Mao ZeDong and 4GW

Lexington Green:

June 18th, 2008 at 3:36 pm

"China’s civil war, running from the collapse of the Q’ing dynasty in 1911 to the proclamation of the People’s Republic in 1949, is a historical laboratory for 4GW and COIN theory. "

Am I wrong, or is there no fat, scholarly, reliable history in English of the period?  If I’m wrong, what book or books should I have on my list for this era?  It seems that this complicated period is probably saturated with lessons which will be relevant in the decades ahead, yet it is virtually unknown to Americans. 

"… he sent the PLA’s 5-6 crack divisions into the Korean War to face American troops in 2GW-style attrition warfare, not guerilla infiltrators behind MacArthur’s lines." 

Not strictly correct.  In the early, "open warfare" phase, Mao did precisely that.  He had whole divisions marching at night and hiding during the day, seeping in behind the UN forces.  At least one of John Poole’s books talk about the Chinese infiltration tactics, and summarizes various scholarship on it.  Once the entrenchments stretched across the whole peninsula, you had the imposition of 1914-1918 warfare, not because Mao’s generals chose not to use more subtle tactics, but because they couldn’t. 

zen:

June 18th, 2008 at 4:53 pm

Hi Lex,

I have not read Poole but you are right that advance units of US-UN forces reported encountering Chinese in  small groups well before being hit by the main Chinese force en masse and being forced to retreat. Is that indicative of a guerilla strategy by Mao or of preliminary recon/bolstering DPRK forces or just poor planning in sending what local provincial forces were available ahead of the PLA regulars ? I don’t know but the record of the Mao-Stalin talks on how each Communist giant were to support the North Koreans indicated that China was going to make a massive manpower commitment to the war ( which they did, at terrible cost).
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I am not aware of that kind of truly comprehesive work in English ( which hardly means one does not exist) both the Jung Chang Mao bio and the Fenby bio of Chiang have substantial military info on China’s civil war, as do works on Japanese intervention in China like Soldiers of the Sun.  A historian trying to do a comprehensive book would be looking at working in archives in Chinese, Japanese, Russian, English and German ( Chiang used serially Bolshevik, Reichswehr, Wehrmacht and American military advisers). Plus, on the Communist side there is an access problem to PLA and Party archives.
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If any readers out there have any suggestions as to what Lex is looking for, please offer them up.

Lexington Green:

June 18th, 2008 at 6:44 pm

I think, following Poole’s synoptic discussion, as well as other works, that the PLA was using infiltration tactics intentionally, at the tactical and operational level, throughout the early phase of its intervention.  I think Mao hoped to literally annihilate the UN forces in a single blow, and the PLA came scarily close to doing so.  US and Allied material superiority staved off disaster. 

Right, a truly comprehensive book would require a gigantic scholarly effort.  Too bad it does not exist.  1911-49 in China is a database of experience we would greatly benefit from having in digestible form.  I’ve got Fenby, as well as Soldiers of the Sun.  Grey knowledge. 

"… Bolshevik, Reichswehr, Wehrmacht and American military advisers …"  I wonder if there are any memoirs?

Manuel L. Quezon III: The Daily Dose » Blog Archive » Squeezing the turnip:

June 19th, 2008 at 10:48 am

[…] for the Great Helmsman himself, zenpundit takes a look at his reputation for being an innovator in military doctrine and says he was most […]

Melissa:

June 19th, 2008 at 3:08 pm

One great NF Historical Chinese book for anyone interested in the intricacies of politics in the Chinese way, pick up "Return to Middle Kingdom", by Yuan-tsung Chen. A magisterial portrait of intrigue and politics in Peking as China emerged into the 20th century. I highly recommend it.

Jay@Soob:

June 19th, 2008 at 10:23 pm

Thanks much for a detailed and engaging response!

"He was never interested in carving out a sphere of influence or an autonomous zone in China except as a stepping stone to final victory. Moreover, the Red Army’s lack of conventional fighting ability for most of the civil war related to a lack of means, not motive on Mao’s part."

Specifically the last part, I’m not sure this qualifies as a "no" in terms of 4GW. I can’t think of many organizations that would qualify as 4GW that intentionally remain nebulous and don’t strive for some semblance of political realization. Al Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf come to mind as examples of those that relish in a liquid existence. Others like Hamas, Hezbollah, the PKK etc. would seem to be striving in the same fashion as Mao for a semblance of statehood and utilize the 4GW method because they cannot fight on 3GW (or otherwise) terms.