Beyond COIN: A Potential Answer to “Granular” 4GW Scenarios ?
Dr. Chet Richards at DNI had this post on Mexico:
A fourth generation war near you
…..An alternative is that what we’re going to face might better be described as a fourth generation, non-trinitarian conflict and not classical insurgency because it doesn’t appear that the goals of the groups employing terrorism and guerrilla warfare tactics involve replacing the government of either Mexico or the United States (see Bill Lind’s latest, below, for a discussion of this point).
So it is armed conflict, and if it isn’t insurgency, is it war? This is an important question because, as the current president claims and as the candidate from his party agrees, in war, a president has extraordinary powers.
While such powers have proven useful when the country faces the military forces of another country, they also allow the president to undertake activities that would be counterproductive if used against a guerrilla-type opponent, where the outcome depends primarily on moral elements – that is, on our ability to attract allies, maintain our own determination, and dry up the guerrillas’ bases of support.
The post elicited the following comment from Global Guerilla theorist, John Robb:
You are exactly right Chet, will this counter-insurgency stuff work against an open source enemy with billion dollar funding?
The narco-cartel killers, especially the Zetas, resemble the tiny, highly professional, 1GW armies of the 17th and 18th centuries. Very few in number relative to the population as a whole that they generally ignore ( or run roughshod over) while they engage the other, numerically small, professionals ( Mexican police and Army). Perhaps the appropriate strategic counter is analgous to the French Revolution’s response to invasion by monarchical 1GW armies – a levee en masse in the form of an ideologically turbocharged popular militia. This was one of the ideas being toyed with in the 1920’s by the German officers of the Reichswehr under von Seeckt, that had it’s last, twisted, gasp as Ernst Rohm’s vision of a 4 million man SA National Militia, a possibility extinguished in the Night of the Long Knives. Even the stealthy Zetas would have trouble operating in a city where the police and Army were backed by, say, 40,000 armed militiamen who were part of a national network. A loyalist paramilitary on steroids.
However, any such hypothetical popular militia will have to come from a social movement as the Mexican state no longer commands enough political legitimacy to recruit such a force to it’s side – even if it had the courage to grasp that kind of wolf by the ears.
John Robb:
June 8th, 2008 at 9:44 am
Bingo. Open source counter-insurgency — a wide variety of "loyalist" paramilitaries, from corporate to personal to neighborhood — is likely the next step.
zen:
June 8th, 2008 at 4:07 pm
Thanks, John.
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The degree to which the USG is ignoring possible worst-case scenarios on the border is a sign of the selfishness and myopia our our own coastal elite. I can easily see nothing concrete being done until 700,000 refugees begin crossing the border in just a few days to escape a descent into Somalia-like anarchy
CurtisGale Weeks:
June 8th, 2008 at 8:12 pm
What John appears to be describing could be an effect of a 5GW campaign, in which so many c0-opted and seemingly disparate/unconnected forces work toward the same goal or more likely complementary goals the accomplishment of which (effect in toto) becomes the defeat of the granular 4GW.
It is not necessary that these disparate forces be brought into some conscious understanding that they are working together, by a third party or "central board", nor even necessary that they each have their eyes focused on consciously defeating the same 4GW foe although that will be the ultimate effect. No, they can be nudged to do what they want to do anyway, separately (i.e. pursue their own self interests and for their own reasons and benefits); but the key point is, their paths would need to be guided just enough that the ultimate fulfillment of their own pursuits, in toto, results in the defeat of the 4GW threat.
Lexington Green:
June 9th, 2008 at 3:24 am
"…a wide variety of "loyalist" paramilitaries, from corporate to personal to neighborhood — is likely the next step."
Our constitutional heritage is one of armies raised only for particular purposes, and funded for only two years at a time.
The country’s "unorganized reserve" is all able bodied men, after all.
So, we can look to a subset of that, and add women to it, since that is what we do now. People who have concealed carry permits are registered with the state. Ask for volunteers. Network them. Bingo. You can mobilize the "unorganized reserve". Howabout flash mobs of volunteer handgun-armed citizens? Offer training to the volunteers, perhaps trained by private sector companies on a contract basis. All kinds of possibilities suggest themselves.
This is not retrograde. Nor is it, in many ways, novel. It is a return to our Anglospheric roots. Citizens of the shire raising the hue and cry; the Minutemen of colonial New England, citizen militias and voluntary organizations of the western migration. That sort of thing. We don’t need to do it like Ernst Rohm. We can do it like Ethan Allen and John Parker.
zen:
June 9th, 2008 at 4:08 am
Hi Curtis,
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The cartels, from what I have read, are edging into 5GW already with their emphasis on psycholoigcal warfare and misdirection.
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Unity of purpose is more important than unity of organization but very large organizations, like the SA or Mao’s Red Guards, were always semi-decentralized and impossible to bring under reliable command & control. It’s why Hitler and Mao ultimately destroyed their own creations.
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Hi Lex,
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You’re correct – the raising of the yeomanry is in the common law tradition and it was the root of our own militias in colonial America and the general principle behind the state militias until the 1950’s when Ike made it clear that the Guard was Federalized at the C-in-C.’s discretion. Since then, we have only had a professional army with gradations of reserves. No actual militia exists, except theoretically and legally.