SOME THINGS I MISSED<\/b><\/p>\n
Shloky<\/a><\/strong> has an excellent series of data points from Boyd 2007<\/strong>:<\/p>\n Overview<\/a> A review from reader Isaac<\/strong>, which he helpfully posted in my comments section ( Isaac should get a blog ).<\/p>\n “Additional notes and such by presenter:<\/p>\n Osinga- <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n I found it surprising that, according to Osinga, Boyd hadn\u2019t used a slide of the OODA loop until 1995. He may have wanted to avoid over-simplification via encapsulation. Perhaps he didn\u2019t feel comfortable until then that his students would realize that he was talking about much more than \u2018the decision cycle\u2019, as you well point out.<\/p>\n Osinga also discussed the shift from the technical to the doctrinal in the 70\u2019s and 80\u2019s as a reaction to our defeat in Vietnam. Boyd\u2019s quote at the DNI site saying that, \u201cMachines don\u2019t fight wars. People do, and they use their minds\u201d, flows right with this and all sound hesitance at becoming technology fetishists. Technological advances in warfare are more easily countered than the intangible advances made in our minds as the former represent closed systems, regardless of their other attributes, while the latter represent enhanced, open adaptability. If we\u2019re able to generate rapidly changing environments for our opponents, we inhibit their adaptability while showcasing\/utilizing\/increasing ours. This mismatch is part of the \u2018certain to win\u2019 principle. The more uncertainty experienced by our adversaries, the more we\u2019re able to survive on our terms.<\/p>\n The epistemological character of Osinga\u2019s discussion of the expanded, full OODA loop, to me, admitted of shades of phenomenology in its stress of the individual\u2019s experiences as central to feedback. After all, warfighters use their minds, right?<\/p>\n Richards- <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n I found his discussion of the \u2018Orientation\u2019 element the most salient. Our orientation is at its best when it is \u2018closest to chaos\u2019, that is, when we experience the widest range of possibilities with as much \u2018flow\u2019 (feedback and other stimuli) as possible. It is this broad range which provides for a unifying theme in groups as the sheer amount of broadly informing stimuli and feedback creates a more open system. The more\/better our information\/knowledge the better, and the more intuitively\/implicitly we are then able to act\/react with less\/out thinking, the more we, well, win.<\/p>\n This has implications regarding \u2018Command Intent\u2019, of course, in that the better the unifying theme, the better individuals are able to act independently. You noted this as well. In a perfect version of this world, by extension, a totally dispersed force with a strong enough unifying theme and excellent orientation would be capable of truly \u2018organic\u2019 swarm activity.<\/p>\n I\u2019ll not attempt to delve into Lind here. Dan\u2019s done some good work on that and your post covers much of what I\u2019d have to say perfectly. He was as much King and Jester to his court assembled. I enjoyed both his acumen and antics immensely.<\/p>\n As for the generals, I\u2019ve little to add.<\/p>\n Van Riper stated that he\u2019d stop all training immediately and get back to Mission-Type orders across the board. This jibes well with both Ossinga and Richards. I also enjoyed his example of the game of chess to show the nature of interactively complex systems as opposed to structurally complex ones. You\u2019re spot-on in your comments. Reductionism works with the latter as their elements are \u2018near-static\u2019, linearly-related and have little \u2018action\u2019, as he put it. One can easily lose control\/understanding, however, of interactively complex systems like chess. He said that after very few moves in a game of chess, the players have surpassed a million possible moves and that there are 10128 possible moves in a full game. That\u2019s a larger number than there are atoms in the universe, he said. Reductionism won\u2019t help you understand chess, or warfare.<\/p>\n This was echoed by Zinni saying that \u2018process warfare\u2019 isn\u2019t the answer. Mastering multiple processes is still step-by-step, sometimes on a such a scale that you can drown in it. Besides, if you\u2019re consumed by process, you can\u2019t adapt \u2013 not very Boydian, that.<\/p>\n Speaking of reductionism, Zinni also said something very refreshing in the face of those that would reduce all\/most\/many Muslims to terrorists, \u2018Islamists\u2019, or some such epithet. He\u2019s lived in Muslim countries for 17 years and has yet to meet a Muslim who\u2019s even spoken of every alarmist\u2019s favorite \u2013 the \u2018Caliphate\u2019. He continued to say that institutions in society have to be culturally acceptable as\/and \u2018order\u2019 doesn\u2019t necessarily mean \u2018stability\u2019.<\/p>\n Gray said that we need to get back to who we, as Americans, are as a people. I took this to mean (based on his tangential stories and other things) good, just, open, smart and free \u2013 imbued with a truly pioneering spirit and a joy of discovery. He said we must educate society as a whole and that, actually, we know nothing of the world compared to what we could in truth. He also said that Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy should work to balance the equation of \u2018haves\u2019 and \u2018have-nots\u2019. I must admit, I wasn\u2019t prepared for such comments from a former Commandant of the USMC \u2013 and one of his magnitude at that. We were sitting in a building complex named for him. I\u2019ll chalk that up to my own joy of discovery and hope for an anthropologist and\/or philosopher in each future platoon.” ADDENDUM:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n The return of monster tdaxp<\/strong> <\/a>graphics!!!!<\/p>\n
Osinga On Boydian Influences<\/a>
Boydian Maxims<\/a>
Gudmundsson On The ANG<\/a>
Lind On Barnett and IR<\/a>
Hammes On 5GW<\/a>
Hoffman On Modern\/Future COIN<\/a><\/p>\n
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Thanks Isaac!<\/p>\n