{"id":4569,"date":"2011-12-08T04:14:03","date_gmt":"2011-12-08T04:14:03","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=4569"},"modified":"2011-12-08T04:14:03","modified_gmt":"2011-12-08T04:14:03","slug":"updates-on-coin-is-dead-debate","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=4569","title":{"rendered":"Updates on COIN is Dead Debate"},"content":{"rendered":"

From Major Mike Few<\/strong> of SWJ<\/strong> and Fabius Maximus<\/strong>:<\/p>\n

SWJ Blog (Few)<\/strong> \u00a0Rethinking Revolution<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Do Two Wrongs Make a Right?<\/a><\/p>\n

When is a revolution over, completed, fulfilled?\u00a0 Traditionally, we prefer to quantify revolutions as ending in a win, loss, or negotiated settlement.[1]\u00a0 While this framework is helpful for shaping theory, it neglects that reality is often much more complicated and messy.\u00a0 As John Maynard Keynes said, \u201cit is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique for thinking, which helps the possessor to draw correct conclusions.\u201d\u00a0 Simply put, it is only a guide towards understanding history and human nature.<\/strong><\/p>\n

….<\/strong>In his seminal work,\u00a0Rethinking Insurgency<\/em>, Steven Metz challenged our community to rethink the existing assumptions and relearn how to counter insurgencies.[5]\u00a0 Moreover, over the past decade, scholars challenged the accepted military definition that an insurgency is \u201can organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.\u201d \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yet, with all the evidence, scholarship, theories, and analysis, we continue to muddle through small wars. \u00a0Why? \u00a0Perhaps, we often choose mass over maneuver and speed over subtle influence in attempts to control the problem.\u00a0 Small wars are wicked problems.\u00a0 If we continue to plug and play the latest “new” idea to tame a problem, then we will just muddle along and only make the problem worse.<\/strong><\/p>\n

….Before we can hope to distill any lessons learned from this past bloody decade of war and rewrite the existing counterinsurgency manual[7][8]\u00a0and find a suitable foreign policy for this new century, perhaps we should first seek to better understand the nature of revolution.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

 <\/p>\n

Fabius Maximus – COIN- Now that we See it Failed….<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong>and COIN, another difficulty….<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

As we walk away from the Iraq and Af-Pak Wars, we face many questions about the future.\u00a0 Two of these are:<\/strong><\/p>\n