4GW RECOMMENDED READING<\/b><\/p>\n
For those of a pessimistic bent – I don’t agree with everything these authors have to say in their respective critiques of U.S. military and foreign policies – the Germanomania that sometimes prevails at DNI is most odd considering that the Germans lost both world wars through strategic and tactical blundering – but they raise points that are worth careful consideration:<\/p>\n
” Lessons Learned from the American Expedition to Iraq<\/a>” by ” Fabius Maximus<\/strong> ” at DNI<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n I’m not privy to the identity of the writer who posts under this nom de guerre but he has an excellent command of history. I tend to agree with his assessment that our grasp of the Salafi-Jihadi -Qutbist-Takfiri network is remarkably poor considering that we are four years into a global unconventional war. That however, comes from having a drastic shortage of military and intelligence personnel with the requisite language skills and deep in-country experience and not moving heaven and earth to train more. Fundamentals should be our first priorities.<\/p>\n From “Kingdaddy<\/a><\/strong>” at Arms and Influence<\/strong> <\/a>– The Counterinsurgency Series:<\/p>\n “Counterinsurgency is Hard, Part IV<\/a>“<\/p>\n “Counterinsurgeny is Hard, Part III<\/a>“<\/p>\n