{"id":1610,"date":"2006-01-13T15:57:00","date_gmt":"2006-01-13T15:57:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=1610"},"modified":"2006-01-13T15:57:00","modified_gmt":"2006-01-13T15:57:00","slug":"1610","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=1610","title":{"rendered":""},"content":{"rendered":"<p><b>FPRI: COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE<\/b> <strong>&#8211; PART I<br \/><\/strong><br \/>A good article from <strong><a href=\"http:\/\/www.fpri.org\/\">FPRI<\/a><\/strong> via <strong><a href=\"http:\/\/www.cominganarchy.com\/\">Younghusband<\/a><\/strong> that I am posting in its entirety after my friend and former FPRI man <a href=\"http:\/\/www.democracy-project.com\/archives\/002250.html\"><strong>Bruce Kesler<\/strong> <\/a>helpfully pointed out that I should read the distribution rights fine print :o)<\/p>\n<p>I am breaking this in two parts. I disagree with some of the author&#8217;s normative choices but think, in general, that he has a very solid point. Given that he is surveying the spending priorities of all the services, some quibbling could hardly be helped.<\/p>\n<p><strong><span style=\"color:#336666;\">Foreign Policy Research Institute<br \/>50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation<br \/>1955-2005<br \/>www.fpri.org<\/span><br \/><\/strong><br \/><strong><span style=\"color:#336666;\">COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE<br \/>by Frank G. Hoffman<\/p>\n<p>January 6, 2006<\/p>\n<p>Frank G. Hoffman is a Research\u00e1 Fellow at the Center for<br \/>Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) in Quantico, VA,<br \/>and is a non-resident Senior Fellow of the FPRI.The views<br \/>represented here are the author&#8217;s alone and<br \/>do not represent the views of the Department of Defense or<br \/>the U.S. Marine Corps.<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. National Defense Strategy identifies<br \/>irregular challengers as an increasingly salient problem.<br \/>The ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was expected to<br \/>shape America&#8217;s capacity to deal with nonlinear and<br \/>irregular warfare, as well as balance the Pentagon&#8217;s<br \/>overdrawn checkbook But like the last two evolutions, this<br \/>QDR will probably be a dud.It is mired by major programs<br \/>the Services cling to, despite their high costs and<br \/>irrelevance in an era of intra-state warfare and global<br \/>insurgency. OSD&#8217;s leadership cannot convince the Services,<br \/>Congress, or swarming army of lobbyists that we need to<br \/>shift the Pentagon&#8217;s budget towards more irregular threats<br \/>and away from a rigid focus on conventional warfighting.<\/p>\n<p>This essay outlines the emergence and implications of<br \/>Complex Irregular Warfare.This mode of warfare builds upon<br \/>and exploits nontraditional modes of warfare.The rise of<br \/>Complex Irregular Warfare is the natural reaction to<br \/>America&#8217;s overwhelming military superiority. The United<br \/>States has pushed future opponents to alternative means that<br \/>are purposely designed and deployed to thwart Western<br \/>societies. This mode of warfare exploits modern<br \/>technologies and the tightly interdependencies of globalized<br \/>societies and economies. A more appropriate alternative to<br \/>America&#8217;s current overall security architecture and its<br \/>national security investment portfolio is offered to shape<br \/>America&#8217;s military against this threat.<\/p>\n<p>The nature of tomorrow&#8217;s irregular wars is not completely<br \/>clear. Most likely it will evolve into &#8220;War Beyond Limits&#8221;<br \/>as described by a pair of Chinese Colonels in a volume<br \/>entitled &#8220;Unrestricted\u00e1 Warfare.&#8221; It certainly will not<br \/>break out as described in the Pentagon&#8217;s strategy, with<br \/>enemies choosing discrete options between conventional,<br \/>irregular, catastrophic or disruptive strategies.We will<br \/>face hybrid forms purpose built to exploit U.S.<br \/>vulnerabilities. This would include states blending high-<br \/>tech capabilities like anti-satellite weapons, with<br \/>terrorism and cyber-warfare directed against financial<br \/>targets or critical infrastructure. They will surely<br \/>involve protracted and extremely lethal conflicts like the<br \/>insurgency in Iraq. Such wars will be neither conventional<br \/>nor low intensity. Above all, the enemy will be protean.<\/p>\n<p>The posture of U.S. military forces under such a strategy<br \/>requires greater nuance and more of an indirect approach<br \/>than yesterday&#8217;s Garrison Era. Forward presence will be<br \/>costly but invaluable, shifting rather than fixed, depending<br \/>on the current context. Forces will have to be designed to<br \/>maintain American interests across a broader array of<br \/>missions and against more adaptive enemies.The following<br \/>constitutes an outline sketch of the changes needed.<\/p>\n<p>ARMY<br \/>The evolution of the Division-based Army to one centered on<br \/>modular Brigade\u00e1Combat Teams (BCTs) is spot on. These are<br \/>more self-contained,cohesive, and faster to deploy. But<br \/>the Army&#8217;s plan to transition the Army&#8217;s 10 Divisions, (33<br \/>BCT equivalents)into 43 smaller BCTs needs reexamination.<br \/>Creating the overhead costs for the\u00e1 new BCT cuts out real<br \/>combat power, and the proposed mix of Heavy (armor), Medium,<br \/>and Infantry \u00e1 brigades (19\/6\/18) is too conventionally<br \/>oriented.<\/p>\n<p>The &#8220;modularity&#8221; concept offers less than meets the eye.<br \/>The claim that the proposal increases combat power by 30<br \/>percent measures only a 30 percent increase in the number of<br \/>brigades, and not true combat power. The Army plan<br \/>decreases the number of Total Force maneuver battalions from<br \/>201 to 161. More than\u00e1 20,000 &#8220;trigger pullers&#8221; have been<br \/>sacrificed to produce larger number of arguably weaker<br \/>units until the Future Combat System is fielded. In theory<br \/>the FCS will use better computers, sensors, and networks to<br \/>compensate for traditional firepower, but the program will<br \/>not deliver anything until at least 2015.<\/p>\n<p>To rebalance the Army for an era of Complex Irregular War, 7<br \/>heavy brigades should be traded for more medium and infantry<br \/>BCTs. Adding 3 Stryker Brigades and third infantry<br \/>battalion to the 18 IBCTs provides more balance for<br \/>irregular warfare. In effect, by reversing the shift to<br \/>create additional brigades and their overhead, a net total<br \/>of 13 maneuver battalions can be created, within the Army&#8217;s<br \/>current manpower totals.This would represent a significant<br \/>increase in true combat power, adding &#8220;boots on the ground,&#8221;<br \/>and enable &#8220;full spectrum operations&#8221; and the ability to win<br \/>the peace as well as the fighting phases.<\/p>\n<p>AIR FORCE<br \/>America&#8217;s airpower dominance will have to be reshaped to<br \/>provide relevant strategic and operational effects. This<br \/>will require the Air Force to expand its missions in space<br \/>and cyberspace, as well as provide a modernized strategic<br \/>strike capability. The $200 million F-22 &#8220;Raptor&#8221; may be a<br \/>technological marvel, but it&#8217;s an investment that reflects a<br \/>misappropriation of funds for an irregular world.Thus, it<br \/>should be cancelled with its funding shifted to new long-<br \/>range bombers. A bomber with a range in excess of 2,000<br \/>miles is needed. The Air Force buy for the Joint Strike<br \/>Fighter can be cut in half, and those funds shifted towards<br \/>investments in the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles.<\/p>\n<p>MARINES<\/p>\n<p>To adapt for the 21st century, the Marines should shift its<br \/>orientation from major combat operations and amphibious<br \/>assaults to focus on protracted Small Wars. They should<br \/>achieve more modularity by shifting away from the separate<br \/>Marine Division and Aircraft Wings to standing Expeditionary<br \/>Maneuver Brigades,with roughly 15,000 Marines each. Each<br \/>of these would be supported by new units for Information<br \/>Warfare, Special Operations, and\u00e1 Security<br \/>Cooperation\/Foreign Military Training tasks.<\/p>\n<p>Considering the nature of a second Small Wars era, the Corps<br \/>should terminate or sharply reduce plans for the V-22 Osprey<br \/>and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). The tilt-rotor<br \/>Osprey is too expensive and too fragile for expeditionary<br \/>employment. The Marines are making too many operational<br \/>compromises in their ground systems to get around the<br \/>limitations of the $80 million V-22. The $8 million EFV<br \/>affords seamless high-speed transition from sea to deep<br \/>inland objectives for forcible entry operations. It is too<br \/>optimized for very rare ship-to-shore maneuver, and is not<br \/>adequate for tactical maneuver of Marines during Small Wars.<br \/>The resources allocated to the V-22 and EFV programs should<br \/>be applied to simpler, less vulnerable, and more rugged<br \/>modes of air and ground mobility.<\/p>\n<p><\/span>END PART I.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>FPRI: COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE &#8211; PART IA good article from FPRI via Younghusband that I am posting in its entirety after my friend and former FPRI man Bruce Kesler helpfully pointed out that I should read the distribution rights fine print :o) I am breaking this in two parts. I disagree with some of the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1610","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1610","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1610"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1610\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1610"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1610"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1610"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}