Deep Understanding

Michael Tanji points to this report by RAND to explain why the IC isn’t demonstrating any.

Part of the problem, I will hazard is a guess, is legacy security and pesonnel policies. “Deep understanding” of cultural-political variables of foreign societies requires a mix of academic historical, linguistic and social science expertise coupled with extensive “in-country” experience. Ideally, in the same analyst but failing that at least within the same analytical team. Aside from the collector-analyst division which could stand some erasure, many of the most useful sort of moldable, raw, talent – children of native speakers and Americans with extensive experience living overseas – have a difficult time getting through the clearance process.

Then, once these folks are in, cultivation of a strategic perspective – which includes synthesis, intuition and imagination and a long time horizon alongside analysis – have to become a priority over narrow analytical-reductionism and a “presentist” mindset. We have guys who do the latter already, they’re called journalists and the best of them do it very well. The IC should be playing at another level.

  1. Fabius Maximus:

    How strange that the IC cannot understand or forecast events in the wilder corners of the world!  The CIA’s middle-brow academic types, civil servants to whom strong emotions are foreign, for whom security is both a right and the highest necesity — should have a better field for those for whom power is the primary goal, spilling rivers of blood a thrill, obedience to God trumps even life, and/or loyalty to clan trumps individual needs.

    Perhaps another re-org will do the job, or new job titles.  Better carpets?  New software?

    The latter will work, if installed in their heads.

  2. zen:

    We’re at the teetering point that the Ming dynasty went through when the examinations that produced Mandarins began to reward reverential memorization and ritual form over novel application of established principles