{"id":4126,"date":"2011-06-22T16:53:27","date_gmt":"2011-06-22T16:53:27","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=4126"},"modified":"2011-06-22T16:53:28","modified_gmt":"2011-06-22T16:53:28","slug":"follow-up-on-the-astrategic-discussion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=4126","title":{"rendered":"Follow-Up on the “Astrategic” Discussion"},"content":{"rendered":"

The real value was in the comment thread. Original post here<\/a>.<\/p>\n

That caused Joseph Fouche<\/strong> to post Overgrown Comment, Short\u00a0Post<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0from which I will excerpt relevant comments from JF, Dave Schuler<\/strong> and Seydlitz89<\/strong>:<\/p>\n

Dave Schuler<\/strong><\/a> comments:<\/strong><\/p>\n

I think that the Obama Administration’s actions are less an instance of only an indirect relationship between means and ends than a disagreement with you on ends, Mark. Just as one example, the primary objective of the Obama Administration (as in all administrations) is a second term. Consider the actions through that lens.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Also, isn’t it possible that the Administration is really sincere about the “international support” trope that marked the Libyan intervention? International support will never be forthcoming for intervention against the Syrian regime. I don’t think that either the Russians or Chinese would stand for it. The Russian relationship with Syria at least is much cozier than that between Russia and Libya.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Noted Clausewitzian <\/strong>seydlitz89<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong>comments<\/strong><\/a>:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Zen-<\/strong><\/p>\n

Good thought-provoking post, you actually got me out of my hiatus from blogs\/blogging, just don’t tell anyone over at milpub ;-)><\/strong><\/p>\n

While I agree with Joseph’s comment, I would add a few other points to consider:<\/strong><\/p>\n

First, “strategy”, is a specific concept in terms of strategic theory which can be linked to “strategic effect”, but not necessarily so.\u00a0 Force and personality alone (which are not “strategy” the way I define it -see\u00a0<\/strong>http:\/\/milpubblog.blogspot.com\/2010\/11\/when-strategy-is-not-strategy.html<\/strong><\/a>) can achieve strategic effect.\u00a0 So we need to be clear how we\u00a0 are using this particular adjective, which need not be linked to a specific strategy at all.\u00a0 Also the strategy in question might be bad, even self-defeating, as Joseph points out and still be a strategy.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Second, when has our Middle Eastern policy ever been consistent, in terms of treating all countries the same?\u00a0 Perhaps under Bush I during 1990-91, but we have always treated the different Arab countries differently in line with our different interests involved.\u00a0 Bahrain gets a pass, whereas Libya gets NATO intervention, and Syria gets referred to the ICC .\u00a0 .\u00a0 . In each case the US interest is seen as different so the response is different.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Third, the real root cause of the problem is imo our dysfunctional political system which is unable to implement policies which are in the best interests of the country as a political community.\u00a0 The Iraq war was essentially a collapse of US strategic thought and rather was based on narrow and corrupt interests, deceptive politics and notions of unlimited US power (force) and exceptionalism (personality)\u00a0 which triggered a still ongoing strategic disaster for US interests in the region, but not limited to it.<\/strong><\/p>\n

We have a long way to go and I don’t see us getting there any time soon, unfortunately.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The Committee comments<\/del> <\/strong>posts<\/strong><\/a>:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Scottish historian Niall Ferguson, just before transmogrifying into Scottish celebrity historian Niall Ferguson, proposed an approach that serious credentialed historians could use if venturing to write the generally silly and uncredentialed genre of counter-factual history:<\/strong><\/p>\n

To produce serious counter-factual history that is not utter bollocks, your point of departure from our factual timeline has to be a documented and real credible alternative raised by a documented and real credible person at a documented and real point in time prior to the moment when factual and the proposed counterfactual timelines diverge.<\/strong><\/p>\n

As Dave Schuler alludes, how Zen, I, or seydlitz interpret what is strategic, what is astrategic, and what is antistrategic is often determined by what we individually interpret as political, apolitical, or antipolitical. We put events in boxes and eventually there is a box beyond which we do not stray because we don’t know this outer box is there. We can perhaps use Ferguson’s approach to separate which of the Administration’s factual alignment of ends to means are impossible and which are merely improbable and which of our various counterfactual alternative alignments of ends to means are impossible or merely improbable.<\/strong><\/p>\n

….I’ll close my observations on this post and its comment thread with two points:<\/strong><\/p>\n