{"id":4529,"date":"2011-11-29T05:29:09","date_gmt":"2011-11-29T05:29:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=4529"},"modified":"2011-11-29T13:59:02","modified_gmt":"2011-11-29T13:59:02","slug":"do-oligarchies-create-insurgencies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=4529","title":{"rendered":"Do Oligarchies Create Insurgencies?"},"content":{"rendered":"<blockquote><p><strong>&#8220;&#8230;.\u00a0But when the sons of these men received the same position of authority from their fathers-having had no experience of misfortunes, and none at all of civil equality and freedom of speech, but having been bred up from the first under the shadow of their fathers&#8217; authority and lofty position-some of them gave themselves up with passion to avarice and unscrupulous love of money, others to drinking and the boundless debaucheries which accompanies it, and others to the violation of women or the forcible appropriation of boys; and so they turned an <em>aristocracy <\/em>into an <em>oligarchy. <\/em>But it was not long before they roused in the minds of the people the same feelings as before; and their fall therefore was very like the disaster which befell the tyrants.&#8221;<\/strong><strong>-Polybius<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>One of the tenets of <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/smallwarsjournal.com\/blog\/journal\/docs-temp\/377-springer.pdf\"><strong>pop-centric COIN<\/strong> <\/a>is that better governance will deliver the loyalty of <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.isaf.nato.int\/article\/caat-anaysis-news\/comisaf-coin-guidance.html\">the people who are the center of gravity <\/a>over whom the insurgent and state contest. This usually means cajoling the state to reform and remove the worst abuses that serve to politically fuel the insurgency. Occasionally this is successful (El Salvador), frequently it is not (South Vietnam, Afghanistan) and in other cases it may be irrelevant as\u00a0the method is eschewed in favor of indiscriminate brute force and punitive\u00a0expeditions\u00a0(Sri Lanka, Soviet COIN) but it begs the question of:<\/p>\n<p><strong>&#8220;What kind of governance is most likely to create insurgencies in the first place?&#8221;<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Of insurgencies that are wholly indigenous, what\u00a0form of government spawns them most frequently? A chart of historically recent insurgencies is given below containing\u00a0who fought and who won\u00a0(&#8220;negotiated&#8221; indicates a political settlemt &#8220;tie&#8221; of sorts, with some political accomodation and not settlements that are trucial\u00a0&#8220;exit agreements&#8221; for the defeated belligerent):<strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<style type=\"text\/css\">  .style12 {  \tFONT-FAMILY: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; FONT-SIZE: 11px; FONT-WEIGHT: bold  }<\/style>\n<table border=\"0\" style=\"width: 458px; height: 1192px\" width=\"480\">\n<tr>\n<td width=\"172\"><span class=\"style12\">COUNTRY<\/span><\/td>\n<td width=\"149\"><span class=\"style12\">GOVERNMENT<\/span><\/td>\n<td width=\"123\"><span class=\"style12\">VICTOR<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Aden<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Afghanistan (1979-1989)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Communist\/Occupied<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Afghanistan (2001-2011)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Republic\/Occupied<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Ongoing<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Algeria (1954-1962)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Algeria (1991-2006)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Angola(1961-1975)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Angola (1975-2002)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Communist<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Negotiated<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Bolivia<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Britain (N. Ireland)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Democracy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Negotiated<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"23\"><span class=\"style12\">Cambodia (1970-1975)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Cambodia (!978-1991)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Communist\/Occupied<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Negotiated<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colombia<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Democracy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Ongoing<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Chechnya<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Republic<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">China (1911-1949)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Cuba<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Cyprus<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">El Salvador (1930&#8217;s)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">El Salvador (1970&#8217;s-1980&#8217;s)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship\/Democracy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Greece<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Monarchy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Guatemala<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">India<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Democracy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Ongoing<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Indonesia (1945-1949)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Indonesia (1965)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Iraq<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Democracy\/Occupied<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Israel (1st Intifada)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Democracy\/Occupied<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Negotiated<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Israel (2nd Intifada)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Democracy\/Occupied<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Jordan (Black September)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Monarchy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Libya<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Malaya<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial\/Republic<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Mexico<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Democracy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Ongoing<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Mozambique<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Communist<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Negotiated<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Nepal<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Monarchy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Nigeria (Biafra)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Nigeria (Delta)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Democracy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Ongoing<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Nicaragua (1979)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Nicaragua (1980&#8217;s)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Negotiated<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Palestinian Mandate<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Philippines (1899-1902)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Philippines (Huk Rebellion)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Republic<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Philippines<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship\/Democracy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Ongoing<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Rhodesia<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial\/Apartheid<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Saudi Arabia (Ikhwan Revolt)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Monarchy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">South Africa (Boer war)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial\/Occupational<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">South Africa<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Apartheid<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Soviet Union (Basmachi Revolt)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Communist<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Soviet Union ( partisans)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Communist<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Syria (Hama Revolt)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Syria<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Ongoing<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Vietnam (1930&#8217;s)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Government<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Vietnam (French War)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Colonial<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"14\"><span class=\"style12\">Vietnam (American War)<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td height=\"22\"><span class=\"style12\">Yemen<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Dictatorship<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Ongoing<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Yugoslavia<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Occupied<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"style12\">Insurgents<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<p>The chart is fairly comprehensive, but I\u00a0have not\u00a0accounted for all movements or conflicts\u00a0that can loosely be grouped under the heading of &#8220;insurgency&#8221; in the previous century. There are more.\u00a0Corrections and additions are welcomed in the comments section. I also\u00a0recognize that such a broad historical comparison as this chart involves a fairly massive degree of simplification of diverse examples. To some extent,\u00a0simplification is unavoidable if insurgency is to be studied\u00a0as a phenomenon\u00a0at all rather than as an event in\u00a0the history of a particular state or people.<\/p>\n<p><strong>EXCLUSIONS:<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Insurgencies before 1900.\u00a0 A blog post cannot aspire\u00a0become the encyclopedia of insurgency.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The <strong>Russian Civil War (1918-1921<\/strong>) and the <strong>Lebanese Civil War of the 1980&#8217;s<\/strong> on the basis that while these conflicts contained many aspects of irregular warfare, they were primarily civil wars with extensive foreign intervention. The Greek and Chinese civil wars, by contrast are included because, despite foreign intervention in each case, the character of one of the belligerents in each conflict\u00a0remained authentically and continuously\u00a0insurgent in nature. The Greek communist army supported by <strong>Tito<\/strong>\u00a0had previously\u00a0been an anti-Nazi partisan force while <strong>Mao ZeDong&#8217;s Red Army<\/strong> were in rebellion against the <strong>Nationalist<\/strong> government before, after and to some extent, during, the WWII Japanese invasion of China.<\/p>\n<p>Unlike the <strong>Vietnam War<\/strong>, the <strong>Korean War<\/strong> was neither an insurgency, nor a civil war, the adjunctive use of guerrilla operations by the North Korean and Chinese armies and the pro-DPRK apologetics of historian <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Bruce_Cumings\"><strong>Bruce Cumings<\/strong> <\/a>notwithstanding. The Korean War is better understood with Clausewitz than Galula.<\/p>\n<p>The Soviet Bloc cases of <strong>Czechoslovakia<\/strong> in 1968 and <strong>Hungary<\/strong> in 1956 were excluded primarily because the resistance to Soviet domination was led by, or at least included, the leadership of the local satellite Communist Parties and governments, making those examples\u00a0partially state vs. state conflicts. Of the two, Hungary presents a better empirical case for inclusion but from my readings of Soviet history, Khrushchev&#8217;s concerns were rooted in what he saw as counterrevolutionary and anti-Soviet elements in the Hungarian Party, army and security agencies and the Soviet response was a conventional invasion. I could be persuaded otherwise, but for now I am excluding Hungary.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Katangan Secession<\/strong> &#8211; the reason here is my own lack of familiarity with the subject, as well as Mobutu&#8217;s later fall from power. Readers are invited to weigh in here or on any point.<\/p>\n<p>Inadvertantly awol but intended to be included was <strong>Sri Lanka<\/strong> which recently crushed the<strong> Tamil Tigers<\/strong>. My error and one not easily remedied at this point for technical reasons, having tweaked the chart with another software program.<\/p>\n<p><strong>ANALYSIS: <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Foreign Invasion<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>First, if we wish to know what kind of governments most frequently suffer insurgencies, let us set aside insurgencies that derive primarily from resisting foreign invasion and occupation. While these conflicts are legitimately considered insurgencies, the cause of them is fundamentally external to the nature of the state. People have a natural, visceral\u00a0and ingrained\u00a0tendency to fight violent intruders and that reaction ought to be taken for granted and planned for accordingly. Even the much abused and absolutely\u00a0impoverished peasantry of Russia rose up against Napoleonic armies and Nazi conquerors. So we would remove from consideration\u00a0the cases of Afghanistan after the Soviet and American occupations, Yugoslavia, the Boer War, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the American occupation of Iraq and the Philippines as being\u00a0externally provoked.<\/p>\n<p>Likewise, insurgencies that are predominantly\u00a0the creation\u00a0of foreign powers, which would eliminate the\u00a0US supported Contras in the 1980&#8217;s and parts of the Taliban like the <strong>Haqqani Network<\/strong> or <strong>Lashkar-e-Taiba<\/strong> in <strong>Kashmir<\/strong> (India however, has something like 17 ongoing insurgencies so it remains on the list). Also gone is <strong>Che Guevara&#8217;s<\/strong> quixotic and numerically insignificant expedition in Bolivia.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Totalitarian Dictatorships<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>To look at the chart, the type of government that seems to endure insurgency least often are, ironically,\u00a0totalitarian governments. The USSR is listed with two revolts &#8211; the<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Basmachi_movement\"> Basmachi <\/a>in Central Asia in the 1920&#8217;sand the <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Stepan_Bandera\">Banderists <\/a>of Ukraine in the late 1940&#8217;s. The former began prior to the Revolution and Stalin&#8217;s absolute ascendancy and continued while Soviet governmental authority in Central Asia was still relatively weak. In the Ukraine, Bandera&#8217;s partisans only took root\u00a0as a result of the chaos created by the\u00a0Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, which demolished the\u00a0democidal grasp of Stalin&#8217;s\u00a0<strong>NKVD<\/strong> apparatus there\u00a0while replacing it with that of the genocidal\u00a0<strong>SS<\/strong>.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Historically, governments that exercised analogous control via terror to Stalin&#8217;s USSR simply did not\u00a0endure insurgencies except in foreign territories they invaded, like Vietnam&#8217;s occupation of Cambodia. North Korea today, despite inhuman cruelties has not provoked an insurgency, nor did Nazi rule in Germany, the <strong>Khmer Rouge<\/strong> in Cambodia or even minor regimes like <strong>Enver Hoxha&#8217;s Albania<\/strong>, where efforts by the <strong>CIA<\/strong> to spark a guerrilla movement failed miserably. There is simply very little social\u00a0&#8220;space&#8221; in a society atomized by terror and continuous surveillance for an insurgency to get started except\u00a0by a spontaneous riot.<\/p>\n<p>It is important to note however, as<strong> <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.commentarymagazine.com\/article\/dictatorships-double-standards\/\">Jeane Kirkatrick<\/a><\/strong><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.commentarymagazine.com\/article\/dictatorships-double-standards\/\"> did long ago<\/a>,\u00a0that totalitarian rule is qualitatively distinct from authoritarian rule. The USSR before an after Stalin was a different regime, regardless of outward continuity &#8211;\u00a0and the same can be said of Communist China\u00a0under Mao.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Democratic States<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The type of government that is next least likely to be fighting an insurgency <strong><em>at home<\/em><\/strong> are democratic ones &#8211; though they are perhaps very likely or most likely to be the states\u00a0fighting them <strong><em>abroad<\/em><\/strong>.\u00a0 The democratic states listed include Britain, Colombia,\u00a0Israel, India, Mexico and Nigeria while the Philippines and El Salvador transitioned to democracy while fighting insurgencies and Iraq emerged from American occupation while an insurgency raged.<\/p>\n<p>Of the democratic governments\u00a0that fought\u00a0insurgencies at home, Nigeria and the Philippines inherited their conflicts from previous dictatorships and all of the states have significant to severe demographic divisions based on language, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity or legal status that are reinforced by economic discrimination and (except for Britain) serious to severe levels of corruption.<\/p>\n<p>The economies of Mexico, El Salvador, Philippines and Colombia are historically oligarchic with the economic status quo being reinforced by extralegal violence in the rare instances where the government did not formally side with elite interests (usually\u00a0because of\u00a0factional disputes among the elite). The social complexities of Nigeria or India are too great to be delved into here but traditional structures and social relations were neither free nor highly mobile and that these legacies negatively impact or undermine democratic governance.<\/p>\n<p>Of democracies that have not or have never needed to fight an insurgency, the supposition would be that liberal democracy represents the best vehicle for satisfying popular demands and defusing grievances. Further, there is an implicit\u00a0assumption that democracies are functionally better at solving social and political problems and are less aggressive than dictatorships or traditional regimes. Therefore, a\u00a0a key tenet of pop-centric COIN\u00a0theory, the need for good governance, tends in practice to become conflated\u00a0with implementing\u00a0democratic and liberal reforms of regressive and repressive states, as was successfully done in El Salvador, to win over the loyalty of the population for the state.<\/p>\n<p>I would like to believe that this theory is correct for intuitive and anecdotal reasons &#8211; it seems like common sense\u00a0because our experience is that\u00a0citizens of liberal democracies lead more prosperous, freer and more peaceful lives and are therefore unlikely to pick up arms against their government. Unfortunately, this reasonable assumption may be shakier than it appears and have little relation to success or failure of a COIN campaign.<\/p>\n<p>The first problem with this line of COIN\u00a0thinking is first, it\u00a0mirrors the\u00a0flaw in\u00a0<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Democratic_peace_theory\">Democratic Peace theory <\/a>&#8211; most democracies are of such new vintage historically that we are not assessing risks and probabilities\u00a0from an adequate data set. Democracies have been, until the last twenty years, rare historical outliers. Of those democracies that have been around for the longest period of time &#8211; the European great powers, the United States and Japan &#8211; these nations\u00a0have a formidibly warlike track record\u00a0of military intervention or\u00a0establishing the colonial\u00a0empires that created the conditions for insurgency in most of the world&#8217;s hotspots. This alone should give us pause about the pacifistic nature of democracies if we have failed to learn this lesson from <strong><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Landmark-Thucydides-Comprehensive-Guide-Peloponnesian\/dp\/0684827905\/ref=sr_1_fkmr1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1322541418&amp;sr=8-1-fkmr1\">Thucydides<\/a><\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p>The second problem is that good democratic governance does not equate with or guarantee\u00a0military effectiveness of the counterinsurgent forces in the field. The shooting part of\u00a0COIN wars matter and the &#8220;good guys&#8221; can lose when out-thought and out-fought; &#8220;bad guys&#8221; can be courageous, adaptive, highly motivated\u00a0and militarily skillful adversaries. Nor does democratic governance ensure that wars of choice are fought for sound strategic reasons to accomplish affordable goals. The tendency toward idealism in democratic politics, making a war of choice attractive to an electorate can mitigate against maintaining a strategic perspective and tilt toward pursuing open-ended and ill-defined goals.<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0The third problem is that the population is not always the &#8220;center of gravity&#8221; in 4GW\u00a0or <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=3603\">other non-maoist model insurgencies <\/a>that have as a strategic objective something other than a takeover of the state. The population itself may in addition, be fundamentally illiberal in their orientation and inclined toward customs that are incompatible with Western notions of democracy or &#8220;good governance&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p>Overseas, democracies are also historically\u00a0active in fighting foreign insurgencies or aiding states to do so. Many of these examples are derived from the age of imperialism and the aftermath of decolonization that, as in the Malayan Emergency, became amalgamated with Cold War conflict between the West and Communism. It is also important to note, that liberal democracies are not strictly counterinsurgent\/counterrevolutionary powers. Democratic states are also known to frequently aid or\u00a0sponsor foreign insurgencies for ideological reasons, as under the<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Reagan_Doctrine\"> <strong>Reagan Doctrine<\/strong> <\/a>or the recent <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.responsibilitytoprotect.org\/index.php\/crises\/crisis-in-libya\"><strong>R2P intervention<\/strong> <\/a>by <strong>NATO <\/strong>to aid rebels against Libyan dictator <strong>Col. Gaddafi<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Colonial regimes<\/strong>:<\/p>\n<p>Colonial regimes along with authoritarian dictatorships most frequently faced insurgencies and generated many of the insurgent movements\u00a0that lingered on into independence, fighting successor governments (Vietnam, Angola, Rhodesia etc.). While not the sole source of inspiration and historical experience, colonialism\u00a0was the cradle of COIN theory with such luminaries as <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Small-Wars-Their-Principles-Practice\/dp\/080326366X\/ref=cm_cr-mr-title\/102-7097696-4450507\"><strong>Callwe<\/strong><\/a><strong>ll, <\/strong><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Gerald_Templer\"><strong>Templer<\/strong><\/a><strong>, <\/strong><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Counterinsurgency-Warfare-Theory-Practice-Classics\/dp\/0275993035\/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1322454950&amp;sr=1-1\"><strong>Galula<\/strong><\/a><strong>, <\/strong><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Defeating-Communist-Insurgency-Experiences-international\/dp\/0333248252\/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1322455011&amp;sr=1-1\"><strong>Thompson<\/strong><\/a> and<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Street-Without-Joy-Indochina-Stackpole\/dp\/0811732363\/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1322455050&amp;sr=1-1\"> <strong>Fall<\/strong><\/a> as patron saints and the &#8220;red team&#8221; of <strong><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Red-Book-Guerrilla-Warfare\/dp\/1934255270\/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1322455256&amp;sr=1-2\">Mao<\/a>, <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Peoples-War-Army-Insurrection-Underdeveloped\/dp\/0898753716\">Giap<\/a>, <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Guerrilla-Warfare-Ernesto-Che-Guevara\/dp\/9562915719\/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1322456176&amp;sr=1-2\">Che<\/a>, and\u00a0<\/strong><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Street-Without-Joy-Indochina-Stackpole\/dp\/0811732363\/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1322455050&amp;sr=1-1\"><strong>Fanon<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0on the other side.<\/p>\n<p>Anti-colonial insurgencies are <strong><u>not<\/u><\/strong> considered to be\u00a0in the same category here\u00a0as\u00a0insurgencies\u00a0fighting\u00a0foreign invasion because of the duration of colonial rule, decades or even centuries in length, mean that there are always\u00a0other proximate causes for\u00a0an insurgency than just the\u00a0violent intrusion by foreign conquerors, though that grievance will always be present even if the memory of the event is purely historical. No power maintains itself for long periods of time without securing at least grudging political\u00a0acceptance from a plurality of the population over which it rules and developing enough economic growth to make the imperial enterprise at least self-sustaining.<\/p>\n<p>That said, despite their variable political nature of imperial powers, colonial administrations are almost always engaged in upholding unequal <em>de jure<\/em>\u00a0privileges, even when the colonial territory is to be politically integrated into the mother country (ex. Algeria as a French department) or the imperial authorities\u00a0are more liberal and solicitous of the indigenous population\u00a0than are\u00a0the colonial settlers ( ex. British Cape Colony). These unequal colonial\u00a0priviliges\u00a0typically relate to economic concessions that range from relatively normal productive capital\u00a0investments (ex. British railroads in India)\u00a0to rapacious looting and imposition of slave labor on a vast scale (ex. the Congo Free State under Leopold).<\/p>\n<p>Colonial\u00a0states are almost always minority governments of a settler\/creole population and allied indigenous subgroup dominating a resentful majority excluded from the lion&#8217;s share of any economic benefits the regime is capable of generating. In the meantime, while badly outnumbered , colonial regimes tend to lack the overwhelming internal security capacity of the totalitarian police states, making control relatively fragile and dependent in part upon &#8220;divide and rule&#8221; political tactics. Markets do not operate freely but are arranged under\u00a0 mercantilist restrictions designed for an export-driven economy based extraction of raw materials and commercial agriculture, a system that directly benefits only a narrow elite even within the privileged\u00a0settler population. The mercantilist colonial economic structure is so durable that it is seldom dislodged even by independence, as the history of Latin America testifies, with a political elite assuming the privileged role once played by the imperial authorities and settler population.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Authoritarian dictatorships:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This category contains a highly diverse set of regimes, including the absolute monarchies on the list, with widely differing attitudes on political economy, foreign policy\u00a0and social control. An authoritarian\u00a0state may be a\u00a0generally despised government controlled by a minority group (Baathist Syria, Rhodesia under Ian Smith) or it may enjoy nationalist legitimacy (Tito&#8217;s Yugoslavia, Egypt under Nasser) or even international respect (Singapore). They may also be bizarrely personalist tyrannies, like that of <strong>Jean-Bedel Bokassa<\/strong>, the cannibal emperor of the <strong>Central African Republic,<\/strong> or the aforementioned Colonel Gaddafi in Libya. Finally, most Communist states eventually mellowed from totalitarian dictatorships with supreme leaders to collective leadership based party oligarchies, China being the most successful example of such transitions.<\/p>\n<p>In terms of insurgency, it\u00a0is more difficult to generalize among authoritarian dictatorships than totalitatian ones, or even democracies. Repression alone is not the crucial variable as not all authoritarian states face an insurgent challenge at home\u00a0and almost no totalitarian states do despite being several orders of magnitude more oppressive. It would be useful to draw distinctions between authoritarian states that faced insurgencies and those that did not.<\/p>\n<p>Looking at authoritarian regimes that are or were\u00a0free of insurgency &#8211; say for example, Nasser&#8217;s Egypt, Pinochet&#8217;s Chile, Tito&#8217;s Yugoslavia or Singapore and China today we notice that they share some nominally positive\u00a0traits &#8211; competent leadership, nationalist or populist appeal, pro-active security policies, provision of public goods and\/or effective economic policies &#8211; that reinforce or maintain the regime&#8217;s\u00a0political legitimacy. Repression, even\u00a0brutality,\u00a0is more easily swallowed when the state is delivering a rising standard of living and is seen by the public as an effective guardian of communal values and reliable\u00a0protector against threats. Even a certain amount of corruption is tolerable, from the perspective of the average citizen, if the elite polices its members to remediate gross abuses of power. Some minor corruption (baksheesh, na levo) humanizes a rigid system on the margins for people without access to powerful patrons and relieves frustration.<\/p>\n<p>Authoritarian or autocratic states that faced serious insurgencies lack these qualities &#8211; South Vietnam, Afghanistan under Karzai, Nigeria, Batista&#8217;s Cuba, Nationalist China, the Philippines under Marcos &#8211; coupled repression with incompetence, alienation from the public, massively dysfunctional levels of corruption and economic stagnation that magnifies and focuses popular resentment against the regime and provide fertile soil for insurgency and revolution. Contrary to <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.constitution.org\/mac\/prince17.htm\">Machiavelli&#8217;s famous advice<\/a>, the rulers of these states made themselves more hated\u00a0 than feared &#8211; and usually were also helping themselves to the &#8220;patrimony&#8221; of their citizens along the way via looting on a scale\u00a0that exceeded even that of the European\u00a0colonial powers. The Arab Spring began in Tunisia where hatred for the family of the wife of <strong>President <\/strong><a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Zine_El_Abidine_Ben_Ali\" title=\"Zine El Abidine Ben Ali\"><strong>Zine El Abidine Ben Ali<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0as a bloodsucking mafia burst like a flood and most recently toppled the mad Colonel Gaddafi, who is now estimated to have stolen $ 200 billion dollars from the Libyan people over the course of his 41 year regime.<\/p>\n<p><strong>CONCLUSIONS:<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Insurgencies do not appear everywhere and where they appear they do not all enjoy similar success. Some are crushed virtually before they begin; others take over the state only to face new insurgencies against their own brand of government. Local conditions matter a great deal in determining whether an insurgency will appear at all, with some of the most monstrous governments in human history reigning unchallenged while relatively mild tyrannies are ignominiously toppled. A sufficiently omnipresent security regime, while economically wasteful, can make an insurgency&#8217;s emergence\u00a0virtually impossible.<\/li>\n<li>Oligarchical policies seem to increase the likelihood of rebellion by being repressive, economically exploitative, politically unrepresentative and also incompetent, governing in opposition to the interests of a majority of the population. Most of the states comprising historical cases\u00a0on the insurgency\u00a0table, though not all, were oligarchical to a significant degree, including the democratic states. However we can qualify this by recognizing that some states that are politically organized as oligarchies, one-party dictatorships such as China, are also capable of moderation and pursuing a version of\u00a0enlightened authoritarianism and competent governance that secures a degree of genuine popular support. At least for a time.<\/li>\n<li>Democracies are janus-faced in terms of\u00a0insurgency. On the one hand, excepting the French Fourth Republic, advanced liberal democracies in the last century\u00a0have rarely faced a serious rebellion at home (the 1970&#8217;s wave of upper-class Marxist terrorism never exceeded a handful of terrorists). On the other hand, these same democracies have an extensive historical\u00a0record of provoking insurrection in overseas\u00a0colonial possessions, fighting\u00a0insurgencies on behalf of client states\u00a0or even sponsoring insurgents as proxies against unfriendly states. This uneasily complicated relationship between democratic governance qand insurgency\u00a0mitigates any unstated assumptions regarding promotion of democracy as a natural adjunct of COIN; democracy can be highly subversive of traditional mores or it can manifest itself as intolerant\u00a0and illiberal majoritarianism.<\/li>\n<li>Pop-centric COIN is a paradigm for fighting insurgency that is more suitable for some scenarios than others. As such, it would an error to keep it as official doctrine but it would likewise be an error to get rid of it entirely. An array of different COIN approaches of which pop-centric COIN is only one, would be a more\u00a0realistic replacement; with the caveat, stated many times by many experts, that local conditions should determine and shape a COIN campaign rather than resorting to an established template.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&#8220;&#8230;.\u00a0But when the sons of these men received the same position of authority from their fathers-having had no experience of misfortunes, and none at all of civil equality and freedom of speech, but having been bred up from the first under the shadow of their fathers&#8217; authority and lofty position-some of them gave themselves up [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[46,674,20,126,476,425,51,78,199,39,367,340,270,372,588,187,66,104,179,263,558,11,10,486,127,530,605,211,13,1,18],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4529","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analytic","category-arab-spring","category-coin","category-counterinsurgency","category-democracy","category-government","category-history","category-ideas","category-insurgency","category-military","category-military-history","category-military-reform","category-national-security","category-non-state-actors","category-oligarchy","category-politics","category-primary-loyalties","category-reform","category-revolution","category-scenario","category-social-science","category-state-building","category-state-failure","category-state-terrorism","category-strategy","category-strategy-and-war","category-tactics","category-terrorism","category-theory","category-uncategorized","category-war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4529","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4529"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4529\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4529"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4529"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4529"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}