
 - 4. Aum Shinrikyo
- v. An insurgency wants to *rule*
- 1. Lumumba/Taylor/Amin
 - 2. Viet Cong
 - 3. Huk
 - 4. Castro
 - 5. Khmer Rouge
 - 6. FARC
- vi. A revolutionary force wants to *govern*
- 1. Irish Republican Army
 - 2. George Washington
 - 3. Nelson Mandela

VI. American Strategy

- a. Americans tend to think that a war started when they arrived.
 - i. The “Vietnam War” did not start in 1965...it started in 1945.
 - ii. Afghans have been fighting for millennia, and steadily since 1800

iii. Nonetheless, the United States government has a two-year strategy

NATO Strategy

ISAF website, February 2010

“ISAF, in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.

U.S. Government Strategy

Over the next year the USG in Afghanistan is committed to visible, measurable progress that demonstrates to the Afghan people that they can rely on positive momentum towards stability, increasing protection from the insurgency, and a more accountable and capable government.

Generals Eikenberry and McChrystal, June 2009:
*Integrated Civ/Mil Campaign Plan for Support to
Afghanistan (Draft)*

“The following represent the combined USG objectives for 2009-2010:

International security forces and Afghan security partnership reverses security trends (especially in Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, Paktya and Wardak) expanding GIRoA presence at subnational level.

Government reconciliation and communications efforts begin to reduce insurgent capability to influence the people.

Elections are credible, secure, and inclusive. National and sub-national government is increasingly viewed as legitimate, accountable, and effective.

GIRoA works with Afghan local leadership to facilitate access to justice, restricting insurgency efforts to offer illegitimate substitute systems.

Expansion of agricultural and local market access capacity increases economic opportunity and employment and, with improved infrastructure, leverages emerging regional trade corridors to broaden access to regional markets.

GIRoA and international security forces action against the nexus between narco-traffickers, criminals, insurgents, and corrupt government officials, results in improved perception of governance and security.”

- b. This war is unique
 - i. This is unlike any previous insurgency, in that *the insurgent force is itself the out- of-power government*
 - 1. Every brutal step of the NATO and American forces builds resonance for Bin Laden’s message
 - 2. This force combines terror, insurgency, revolution and crusade

VII. American Operations

“*The people may not be the prize*” Kilcullen

- a. Conventional forces
- b. Conventional forces minimally trained as unconventional
 - i. Marine Corps: MEF regional foci
 - 1. Combined Action Platoon (Vietnam) tradition resonates
 - 2. Living in villages
 - ii. Army: Rangers and leg infantry
 - 1. Living in FOBs behind wire
- c. Unconventional forces
 - i. Special Forces operators

VIII. American Tactics

Afghanistan: The Battlefield

- IX. Afghanistan cannot be separated (in a global perspective) from
- i. Pakistan
 - ii. India
 - 1. Animosity toward India is Pakistan's national identity
 - 2. NATO brought in Indian troops for ISAF, which thereby guaranteed hatred of Pakistanis
 - iii. Kashmir
 - iv. Afghans loathe the British, and in particular in Helmand Province (ie Kandahar)
 - 1. Blame British for all their problems
 - 2. NATO nonetheless put British troops into Helmand, guaranteeing the people would be infuriated
 - v. Afghanistan is a failed state
 - 1. "Top 10" *Foreign Policy* 2009 failed state listing
 - a. Pakistan in top ten as well
 - 2. A state needs five basics
 - a. *Arable land*
 - i. Extractive economies succeed only with intense oversight
 - 1. Oil and gas
 - a. Water tables
 - b. Overexpansion
 - 2. Agriculture

- a. Sharecropping exhausts the land
- b. Crop rotation critical
 - i. Dust Bowl lessons

3. Minerals

- a. Theft and corruption
- b. Cash breeds violence

b. *Defined border*

- i. Beyond which it conducts affairs of state
- ii. Within which it has a monopoly on lethal force

- 1. Estimates: worldwide only 3% of nearly 550,000,000 small arms and weapons are in hands of militaries or police forces.

c. *Educated populace*

- i. To run the country

d. *Internal route to trade*

- i. To get goods onto national markets

e. *Access to (or possession of) a warm water port*

- i. To get goods onto world markets

3. Of these, Iraq is 5 for 5

- a. Oil, and infrastructure to crack and refine it
- b. Farms
- c. Educated (now returning from exile) population with backgrounds in engineering and mathematics
- d. Direct route for oil to get to world markets overland and by sea
- e. Routes to trade in every direction

4. Afghanistan is 0 for 5

- a. Illiterate and innumerate population
 - i. No tradition of central government
- b. Harsh, dry, rocky, hot or cold land
- c. Landlocked country, hostile neighbors, one road out
- d. Shifting, remote, austere and ignored borders
- e. Only cash crop is illegal on world markets

vi. Leadership

1. Taraki

- a. Invited Soviets in
- b. Telling Soviets what they want to hear
 - i. We are all proletariat brothers in struggle....
- c. Ruled until September 1979
- d. "Homicidal maniac"

2. Amin

- a. Murders Taraki September 1979
- b. Uncompromising, devout, rigid
- c. "Even more dangerous lunatic than Taraki. Managed to combine the most vicious aspects of totalitarian Stalinism, and Pol Pot's demented social engineering with Afghan ferocity."
- d. Unspeakable cruelties...burying opponents alive, burning, castration, impaling, electrocution
- e. Begins "radical modernization and bloody Sovietization of the country."

3. Karzai

- a. Corrupt
- b. Incompetent
- c. Drug trade
 - i. Brother
 - ii. U.S. cannot fight simultaneous narcotics war and military campaign
- d. Telling Americans what they want to hear
 - i. We are all democrat brothers in struggle...
 - ii. Martha Crenshaw theory: the local leader claims “I am your only hope...”

vii. Indicators of failure

- 1. Who owns the night?
 - a. Of whom are villagers more afraid?
- 2. Who collects taxes?
 - a. That is who controls the country
 - b. Weaker the state, easier the work of insurgency
 - c. Estimates: Current central government controls at most 30% of country
 - i. This percentage has not changed in decades
- 3. People do not stand in line to vote the status quo
- 4. Imposing democracy on Afghanistan is same as imposing burqas and tribal sheiks onto America.
 - a. Equally absurd
 - b. Equally doomed to failure

viii. The Afghan Insurgent

- 1. Dr./Colonel John Waghelstein:

- a. "Hardware and weapons are counterproductive in insurgency wars."
- b. Hearts and minds are the key terrain
- c. Hold off on high-performance aircraft and artillery; keep hardware to a minimum
- d. You have to "walk to work" to win an insurgency
 - i. El Salvador (ESAF)
 - ii. Philippines (Huk)
 - iii. Malaya
 - iv. Even barefoot Montagnard/Hmong tribes could win in this sort of fight.

2. *Avoid parallel wars*

- a. The real question: are you fighting the same war as your enemy is?
- b. You can't win an insurgency in another country, but you can lose it.
- c. Winning hard to define
- d. Losing easy to define.
- e. If you are fighting a conventional, force-on-force battle, you will win that battle.
- f. If your enemy is fighting an insurgency at the same time, he will win that insurgency.
- g. The key is to fight the same battle your opponent is fighting.
 - i. Same objectives
 - ii. Same timeline

1. If your timeline is two years, or ten years, your opponent will wait you out.
3. Endstate at opposite sides of same issue
4. Small forces *cannot* win conventional fights...so they don't fight them.
5. Large forces *can* help local forces win insurgencies...but only if they *do* go out and fight them.
 - a. A large force cannot win its own insurgency
 - b. All it can do is win through a proxy
6. Mao: blow like a soft wind into a village
7. Lawrence of Arabia: drift like a gas among the people

Al Qaeda and the Taliban

In a small war, a major power loses by not winning.

In a small war, a guerrilla force wins by not losing.

X. Al Qaeda

“The enemy gets a vote.”

General James Mattis

Al Qaeda operating assumption:

The world is controlled by unbelievers who want to destroy Islam.

a. Grand Strategy / Total Strategy

1. Quite pragmatic
2. *Their real fight is against – and for - other Muslims*
 - a. Al Qaeda has killed roughly 100 Muslims for every Westerner
3. Osama bin Laden is the “emir of jihad”
4. Mullah Omar is the caliph
 - a. Osama bin Laden has in fact sworn fealty to Mullah Omar

b. National Strategic Endstate:

Reestablish Khorasan, the great Muslim state

Three crisp, clear steps to this endstate:

- a. Restore Islamic territory
 - i. Any territory ever inhabited by Muslims must again be Muslim.

ii. Afghanistan was – and is again to be - the caliphate

1. A force has moral, mental and physical centers of gravity and strength
2. Afghanistan is the moral, mental and physical center of everything AQ is
3. Historic Khorasan was an actual place, centered in modern Iran (ie Persia) and spreading across what is now Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
 - a. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a “Twelver,” and he truly believes that the Imam (who has been in hiding in a cave since the Twelfth Century) will reappear and unleash the final judgment upon the world.
 - b. This makes Iran’s nuclear ambitions far more serious: Ahmadinejad is unafraid to die, and he truly believes in the end times.
4. Al Qaeda believes Khorasan must be restored.
5. It does not matter when this happens: the struggle is as important as the result.
6. Like Mao, AQ works on vast and patient timelines.

iii. *Infidels must be out of Muslim lands*

1. Prioritize enemies
2. *United States is always first target*
 - a. Local or even state rulers are irrelevant

- b. U.S. is the “greater unbeliever”
 - 3. *All* others are enemies
 - a. Jews
 - b. Americans
 - c. Westerners
 - d. Any democracy
 - e. Any Muslim land insufficiently holy
 - b. Restore the *caliph* (the *successor* to Mohammed)
 - i. Must be a descendant of Mohammed
 - ii. This is a ***global*** jihad
 - 1. All Muslims have this duty
 - 2. All Muslims (the *umma*: community) must fight
 - c. Restore Islamic holy law (tawhid)
 - i. Make word of God the highest word
 - ii. All law is made by God
 - 1. Therefore any secular law is inherently unholy
 - 2. Therefore any body which makes a law is trying to replace God
 - 3. If you are trying to replace God, you are trying to *be* a god.
 - 4. Therefore that body must be destroyed
 - 5. Concept of separation church/state completely alien

ii. Strategy

1. We will establish alliances of convenience

a. Abandon them at will

2. We will fight the global jihad

a. Economics

i. Taliban

1. Estimates are ~ \$80 to \$400 million per year operating budget.

2. Taliban spends in a year roughly what NATO spends in a day

ii. Taliban: at outside, \$400,000,000

iii. U.S. : \$2,000,000,000,000 and climbing swiftly

iv. Who wins that campaign?

b. Military campaigning

c. Use safe havens

d. Recruiting via Internet

i. Resonates worldwide to young men

3. We will unite all Muslims in a holy umma

4. We will restore the caliphate

a. Want to kill, and to rule, and to govern

i. Unique enemy

ii. Combines worst of terror, insurgency, revolution, religious crusade and government in exile

iii. Operations

1. Safe haven is critical to a hit-and-run fighter

- a. Allows him to move light and fast
- b. Resupply comes in safe area
- c. Viet Cong and NVA had Laos and Cambodia
- d. Taliban and Al Qaeda have FATA, Pakistan and Stans
- e. The average American soldier and Marine carries up to 100 pounds on his back.
 - i. Fights in strange land
- f. The average Taliban/AQ fighter carries a rifle, ammunition and small rations.
 - i. Fights on his homeland, or at least in area like his

iv. Tactics

1. Maoist ideas and tactics

- a. Deception
- b. Surprise
- c. Guerrilla war
 - i. Start it slowly
 - 1. Three to five years to build to full war
 - 2. After 9/11, they took a two-year strategic pause
 - a. Wanted to watch U.S. reaction
 - b. Expected a few missiles (a la Sudan) and nothing else
 - c. Very surprised by U.S. invasion
 - d. Watched us quietly
- d. Irregular war
 - i. Any male over thirteen is a combatant

- ii. All AQ fighters use an alias
 - 1. Viet Cong did this, and renamed units continually to keep U.S. intelligence off balance.
- v. Tribal bonds supersede borders drawn by Westerners
 - 1. The Durand Line
 - a. Misdrawn (Pakistan)
 - b. Doesn't exist at all (Afghanistan)
 - c. Scholars of the area don't even use this phrase
 - 2. Honor, revenge and hospitality
 - a. "I took revenge after 100 years... and I took it too soon."
 - b. Pashtunwali
 - c. Me against my brother
 - d. My brother and I against my cousin
 - e. My brother, my cousin and I against you
 - f. 1965: "The one they have in common is that they are all Vietnamese."
 - g. 2010: Afghans identify themselves by (in order)
 - i. Tribe
 - ii. Region
 - 1. Never as Afghan
 - 2. No tradition of central government
 - h. Soviets and Americans, however, lump/ed them together and identify them as Afghans, under a central government through whom we will work

vi. The global dominance of Osama Bin Laden

1. Millionaire: eliminates funding problem
2. The cave-dwelling Muslim authentic
3. American invasion allows him to stay on world stage
 - a. Most recruiting is done online
4. Builds and strengthens his leadership of Muslim brotherhood of fighters
5. Warrior clans and tribes continue to be drawn to him
6. Every brutal step of the Western forces builds resonance for his message
 - a. It doesn't matter if killing of civilians was intentional, or if it even happened
 - b. The people believe it happened, because it fits a narrative they understand
 - c. Illiterate people communicate by word of mouth
 - i. Heuristics replace – and supersede -fact
 - ii. Highly susceptible to strong oration
 1. Particularly from a prominent leader in their religion or their tribe

c. Local government

- i. When colonial masters are overthrown, those natives with an aura of competence take charge
 1. The poorer the country, the less competent those people actually are
 2. Often, those who can read are a level above an illiterate peasantry, and are thus immediately put in charge
 - a. They may be simple people: clerks, for example

3. Example: this is why Khmer Rouge and similar totalitarians executed anyone who wore glasses.
 - a. That person wears glasses
 - b. Glasses represent learning
 - c. Learning represents someone who may take charge of forces against us
 - d. We must pull out resistance by the roots: execute those with – or who appear to have – education of any kind
- ii. Nonfunctional in Afghanistan
- iii. What government does exist is not trusted
 1. This is a critical point
 2. *Our proxies closest to the people are the least competent*
 3. In countries such as post-war Germany or Japan, we were rebuilding major industrial powers
 - a. Infrastructure was in place
 - b. Native, local competence and expertise was in place
 4. In Afghanistan, we are *building* – not *rebuilding* – a country
 - a. No infrastructure
 - b. A tradition of *self-rule*, but not of *united rule*
 - c. No native, local competence in governing
 - i. Public administration
 - ii. Economics
 - iii. Engineering
 1. Public works
- iv. Such incompetent governments are known in social science literature as “the agency of final disappointment.”

1. There is someone to point at and blame for situation
 2. Government narrative of security/success does not resonate
- v. Insurgent leader narrative *does* resonate
1. Insurgency, or revolution, takes hold