Broadband connectivity style State-building is a positive endeavor, a useful prophylactic in weak States before trouble begins and a vital support where resilient states are effectively combatting 4GW attackers. Resiliency however is critical to state survival – it is the foundation that will support the range of State-building programs and will be reinforced by them. Nurturing resiliency should be the pivotal aspect of any System Administration intervention.
Without resiliency, State-building is nothing more than the creation of an empty suit.
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Dan tdaxp:
November 2nd, 2005 at 2:27 pm
Extremely good post. Very thought-provoking, and I will try to respond with a worth-while comment soon.
In the meantime, what are the major differences between deobandians and salafis? You’ve addressed this before (The Taliban were D, Wahabis are S, etc), but what are the doctrinal differences?
Dan tdaxp
mark:
November 2nd, 2005 at 9:00 pm
Well the deleted post was certainly a strange one….
Hi Dan,
Collounsbury would be beter placed to answer your question than me but here’s my understanding.
Wahabbis adhere to a form of Sunni Salafism originating in Saudi Arabia in the 1700’s. It was originally quite hostile to the form of Salafism emnating from Egypt’s al-Azhar (the first 19th century Islamists Mohammed Abdub and al-Afghani were modernizers). Even as late as the 1920’s and 1930’s, Saudi Ikhwan loathed the Egyptians. This has changed as the Qutbist Salafis fled Nasser’s repression in the 1960’s and settled in KSA universities ( Bin Laden was taught by Qutb’s brother) radicalizing the already xenophobic Wahabbi fringe.
Deobandis are a school of thought from Northern India similar to Arab Salafis in that they seek to find purer, older Islam without innovations. Like the Islamists they were anti-Western from the start and emphasized the obligation of jihad against infidels and Shiites. There are some differences of opinion though with Salafis over what Islamic practices and beliefs are ” truer” than others but close enough that the relations between KSA and the Taliban were quite warm. If anything, Pakistan Deobandis are more reactionary and anti-modern than their Saudi counterparts.
I’d recommend checking out Gilles Keppel on this one for fine points.
Anonymous:
November 2nd, 2005 at 10:14 pm
One thing you may want to consider is that autocracies aren’t a problem for us until they direct internal anger at their rule outward towards us.
Curtis Gale Weeks:
November 3rd, 2005 at 4:09 am
Well, Mark, this is a very interesting post, and I wonder if this was the big project you were promising…
I have some problems with your method — or maybe, they are questions — but I’m a little too exhausted at the moment to force myself to explicate, and I’m not sure I have the words/terminology I need. I’ll have to think about it.
In general, though, I’m a little troubled by the focus on “the State” which largely ingores the constituency of that state. If a state is a system (as it surely is), then any discussion of states fighting 4GW opponents would need to take a hard look at the constitution of that state, or the nodes and connections which make up that system. Resiliency (as I understand it) is not a top-down undertaking (or not only a top-down accomplishment).
Your post has me thinking that we are approaching the vs. 4GW question all wrong. Perhaps the 4GW opponent is so threatening, and often successful, because it doesn’t quite need the “State.” That is, if my fingertip-feeling is correct, then the network we call “The State” is one which is not a scale-free network (to borrow Vonny’s conceptualization of it): for a “state” to be recognizable, it must be definable, or have definition, and when we consider or conceptualize a state, we tend to think of a very organized — perhaps a rigid – entity. To borrow from Vonny again, consider the removal of one branch of government, or of the Constitution, and then ask if the system would hold. For another example, Vonny’s description of a hierarchical, “tree branch” system of government strikes me as being a description of virtually every state (especially, every democratic state) in existence. In America, the Constitution of the U.S. is the trunk, and various branches rise from it to form the three branches of the federal government and also the states and their state government agencies, etc.
If resiliency is as Vonny described it, then a truly resilient state would need to be a scale-free network.
I don’t think the ideas I’ve skimmed over here are antithetical to the ideas in your post. However, I do believe that the constant focus on “the State” as the primary actor which will defeat 4GW foes introduces too much rigidity, dooming dreams of a truly resilient and efficient entity. It ignores the people, the constituency of that entity, and thus ignores the variety and, well, cosmopolitan nature of the system: a necessary bit of chaos in a system which wants to be resilient (if only “the State” will let it.)
I think it’s good to dream that a charismatic leader or set of leaders might pull all the threads together —
A state whose leaders exemplify a nation’s creed and demonstrate courage or intelligence can find men who will march for them to the Gates of Hell.
— but I think it is a dream that can come true only in short (and thus, largely ineffective) bursts in a democratic nation or with great vitality but also long-term inefficiency via a dictatorial mania-driven program. See again my post on Flu(n)x: Your idea of “a nation’s creed” implies a fantasy homogeneity at worst; at best, it implies strength where one or few common core values will only produce a weak national unity, in most cases. (The wish for survival of the self, however, is quite strong, and might work all by itself, under the right circumstances.) In fact, I think that such a formation around one person or a group is the very opposite of resiliency, since that one human node holds all together.
Of course, these musings have inspired many practical ideas about true democratic resiliency against a 4GW foe, but as I said, I’m a little too exhausted at the moment to go further!
mark:
November 3rd, 2005 at 5:04 am
Hi Curtis,
No, the big project is still on the way. Hopefully I can announce it tomorrow or Friday.
I too am really beat so these will be short points:
The state was the focus of my post but I am not implying an either/or situation.
You are right to look at the State’s constitution.
Not all networks are scale free and I think formal state constitutional structures are not.
On the other hand, scale free networks of a professional, social and political nature constantly form within government institutions. The function and form of the State institutional structure would also tend to ” shape” the growth of such networks to an extent even as these networks emerge to remediate the state’s own functional shortcomings.
The State does not have to be the only actor engaged in defeating a 4GW opponent but if it isn’t at least primus inter pares it risks vanishing altogether regardless if the 4GW opponent is defeated.
Curtis Gale Weeks:
November 3rd, 2005 at 5:38 am
My gut is telling me that, properly speaking, there is no state. What we call “the state” is merely our description of the actors within it: the larger system/network formed by all the interactions of the actors. “State” is shorthand for that. To the degree that this “state” is not scale-free, or is rigid or functions through linear paths, the interactions of those within it are also rigid, linear, unable to adapt to new parameters — at least, unable to adapt without also causing a change in the whole, or the “state.”
nadezhda:
November 4th, 2005 at 3:30 am
Legitimacy is similarly at the heart of the Weberian bureaucratic state. We could define a state’s response to 4GW in bureaucratic terms as primarily a problem of coordination — devising and executing responses across a wide range of dimensions — and organizational adaptivity. I’m not sure where thinking about the state as a network-of-networks gets you beyond what Weber would provide. Certainly network analysis is helpful in looking at specific spaces — issue areas or action areas. But do we gain any distinctive insights about legitimacy when we view the state as some sort of amalgamation or aggregation of networks? Or when you’re identifying legitimacy as a key characteristic of resiliency are you highlighting the interpenetration of the state with civil society through shared networks of elites?
Valdis:
November 4th, 2005 at 1:49 pm
“If resiliency is as Vonny described it, then a truly resilient state would need to be a scale-free network.”
NO!!! Just the opposite! A scale-free network is very vulnerable to an “intelligent attack” A scale free network collapses very quickly when < 5% of its best connected nodes are disabled/disrupted. We know how to attack a scale-free network — Saddam’s Iraq, but we are not effective in fighting a distributed network — post-Saddam insurgency. Which is more resilient? Those of you that are “in love” with scale-free networks need to read more than one book on networks!
mark:
November 4th, 2005 at 4:19 pm
I just visited Valdis’ site – I’ll have to go back and review it in detail but it is certainly information-rich on network theory and its applications –
Dr. Von if you are reading this today, you in particular should take a look
vonny:
November 4th, 2005 at 4:34 pm
I’ll certainly look at Valdis’s site, and he is absolutely correct about scale-free networks being greatly affected if small numbers of the larger hubs are taken out. But keep in mind that something like the Iraq network, where Saddam was THE main hub and was removed, does not entirely collapse because there are smaller nodes (i.e. with few connections to other members of the network) still out there on the periphery of the network, as we learned in the insurgency.
A more resilient network is a modified version of a purely scale-free network, and tht is one with modularity, where subgroups in the network do their own thing but have some connectivity with other subgroups (along the lines of a corporate structure, where various divisions specialize on different jobs…if one division goes down, the others have a higher degree of independence and may not be affected, even though they all exist as members of the larger network). Perhaps this is what Curtis had in mind.
Curtis Gale Weeks:
November 4th, 2005 at 7:33 pm
I’ll take a look at Valdis’ site, even though I am not “in love” with scale-free networks.
Vonny is tracking my mind.
Actually, I’ve been thinking of attractors, and the ability of systems to adapt or change attractors without being utterly changed or destroyed — with the idea that “strangely attracting” systems would be more resilient than systems which have fixed point or limit cycle attractors. (Here of course I am separating the concepts stability and resiliency to get a better look at it.) I’m not altogether certain (am even doubtful) that the term “networks” will be sufficent for describing democratic “states” — perhaps we should be thinking in terms of complex systems rather than complex networks.
And of course the idea of a pure “scale free” network doesn’t fit neatly with the idea of scaling and self-similarity for the network of nodes; but the idea of scale-free networks Valdis seems to hold assumes a small set of “best connected nodes” — which in turn implies a scale. (Best connected node, better connected nodes, connected nodes, less connected nodes.) So modularity might be considered for scale-free networks, in which such a scalng becomes less significant: an attack on one or many of those nodes doesn’t upset the operation of the others.
Valdis’ scale seems to imply a state with a few fixed-point attractors or a cyclical attractors — i.e., like an electrical grid, activity flows through a set of major hubs and, between the hubs, an enclosed and cyclical pathway. Even the “less connected” nodes in such a system nonetheless depend on those major nodes and pathways.
But, you know, I’m no expert.
praktike:
November 5th, 2005 at 1:04 pm
I’m late to the party, but this post is making me want to go back and look at the 90s counterinsurgency work by the Egyptian government, or its ongoing low-level war in the Sinai.
mark:
November 5th, 2005 at 1:52 pm
Hey Curtis,
From an earlier comment you wrote:
“What we call “the state” is merely our description of the actors within it: the larger system/network formed by all the interactions of the actors”
No, the continuity of new actors over time being required to network in exactly ( or substantially) the same way is the state, not the actors themselves. The difference between patrimonial medievalism and constitutional nation-state forms.
Nadezhda wrote:
“Or when you’re identifying legitimacy as a key characteristic of resiliency are you highlighting the interpenetration of the state with civil society through shared networks of elites?”
Always glad to have you commenting here Nad – very insightful. Yes my use of legitimacy – admittedly a slippery concept but one that defines a real characteristic – hews more to the latter.
Hi Prak !
How’s the Arabic training going ? You could probably add something to Dan’s Salafi/Deobandi question.
If i recall, the Egyptian response in terms of CI was ramped up after the major tourist attack ( Karnak?)
I read the other day that the U.S. Army has only recently rebuilt its CI programs *after* the invasion of Iraq. Great for future soldiers but right now Majors LTC and Colonels are trying to ad hoc train troops in the field in Iraq.
praktike:
November 6th, 2005 at 3:03 pm
The big attack was the machine gunning of several dozen Swiss tourists at the Hatshepsut temple in Luxor, I believe.
As for doctrinal differences between salafism and Deobandism, I think that Deobandism is actually a subset of salafism. A regional variant, if you will, which reflects the culture of the Indian subculture as well as the extreme views of Mawdudi, the school’s founder and ongoing inspiration. I would be hard-pressed, however, to go into details–suffice it to say that Deobandis are extremist though not necessarily violent.