On Libya

I thought it might be interesting to look at some views of the Libyan War and then offer some remarks of my own. Of course, readers are encouraged to read each source in full rather than just my excerpt: First up….

CNAS (Andrew Exum & Zachary Hosford) – Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration

….The most dangerous outcome for the United States is also the most likely, which is a stalemate that prolongs U.S. and allied military intervention in Libya. The relative lack of sophistication and organization among rebel fighting forces means they may be unable to regain the momentum in Libya and defeat Gadhafi’s forces in open combat absent significant direct and indirect support from U.S.and allied militaries – which is not explicitly authorized by UNSCR 1973 and might not be supported by the U.S. Congress.

A stalemate in Libya would effectively result in a de facto partition of the country with a severely underundergoverned and disorganized safe haven in eastern Libya for the rebels that could provide refuge for various militant and criminal groups capable of exporting violence and instability to other countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Such a scenario would prolong U.S. and allied military intervention as only a major Western investment in developing the independent governance, economic and security force capacity of eastern Libya would be likely to forestall this outcome. However, such an investment is highly unlikely due to the overarching fiscal constraints facing the United States and NATO countries and competing priorities.

Nice work on a very important policy brief by Exum and Hosford. This one was “tight”, written to the point, properly focused on strategic variables rather than getting bogged down in debatable specialist minutia and delivering clear policy option scenarios. Written in exactly the right mode for a White House/NSC staffer or deputy to SEC to digest and disseminate to their boss or peers. Kudos, gents.

I think Ex and Hosford have correctly diagnosed Libya as a potential albatross for the US from which we stand to gain very little benefit even in the best case scenario. I disagree with their assertion that it would be a tolerable outcome to leave Gaddafi in power. No, that ship has already sailed and we have had enough Lockerbies. To imagine that there will not be ongoing blowback from a rump Gaddafi regime in a fragile neighborhood with which the US will repeatedly have to deal is just not at all realistic.

The Allies badly wanted Gaddafi out. They will have to be pressured now to follow through and the US needs to make it clear that we will neither babysit an enraged, cornered, Gaddafi for the next seven years, tying down an aircraft carrier group and costing the US taxpayer billions, nor we will accept the Brits and French hanging Gaddafi’s triumphant survival on our doorstep as an “American defeat” while skating away diplomatically (which is their Plan B if we refuse to do a Panama type operation for them). They will have to finish the job on the ground themselves and ensure Gaddafi’s death or departure with our support, but not the reverse. Or Paris and London can help build a real rebel army, salted liberally with PMC units and SOF “advisers” to stiffen spines.

CRS Report ( Christopher M. Blanchard) – Libya Unrest and US Policy

….The complexity of these factors and the stress that ongoing fighting places on their interrelationships creates challenges both for Qadhafi supporters and opposition groups. As both parties seek to navigate the political waters of the upheaval and look ahead to potential postconflictscenarios, they face difficult questions about current tactical choices and future means for promoting national reconciliation and governing effectively.

For the opposition, the question of foreign military intervention is complicated by opposition leaders’ desire for external assistance and their appreciation for the strong nationalist, anticolonial sentiment shared by most Libyans. Internally, political differences and competing demands among the opposition’s constituent groups may complicate the maintenance of a united front against Qadhafi counterattacks and complicate efforts to speak with one voice in dealings with the international community. Other regional examples suggest that such internal differences may prove even more challenging for any transitional authority in the aftermath of the conflict…

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