I’m pretty tired, megaproject due on Monday which I finished a few hours ago,\u00a0but I have not done one of these posts in a while.<\/p>\n
TopBilling! HG’S World<\/strong> – 600 Years of Naval Strategy<\/a><\/p>\n It’s a big post, as befits six centuries of history and strategy:<\/p>\n The key point of the article focuses on the real\u00a0goal behind the theory of sea power by <\/strong>Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan<\/strong><\/a>. Their point\u00a0is that Mahan saw maritime strategy in these terms.<\/p>\n <\/strong><\/p>\n Naval preparedness is the sharp edge of maritime strategy, then, but it is only a means to an end. For Mahan, commerce was the true path to affluence and national greatness: “War has ceased to be the natural, or even normal, condition of nations, and military considerations are simply accessory and subordinate to the other greater interests” they serve.17 Prosperity took precedence. The “starting point and foundation” for comprehending sea power was “the necessity to secure commerce, by political measures conducive to military, or naval strength. This order is that of actual relative importance to the nation of the three elements-commercial, political, military” (our emphasis).<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n This is why nations covet access to faraway regions like Asia. In essence, commerce is about unfettered access to the means for producing wealth and national power. Reliable access is impossible without the military means to protect it, and to keep others from denying it. Mahan thus advances a tripartite concept, which we call his first “trident” of sea power. Access to sources of economic well-being-foreign trade, commerce, and natural resources-ranks first within the Mahanian trident, military access third. This cuts against the usual, military-centric understanding of Mahan. I immediately took notice of this passage because during my recent trip I visited the <\/strong>Ming Dynasty Tombs<\/strong><\/a>, where 13 of the 16 Ming Emperors are buried. The Changling tomb of the third\u00a0Ming Emperor,\u00a0<\/strong>Yongle Emperor<\/strong><\/a>,\u00a0has an exhibit that traces the acomplishment of this emperor, now\u00a0considered one of the greatest in Chinese history. One exhibit is given prominence, and\u00a0is centered to draw attention\u00a0to <\/strong>Admiral Zheng He<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0who under the sponsorship of Emperor Yongle led seven naval expeditions between 1405 and 1433.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n ….What was the motivation for these voyages? Not global conquest or imposition of their political system on their neighbors. The goal was to support the <\/strong>tributary system<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0and promote trade and commerce. Historians are somewhat divided on why China ended the voyages and imposed the <\/strong>Hai jin order<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0banning maritime activities. One thing is certain, today’s China\u00a0appears\u00a0poised for the first time in 600 years\u00a0to reach\u00a0a\u00a0level of power equal to the early Ming Dynasty.<\/p>\n How does this all square with Alfred T Mahan’s theory? Let us look at the Yongle Emperor’s\u00a0goal. He wanted to gain respect and demonstrate to those in the extended region that\u00a0China was the superpower because\u00a0she controlled the seas. The result, would be tribute\u00a0and commerce leading to prosperity and continued “national greatness”\u00a0for China. A great plan, but in a world of\u00a0a belief in the <\/strong>Mandate of Heaven<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0manipulated by palace <\/strong>Eunuchs<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0fate deemed a different result.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Read the rest here<\/a>.<\/p>\n One more Naval appraisal, I\u00a0 really liked this post by Galrahn<\/strong> at Information Dissemination<\/strong>:<\/p>\n Screening Asymmetrical and Symmetrical Threats at Sea<\/a><\/p>\n What exactly is asymmetrical about submarines, smaller missile boats, mines, aircraft, and\/or land-based missile systems? Swarm tactics with small boats does not represent an asymmetrical military capability, rather it represents a symmetrical naval tactic that is well chronicled as far back as Themistocles.<\/p>\n The way this Office of Naval Intelligence report describes Iranian capabilities as “asymmetrical” does not encourage me, because it essentially groups equipment and tactics that are common among small nations – littoral submarines, missile boats, mines, shore based anti-ship missiles – as an asymmetric military capability. That is fundamentally inaccurate, these capabilities are symmetrical even as these capabilities specifically target what is seen as a weakness in US Navy Fleet forces.<\/p>\n All of these naval capabilities – littoral submarines, missile boats, mines, shore based anti-ship missiles – are simply exploiting the absence of a single naval element of combat in the US Navy:<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Normally, I do not like to weigh in on maritime matters, there’s a lot to know there and it is not my area of expertise or more than a passing interest but I think Galrahn has hit on a stubborn\u00a0lacuna among the flag officers. Lt. Gen. Paul van Riper<\/strong> more or less kicked the Navy’s collective ass so badly in that infamous\u00a0wargame years ago, that the need for smaller, screening, combat vessels should be a problem en route to being solved by now. Calling attacks from small vessels and missiles “asymmetreic” seems to mean in Navyspeak\u00a0“If we call it this an ‘asymmetric threat’\u00a0then we don’t have to buy those goddamn little\u00a0brown water boats like Martin Sheen<\/strong> was riding in Apocalypse Now!<\/em><\/strong>“.<\/p>\n Adam Elkus<\/strong> and Lt. John Sullivan<\/strong> on borders and 3rd\u00a0 Generation gangs <\/a>ramping up security threats.<\/p>\n Fun with dinosaurs<\/a>.<\/p>\n Eide Neurolearning Blog<\/strong> – Orchid Kids: The Positives of Intense and Demanding Children<\/a><\/p>\n Shepherd’s Pi<\/strong> – A-Space Past and\u00a0Future<\/a><\/p>\n For IC and Social Media -philes.<\/p>\n
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