{"id":68236,"date":"2020-10-30T20:10:49","date_gmt":"2020-10-30T20:10:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=68236"},"modified":"2020-10-30T20:10:49","modified_gmt":"2020-10-30T20:10:49","slug":"the-a-yeoman-farmer-series-part-iv","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/?p=68236","title":{"rendered":"The A Yeoman Farmer Series Part IV:"},"content":{"rendered":"

[Mark Safransk<\/strong>i\/\u00a0zen<\/strong>]<\/p>\n

I am stirring from blogging retirement to bring you a series culled from a historical-political essay by a scholar who is a very long time reader of ZP who wrote this post over a long period of time following the last presidential election. He writes under the pseudonym \u201cA Yeoman Farmer\u201d and his foil is the famous\u00a0\u201cFlight 93 Election\u201d essay<\/a>\u00a0of \u201cPublius Decius Mus\u201d in\u00a0The Claremont Review of Books<\/a><\/em>.\u00a0I will be breaking the essay into parts and turning the footnotes into section endnotes with each post and linking to the previous sections that have been posted. This post comprises Part IV and the final conclusion of the series.<\/em><\/p>\n

Part I can be found here<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Part II can be found here<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Part III can be found here<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

The Reichstag is always burning: a commentary on The Flight 93 Election<\/strong><\/p>\n

By: A Yeoman Farmer<\/strong><\/p>\n

….<\/p>\n

9. Continetti trips over a more promising approach when he writes of \u201cstress[ing]
\nthe \u2018national interest abroad and national solidarity at home\u2019 through foreign-
\npolicy retrenchment, \u2018support to workers buffeted by globalization,\u2019 and setting
\n\u2018tax rates and immigration levels\u2019 to foster social cohesion.&quot; That sounds a lot
\nlike Trumpism. But the phrases that Continetti quotes are taken from Ross
\nDouthat and Reihan Salam, both of whom, like Continetti, are
\nvociferously\u2014one might even say fanatically\u2014anti-Trump. At least they,
\nunlike Kesler, give Trump credit for having identified the right stance on
\ntoday\u2019s most salient issues. Yet, paradoxically, they won\u2019t vote for Trump
\nwhereas Kesler hints that he will. It\u2019s reasonable, then, to read into Kesler\u2019s
\nesoteric endorsement of Trump an implicit acknowledgment that the crisis is,
\nindeed, pretty dire. I expect a Claremont scholar to be wiser than most other
\nconservative intellectuals, and I am relieved not to be disappointed in this
\ninstance.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The \u201cright stance on today\u2019s most salient issues\u201d sums up the problem for what ails
\nAmerica is not today\u2019s more salient issues, it is something deeper and not one that is
\nsolved by having the \u201cright stance\u201d, a stance that seems to be right only because it
\nfits the author\u2019s prejudices. If the right stance were all that mattered, then there is no
\nfundamental choice to be made only different stances on the same issues. In other
\nwords, there are no choices left, only policy positions, which itself suggests that the
\ncrisis the author claims exist is simply that his policy preferences, the right stance, is
\nnot being chosen or can be chosen. Yet, the author, aside from describing a
\ndeclension of the most alarming kind, the 1000-year progressivist Reich awaits,
\nsimply refers to the right policy stances. One wonders if the real 1000-year Reich
\ncould have been defeated with the right policy stances.<\/p>\n

What is surprising, but in a deeper sense is not at all surprising since it fits the
\ncontempt for the \u201ccorrupt\u201d America, is that none of the conservatives and specifically
\nTrump did not have a proposal or thought for the opioid epidemic killing thousands of
\nAmericans. Instead, the key issues are immigration, trade, and war as if these are
\nwhat are killing the most Americans each year. Here is where Kesler\u2019s glib statement
\nand the author\u2019s implicit support for it are revealed for their dishonesty. Trump did
\nnot have a policy proposal on the opioid crisis and Hillary Clinton did. 6 I guess that
\nProfessor Kesler believes that no policy option for opioids is better than Clinton\u2019s
\npolicy option.<\/p>\n

What is not explained nor is it explored is how conservatives contributed to America
\nbecoming so corrupt that it was in danger of going over the cliff on immigration,
\ntrade, and war. If we look at the broad level, we see that Obama brought down
\nimmigration levels, improved America\u2019s trade position, and worked to bring
\nAmerica\u2019s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan to an end. However, we are to
\nunderstand that America is at the cliff edge without having a point of reference to
\nknow when it was not on the cliff edge or what specifically about the general issues
\n(trade, immigration, and war) as well as the eight sub issues that appear as
\nconstants within American society (all societies?) was not problematic previously but
\nbecame problematic in 2016?<\/p>\n

We are also given an insight into what Trumpism means when the author praises
\nContinetti\u2019s proposals. Here is what Trumpism appears to be:<\/p>\n

national interest abroad and national solidarity at home<\/strong>
\nforeign-policy retrenchment<\/strong>
\nsupport to workers buffeted by globalization<\/strong>
\ntax rates and immigration levels\u2019 to foster social cohesion.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

On the surface, these appear anodyne or boiler plates. What President does not
\nseek the national interest abroad and national solidarity at home? Is this an issue for
\nthe campaign? This would also suggest that Obama was not pursuing the national
\ninterest and national solidarity. The desire for foreign policy retrenchment seems to
\nseem a strange desire since Obama worked to retrench American foreign policy with
\nMuslim countries and to wind down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If these were
\nnot retrenchments, then what does retrenchment look like? We are told America First
\nwould be a form of retrenchment but would it be if it too seeks the national interest
\nabroad? How can we retrench foreign policy and simultaneously seek the national
\ninterest abroad? As for the desire to support workers buffeted by globalization, this
\nappears laudable yet contradictory. Does this mean that we are to be insulated from
\nglobalisation\u2019s negative effectives and open to its positive effects? How exactly does
\nthat work? It seems to be a nostrum that sounds good, it tastes great and it is less
\nfilling or is simply sound and fury signifying nothing. It is a way to flatter the audience
\nthat wants to hear that the government will take care of them so that we return to big
\ngovernment to protect the worker by intervening in the economy to pick the winners
\nand losers. This might be Trumpism, but it is certainly not conservatism. As for tax
\nrates that foster social cohesion that seems rather strange approach unless the idea
\nis that misery loves company since tax rates have no connection to social cohesion.
\nPerhaps this is the silver bullet to solve social cohesion, better tax rates. Who knew?
\nThen again, the author might be right about conservativism\u2019s decline if the best it can
\ndo about social cohesion is to argue that tax rates are the answer.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

10. Yet we may also reasonably ask: What explains the Pollyanna-ish declinism<\/strong>
\nof so many others? That is, the stance that Things-Are-Really-Bad\u2014But-Not-So-<\/strong>
\nBad-that-We-Have-to-Consider-Anything-Really-Different! The obvious<\/strong>
\nanswer is that they don\u2019t really believe the first half of that formulation. If so,<\/strong>
\nlike Chicken Little, they should stick a sock in it. Pecuniary reasons also<\/strong>
\nsuggest themselves, but let us foreswear recourse to this explanation until we<\/strong>
\nhave disproved all the others.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Once again, the author suggests that things are so bad that we need a change and
\nnot just any change, but a radical change, but without explaining what it is that ails
\nAmerica except that the policy alternatives are so bad that people have voted for
\nthem for the past eight years. What we are to understand is that we have a choice
\nbetween Candide or Gibbon without a choice between them. We are presented with
\na Manichean choice when the reality is that statesmanship is rarely presented with
\nsuch choice except in the most extreme positions, usually moments of existential
\ncrisis (think Churchill rallying Britain and the West against Hitler\u2019s onslaught). The
\nauthor does not want to accept that the general direction of America can be
\nimproved in some areas but that the Republic in its core is stable or is at least in a
\nposition where the normal challenges that any republic faces are not approaching an
\nexistential nature. If the Republic is in an existential crisis, the ails that he mentions
\nare at best the symptoms and not the cause, but we cannot discuss that because the
\nauthor believes that the symptoms are the cause.<\/p>\n

As for the author\u2019s lament of the conservatives who display a Pollyanna-ism which
\nhe claims is unwarranted, we must ask what he thinks of Christians who believe that
\nfinal success is to be found with Christ so that any of the today\u2019s travails can be
\nendured for that reason. In other words, the author seems strangely quiet about
\nreligion\u2019s role in conservatism or more generally the role that optimism plays within
\nAmerica and American politics. If we follow the author, then we must refuse to be
\noptimistic in the face of challenges and that the challenges are so great that
\noptimism cannot be justified. More to the point, if they are to claim things are bad
\nthey must be so bad that radical change is required, not just change but radical
\nchange, which raises the question of whether conservatives can argue things are
\nbad, or things are very bad, but if they do they must embrace radical change for
\nanything less is surrender to unwarranted optimism.<\/p>\n

However, what bothers the author is that his fellow conservatives either do not
\nbelieve that things are that bad, in particular as he does not grant that they can be
\nthat bad in specific areas without being that bad overall, or they have a pecuniary
\ninterest to say that things are bad but not so bad as to allow specific changes without
\nan revolution within the regime. In a neat rhetorical twist, truly Trumpian, the author
\ndeclares his fellow conservatives, who do not support him or Trump, are liars or on
\nthe take.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

11. Whatever the reason for the contradiction, there can be no doubt that there is<\/strong>
\na contradiction. To simultaneously hold conservative cultural, economic, and<\/strong>
\npolitical beliefs\u2014to insist that our liberal-left present reality and future direction<\/strong>
\nis incompatible with human nature and must undermine society\u2014and yet also<\/strong>
\nbelieve that things can go on more or less the way they are going, ideally but<\/strong>
\nnot necessarily with some conservative tinkering here and there, is logically<\/strong>
\nimpossible<\/strong>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The author, by looking at a potential contradiction, almost gets close to the problem
\nbut seems to lose his way. He forgets what Strauss taught that all societies have
\ncontradictions and those societies that try to remove them will destroy themselves for
\nthat is what liberalism requires–the end of contradictions. If this is what the author is
\ntrying to argue, that conservativism retains the same contradictions as Liberalism,
\nthen that is a different argument to America is in terminal decline if it remains on its
\ncurrent path, unless one thinks that America is not, nor ever was, a liberal country
\nand to pursue liberalism is the catastrophe that needs to be resisted. Yet, if that is
\nthe argument, it fails, despite the author\u2019s rhetorical flourishes, for two main reasons.
\nFirst, America is *the* liberal experiment since its founding. To argue that it was
\nnever liberal, even assuming the argument that it was a deeply republican liberalism,
\nseems anachronistic. The second is that America\u2019s pursuit of liberalism is its
\nexperiment that unfolds with each generation where conservatives have offered the
\nnecessary course corrections to keep that experiment from ending in failure since
\nthat experiment by definition is whether human nature finds fulfilment through
\nliberalism and whether the experience of the past 230 years has provided evidence
\nin that argument. Yet, the crisis to which the author addresses, but does not identify,
\nis within liberalism, American liberalism, which he does not explore since he never
\ngoes to the cause. Even though he gropes towards the source and sort of touches
\non possible solutions, without understanding what he is doing, that is his heart is in
\nthe right place, he never gets to the core of why America is in crisis and why Trump
\nhas been able to emerge as a symptom of that crisis and his attempt to solve that
\ncrisis is hampered by being its symptom. However, the author seems to believe it is
\na crisis of liberalism as if there is a serious alternative within America to liberalism or
\none that remains untried if not unimagined.<\/p>\n

What some of his less restrained colleagues have accepted is a previous alternative
\nto liberalism, an outcome that is coeval with politics. However, their preferred
\nalternative only appeals because they have forgotten its previous failures elsewhere
\nin the belief that *this time* it will work in America which is a country founded in direct
\nopposition to that alternative.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

12. Let\u2019s be very blunt here: if you genuinely think things can go on with no<\/strong>
\nfundamental change needed, then you have implicitly admitted that<\/strong>
\nconservatism is wrong. Wrong philosophically, wrong on human nature, wrong<\/strong>
\non the nature of politics, and wrong in its policy prescriptions. Because, first,<\/strong>
\nfew of those prescriptions are in force today. Second, of the ones that are, the<\/strong>
\nleft is busy undoing them, often with conservative assistance. And, third, the<\/strong>
\nwhole trend of the West is ever-leftward, ever further away from what we all<\/strong>
\nunderstand as conservatism.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

What has become clear is that the author really likes to present everything as a
\nManichean choice in which the choice is either\/or and rarely, if ever, both\/and. Either
\nyou must embrace radical change or you admit conservatism has failed. What is
\ncurious about the author\u2019s argument is how ahistorical it is. To claim that he knows
\nor has divined or diagnosed conservativism\u2019s failure, suggests he has an insight into
\nconservatism, liberalism, and the American experiment that is superior to any other
\nargument. In his own words, if he is right, then conservatism is wrong and wrong
\nsimply about everything until he arrived. Yet, for his audacity, his argument lacks
\nsubstance. As someone once said, the more audacious your argument, the less
\nevidence you need, which is perhaps describes the Trump campaign. For a
\npolitician, this is excusable, but for someone professing to be a public commentator it
\nis inadequate if not bordering on incompetence masked by rhetorical eloquence.<\/p>\n

The choice is a false one. America can continue without change to its regime, its
\nfunctioning liberal democratic society, its political institutions and norms and one can
\ndemand that there is a need for change within all three without conservatism being
\nwrong. Yet, it is not whether one is wrong about America, it is that if you do not see
\nthe problem as the author sees them then you are wrong about conservatism and
\neverything else.<\/p>\n

You are:<\/p>\n

Wrong philosophically<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In a word, you are not a conservative. How we came to this moment is uncertain or
\nhow no one else saw it not clear, but conservative philosophy is wrong for not seeing
\nthat a fundamental change is needed. Except for being a Never Burke conservative,
\nhe does not explain what that means to be philosophically wrong.<\/p>\n

wrong on human nature<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

What is not clear is what this means. Human nature is not fixed nor is it fluid.
\nInstead, it is something, like philosophy itself, in that we are still working to discover it
\nwhich is why you can see dramatic changes in regimes or changes in politics based
\non what we understand about human nature. It does not mean human nature has
\nchanged or is changeable to know that our understanding of human nature develops
\nas we contemplate what it means to be human. However, that type of argument or
\nunderstanding is not presented here since it would get in the way of the political
\nargument.<\/p>\n

wrong on the nature of politics, an<\/strong>d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This statement seems redundant since if you are wrong about human nature then
\nyou must be wrong about politics if it is to determine the best way to live as humans
\nsince it is predicated upon a shared or agreed understanding of human nature. As
\nmentioned above, that understanding of the nature of politics cannot be fixed for it is
\nthen political philosophy is at an end. If that quest is at an end, then we are now
\ntransported into sectarianism.<\/p>\n

wrong in its policy prescriptions<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Finally, this seems superfluous since the failure of philosophy, human nature, and
\nthe nature of politics would mean that any policy prescription would be wrong.
\nExcept that it isn\u2019t which gets us back to a deeper secondary question, again
\nunanswered and unasked by the author, in that we only see hints or a shadow of it or
\nrather its negation makes us aware of its presence. The author never explores the
\nrelationship of thought to politics or how political philosophy informs political theory
\nfor policy prescription especially as they appear only to be needed to resolve or
\napply what is already agreed or already implicit in the system. If politics or political
\nthinking does not require philosophy or political philosophy, then the author should
\ndiscuss that since it seems to be a fundamental element of whether conservativism
\nis right or has something to say or whether the American experiment is even
\npossible. But, we never get to see this work. Instead, we are told why we are wrong.<\/p>\n

Why?<\/p>\n

Here we are doubly disappointed. The author does not explore such questions, as
\nwe would expect that if you are to disagree and be wrong about the fundamentals of
\npolitical life, philosophy, human nature, politics and policy prescription then
\nsomething must exist to demonstrate this but the evidence for his argument is
\ndisappointing in its superficiality and shallowness. The evidence that you are wrong
\nis that:<\/p>\n

first, few of those prescriptions are in force today.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Our philosophy is wrong, our understanding of human nature is wrong, our
\nunderstanding of politics is wrong because few of those prescriptions are in force?
\nHow does that follow? How can you draw such a sweeping conclusion from such
\nmeagre evidence? The public do not like us and did not vote for us so everything is
\nwrong. Our policy prescriptions were changed, not all so some must have worked,
\nbut most and therefore we are wrong not that the policy prescriptions were wrong or
\npoorly supported. It seems laughable but here we are and it gets worse because
\nsome conservatives seem to disagree with other conservatives about what
\nconservative prescriptions are best.<\/p>\n

Second, of the ones that are, the left is busy undoing them, often with<\/strong>
\nconservative assistance.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

What this suggests then is that the policy prescriptions that were badged as
\nconservative might not have been truly conservative but served a faction and
\ntherefore were not rooted in anything enduring except for what that faction wanted.
\nHowever, that is not possible because this problem is caused by the ever-present
\nbogeyman\u2014the Left.<\/p>\n

And, third, the whole trend of the West is ever-leftward, ever further away<\/strong>
\nfrom what we all understand as conservatism<\/strong>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The author makes it appear that \u201cfundamental change\u201d is required without saying
\nwhat is a fundamental change. He hits at something deeper, something larger,
\nsomething longer lasting, something permanent, but he dares not address it. If
\nTrump is the fundamental change, we must wonder what was Franklin Roosevelt or
\nLyndon Johnson? Were they the continuity candidates? We can believe that America
\nneeds changes and there are areas of great or even urgent attention and we can
\nalso know that the 2016 election is nowhere as important or requiring a \u201cfundamental
\nchange\u201d as say the 1932 election or the 1968 election.<\/p>\n

Leaving aside the hyperbole, which is quite difficult since the piece and its thinking
\nare infused with it, we face the fundamental question that is still unasked. The author
\nassumes that the policy prescriptions he has described, or the \u201cright stances\u201d on
\npolicy issues, are what needs to change. If this is the radical change, the
\n\u201cfundamental change\u201d, then we have to ask: \u201cHow is this different from just another
\nseries of policy proposals?\u201d Within the essay, we do not find a fundamental or *the*
\nfundamental question, which would indicate a crisis of the magnitude exists, has
\nbeen asked.<\/p>\n

End Part IV<\/strong><\/p>\n

Endnotes<\/strong><\/p>\n

6. When Professor Kesler used to make similar glib statements in his graduate seminars, some
\nstudents would ask afterwards about a particular statements and he would often grin and prevaricate
\ndemonstrating his superior rhetorical skills and thus provided the more advanced students a second
\nseminar in the art of sophistry or the challenge of trying to differentiate the philosopher and the
\nsophist. One student, a veritable ubermensch, would often buy him a beer to congratulate him for
\nbeing particularly skilled in dodging that day\u2019s questions. In the academic arena such games are
\neducative. In the public domain, they prove problematic because they display a desire to flatter and
\ndissemble to promote a man singularly unqualified to be president as the public cannot discern their
\neducative effect and only their political effect. If an academic is to dabble in politics, the least they can
\nbe is responsible, but history has shown academics, particularly German ones have been less than
\nresponsible when getting involved in politics.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

[Mark Safranski\/\u00a0zen] I am stirring from blogging retirement to bring you a series culled from a historical-political essay by a scholar who is a very long time reader of ZP who wrote this post over a long period of time following the last presidential election. He writes under the pseudonym \u201cA Yeoman Farmer\u201d and his […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1345,232,360,361,218,187],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-68236","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-1345","category-20th-century","category-21st-century","category-america","category-philosophy","category-politics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68236","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=68236"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68236\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":68240,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68236\/revisions\/68240"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=68236"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=68236"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zenpundit.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=68236"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}