{"id":3028,"date":"2009-02-14T06:32:31","date_gmt":"2009-02-14T06:32:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=3028"},"modified":"2009-04-23T02:14:35","modified_gmt":"2009-04-23T02:14:35","slug":"israels-half-mad-genius-of-mil-theory","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=3028","title":{"rendered":"Israel’s Half-Mad Genius of Mil-Theory"},"content":{"rendered":"

Just read this profile of Dr. (Gen.)\u00a0Shimon Naveh<\/strong><\/a>, via Soob<\/a><\/strong> via Ubiwar<\/a><\/strong>.<\/p>\n

….Naveh describes his last and perhaps most important military-academic project, OTRI, as a chronicle of failure. “It was a failure of the group and also my personal failure, but in a far deeper sense it was the IDF’s failure. The IDF has not recovered because it doesn’t have the ability, unless it undergoes a revolution.”<\/strong>Naveh, who established OTRI together with Brigadier General (res.) Dov Tamari, draws on imagery from the world of construction to explain the project. “We wanted to create an intermediate level between the master craftsman, the tiling artisan or the electrician, who is the equivalent of the battalion or brigade commander, and the entrepreneur or the strategist, the counterpart of the high commander, who wants to change the world, but lacks knowledge in construction.”<\/strong>Between the two levels, he continues, is the architect\/commander-in-chief, whose role is “to enable the system to understand what the problem is, define it and interpret it through engineers.” In the absence of this link, he maintains, armies find themselves unable to implement their strategic planning by tactical means. “Entrepreneurs and master craftsmen cannot communicate,” he says.<\/strong>Already in his first book, “The Operational Art,” published in 2001 and based on his doctoral dissertation, he described the level of the military architect: “The intermediate level is the great invention of the Russians. [The military architects] occupy the middle, and make it possible for the other fields, from politics to the killers, to understand, plan and learn.”<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

An interesting and to me well constructed analogy by General Naveh\u00a0that rings true to me from what I know of the Soviet history.\u00a0Naveh perfectly describes the peculair adaptive requirements forced on the Red Army by the nature of the Soviet political system, especially as it existed under Stalin from the time of the Great Terror forward ( 1936 -1953). Stalin wiped out much of his senior military leadership of the Red Army during the Yezhovschina in 1937\u00a0and decimated the junior officer corps to boot, leaving it thoroughly demoralized and rigidly shackled to political comissars who were, like the military commanders, completely paralyzed with fear ( the Red Navy officer corps was basically exterminated en masse).<\/p>\n

When Operation Barbarossa<\/strong> commenced in June, 1941, the\u00a0dramatic\u00a0Soviet collapse in the face of the Nazi onslaught was due in part\u00a0to Stalin’s maniacal insistence that Germany was not going to attack and that assertions to the contrary were evidence of “wrecking” and “provocation” – crimes liable to get one immediately shot. Even a high ranking\u00a0NKVD official, Dekanazov<\/strong>, whom Stalin made ambassador to Berlin, was personally threatened by Stalin for daring to warn the Soviet dictator about Hitler’s imminent attack.<\/p>\n

That being said, Stalin quickly realized during the 1941 retreat that he had debilitated his own army by decapitating it and his own judgment as supreme warlord was no substitute at the front lines\u00a0for what Naveh terms “operational art”. Stalin the entrepreneur-grand strategist needed competent military architects like Zhukov <\/strong>and Rossokovsky<\/strong> to plug the gap with the craftsmen\u00a0and\u00a0Stalin not only promoted and protected them, he tolerated their dissent from his own military judgment and sometimes yielded to their concerns. Very much unlike Hitler who could seldom abide criticism or deviation from his general officers or learn from them. Stalin improved as a war leader from interaction with his generals; Hitler did not and if anything grew worse over time – as did the Wehrmacht’s tactical-strategic disconnect.<\/p>\n

The above anecdote\u00a0represents the rich level of depth behind Naveh’s offhand and seemingly disjointed references. There’s a lot of meat there behind the dots Naveh is connecting\u00a0but the uninitiated will have to be willing to dig deep. I’m cool toward\u00a0Naveh’s reliance upon\u00a0French postmodernism but I admire the breadth of his\u00a0capability as a horizontal thinker and theorist. However, Naveh needs an “architect” of his own to translate for him and make his complex ideas more readily comprehensible to the mainstream. I will wager that few Majors or Lt. Colonels, be they U.S. Army, IDF or Russian, read much Focault these days.<\/p>\n

ADDENDUM:<\/strong><\/p>\n

The SWJ<\/a><\/strong> had an interview with Dr. Naveh on his theory of Systematic Operational Design in 2007<\/a><\/p>\n

Dr. Naveh’s book is In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory<\/em><\/strong> (Cummings Center Series)<\/a><\/p>\n

Joint Force Quarterly<\/em><\/strong> (via Findarticle) -“Operational art<\/a>”<\/p>\n

Jerusalem Post<\/em><\/strong> – “Column One: Halutz’s Stalinist moment<\/a>“<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Just read this profile of Dr. (Gen.)\u00a0Shimon Naveh, via Soob via Ubiwar. ….Naveh describes his last and perhaps most important military-academic project, OTRI, as a chronicle of failure. “It was a failure of the group and also my personal failure, but in a far deeper sense it was the IDF’s failure. The IDF has not […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[360,262,16,350,420,9,304,25,78,336,43,39,340,270,520,162,467,127,31,13,540,1,18,217],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3028","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-21st-century","category-4gw","category-5gw","category-army","category-authors","category-complexity","category-defense","category-horizontal-thinking","category-ideas","category-intellectuals","category-mideast","category-military","category-military-reform","category-national-security","category-osint","category-small-wars-journal","category-soob","category-strategy","category-synthesis","category-theory","category-ubiwar","category-uncategorized","category-war","category-warriors"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3028","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3028"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3028\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3028"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3028"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3028"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}