Israel’s Half-Mad Genius of Mil-Theory

That being said, Stalin quickly realized during the 1941 retreat that he had debilitated his own army by decapitating it and his own judgment as supreme warlord was no substitute at the front lines for what Naveh terms “operational art”. Stalin the entrepreneur-grand strategist needed competent military architects like Zhukov and Rossokovsky to plug the gap with the craftsmen and Stalin not only promoted and protected them, he tolerated their dissent from his own military judgment and sometimes yielded to their concerns. Very much unlike Hitler who could seldom abide criticism or deviation from his general officers or learn from them. Stalin improved as a war leader from interaction with his generals; Hitler did not and if anything grew worse over time – as did the Wehrmacht’s tactical-strategic disconnect.

The above anecdote represents the rich level of depth behind Naveh’s offhand and seemingly disjointed references. There’s a lot of meat there behind the dots Naveh is connecting but the uninitiated will have to be willing to dig deep. I’m cool toward Naveh’s reliance upon French postmodernism but I admire the breadth of his capability as a horizontal thinker and theorist. However, Naveh needs an “architect” of his own to translate for him and make his complex ideas more readily comprehensible to the mainstream. I will wager that few Majors or Lt. Colonels, be they U.S. Army, IDF or Russian, read much Focault these days.

ADDENDUM:

The SWJ had an interview with Dr. Naveh on his theory of Systematic Operational Design in 2007

Dr. Naveh’s book is In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (Cummings Center Series)

Joint Force Quarterly (via Findarticle) -“Operational art

Jerusalem Post – “Column One: Halutz’s Stalinist moment

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  1. Mike:

    Zen, you’ve to read Eyal Weizman’s book Hollow Land: Israel’s Architectures of Occupation (Verso, 2007). Weizman is himself an architect, and teaches at Goldsmith’s College, University of London. The book starts with Sharon’s planning c. Suez for networked defense in depth, bridges archeology to architecture in the development of Jerusalem, gets into the influence of OTRI, etc.

    I’m equally cynical about postmodernism; what makes the Israeli story that much more fascinating, I think, is the way architects, and not just architectural theory, are threaded into this bit of contemporary history. Weizman actually repeatedly asserts that it’s been extremely influential in US military thinking, too. I’m curious how true that is. When I met him a few weeks ago, I didn’t get the chance to ask. I will soon.

  2. Lexington Green:

    "…Zhukov and Rossokovsky…"
    .
    And <a href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/90/Vasilevsky.png">Vasilievsky</a&gt;.
    .
    A key figure.  He was an "organizer of victory", not a battlefield commander, so everybody forgets him.  

  3. zen:

    Hi Mike,
    .
    Thanks for the rec -as to your question, Shane Deichman, who had an inside position at JFCOM during it’s heyday, might be able to address that. He sent me an email today re: Naveh’s book.
    .
    The Israeli’s don’t do COIN in my view – or rather they have already co-opted or neutralized non-Jewish groups ( Israeli Arabs, Arab Christians, Druze, Samaritans, Beduoins) to the maximal extent possible already and they are left with the irreconciliable hard core. Palestinian Muslims who cannot be integrated, ruled over nor let go safely because there is no state in waiting that can govern effectively enough to keep any peace with Israel.

  4. zen:

    Hi Lex,
    .
    And I did forget him. Of the uber-staff officers in modern military history, only George Marshall gets his due

  5. Mike:

    I should clarify – I meant that Weizman asserts the influence of OTRI, on IDF officers as well as on US military thinking. Don’t know if that changes Shane’s observation; I’d be curious how directly/indirectly OTRI’s work filtered into US mil training/thinking.

  6. A.E.:

    SOD is actually really popular in the Army and Marine Corps from what I’ve heard. There are a lot of monographs and papers that explicate the thesis. Don’t exactly recall which editions, but there are two main essays in Military Review that are basically puff pieces for SOD. That being said, there is a paucity of primary sources.

  7. A.E.:

    As for Zenpundit’s earlier bit about interpreter–I see a commonality with Boyd that makes SOD (once I find more sources) a good topic for an article comparing Shimon Naveh to Boyd.

  8. zen:

    I too see a similarity – at least in terms of methodological construction of theory. I’d have to read Naveh’s book first before analyzing the substance.

  9. A.E.:

    The book has little relationship to SOD. It’s just his ideas about the proper role of operational theory, explicated through a history that tracks it from Frederick the Great to Maneuver Conflict. The real substance is those essays, powerpoints, and monographs he’s undoubtedly written (in Hebrew, no doubt) on how SOD is expressed. I’ve looked at the bibliographies of the American military SOD monographs but they all link back to documents that are not for public release.

  10. Alex:

    The picture in your post is actually Tim Challans, who works with Naveh on SOD, not Naveh himself. Naveh is a fan of Boyd’s, and some of his PowerPoints include interpretations of SOD in terms of the OODA loop. BG(R) Huba Wass de Czege is the best US source on SOD, having worked closely with Naveh for a number of years. The paucity of source references is because of a reluctance on Naveh’s part to commit his ideas on paper – he claims that he is a terrible writer.

  11. zen:

    Alex! Thank you very much. Regarding the photo, I read "bald head" someplace and when the Challans pic came up on a search for "Naveh" I had assumed it was him. Fixing now….

  12. Alex:

    No worries. But you still have the wrong picture! There is only a low-res animated gif online at http://www.operationaldesign.com/IMAGES/bios/naveh.gif.

  13. gideon afek:

    The picture is that of Maj. Gen. Yair Naveh, deputy chief of staff of the IDF
    Someone different altogether