On Libya
I thought it might be interesting to look at some views of the Libyan War and then offer some remarks of my own. Of course, readers are encouraged to read each source in full rather than just my excerpt: First up….
CNAS (Andrew Exum & Zachary Hosford) – Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration
….The most dangerous outcome for the United States is also the most likely, which is a stalemate that prolongs U.S. and allied military intervention in Libya. The relative lack of sophistication and organization among rebel fighting forces means they may be unable to regain the momentum in Libya and defeat Gadhafi’s forces in open combat absent significant direct and indirect support from U.S.and allied militaries – which is not explicitly authorized by UNSCR 1973 and might not be supported by the U.S. Congress.
A stalemate in Libya would effectively result in a de facto partition of the country with a severely underundergoverned and disorganized safe haven in eastern Libya for the rebels that could provide refuge for various militant and criminal groups capable of exporting violence and instability to other countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Such a scenario would prolong U.S. and allied military intervention as only a major Western investment in developing the independent governance, economic and security force capacity of eastern Libya would be likely to forestall this outcome. However, such an investment is highly unlikely due to the overarching fiscal constraints facing the United States and NATO countries and competing priorities.
Nice work on a very important policy brief by Exum and Hosford. This one was “tight”, written to the point, properly focused on strategic variables rather than getting bogged down in debatable specialist minutia and delivering clear policy option scenarios. Written in exactly the right mode for a White House/NSC staffer or deputy to SEC to digest and disseminate to their boss or peers. Kudos, gents.
I think Ex and Hosford have correctly diagnosed Libya as a potential albatross for the US from which we stand to gain very little benefit even in the best case scenario. I disagree with their assertion that it would be a tolerable outcome to leave Gaddafi in power. No, that ship has already sailed and we have had enough Lockerbies. To imagine that there will not be ongoing blowback from a rump Gaddafi regime in a fragile neighborhood with which the US will repeatedly have to deal is just not at all realistic.
The Allies badly wanted Gaddafi out. They will have to be pressured now to follow through and the US needs to make it clear that we will neither babysit an enraged, cornered, Gaddafi for the next seven years, tying down an aircraft carrier group and costing the US taxpayer billions, nor we will accept the Brits and French hanging Gaddafi’s triumphant survival on our doorstep as an “American defeat” while skating away diplomatically (which is their Plan B if we refuse to do a Panama type operation for them). They will have to finish the job on the ground themselves and ensure Gaddafi’s death or departure with our support, but not the reverse. Or Paris and London can help build a real rebel army, salted liberally with PMC units and SOF “advisers” to stiffen spines.
CRS Report ( Christopher M. Blanchard) – Libya Unrest and US Policy
….The complexity of these factors and the stress that ongoing fighting places on their interrelationships creates challenges both for Qadhafi supporters and opposition groups. As both parties seek to navigate the political waters of the upheaval and look ahead to potential postconflictscenarios, they face difficult questions about current tactical choices and future means for promoting national reconciliation and governing effectively.
For the opposition, the question of foreign military intervention is complicated by opposition leaders’ desire for external assistance and their appreciation for the strong nationalist, anticolonial sentiment shared by most Libyans. Internally, political differences and competing demands among the opposition’s constituent groups may complicate the maintenance of a united front against Qadhafi counterattacks and complicate efforts to speak with one voice in dealings with the international community. Other regional examples suggest that such internal differences may prove even more challenging for any transitional authority in the aftermath of the conflict…
In a sea of government waste and middling competence, the Congressional Research Service stands out as a gem, giving the taxpayers a tremendous informational “bang for the buck” in reports prepared by experts on a vast array of subjects. While not an advocacy piece, the report is a valuable “backgrounder” on the Libyan War of a kind that you cannot get from the MSM.
Marc Lynch – Why Obama had to act in Libya
….And my conversations with Arab activists and intellectuals, and my monitoring of Arab media and internet traffic, have convinced me that the intervention was both important and desirable. The administration understood, better than their critics, that Libya had become a litmus test for American credibility and intentions, with an Arab public riveted to al-Jazeera. From what I can see, many people broadly sympathetic to Arab interests and concerns are out of step with Arab opinion this time. In the Arab public sphere, this is not another Iraq — though, as I’ve warned repeatedly, it could become one if American troops get involved on the ground and there is an extended, bloody quagmire. This administration is all too aware of the dangers of mission creep, escalation, and the ticking clock on Arab and international support which so many of us have warned against. They don’t want another Iraq, as Obama made clear…. even if it is not obvious that they can avoid one.
Lynch is an Arabist, and while the internet traffic aspect is skewing the demographic, al-Jazeera coverage is a dominant information effect in Arab public with limited literacy. It is sort of the Walter Cronkite effect from the 60’s in play again, if the primary trusted source is broadcasting an interpretation, it takes on the air of truth for a majority of viewers. That said, it matters very little whether al-Jazeera is giving kudos to the US if the average rebel can’t fire an RPG, quickly unjam and reload his AK-47 under fire, get water or food in the field or dig simple trench and sandbag defenses. Guys milling about nervously out in the open road, brandishing weapons and arguing amongst themselves will get their clocks cleaned by any opponent with even marginal military training and leadership. Gaddafi’s military forces are fourth rate – this is not Saddam’s army of 2003, much less of 1991 – but they can handle untrained and leaderless groups easily enough.
Which brings us to…..
Thomas P.M. Barnett –Arming the Libyan rebels
…There’s also al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but that group has frankly struggled to be taken seriously as a force, as it’s mostly a relabeling of an existing group that was going nowhere (bigger the territory in the title, more likely, in my mind, that it’s not exactly succeeding anywhere). Up to now, no one has portrayed that group as Libyan-centric. Yes, they will show up, but that’s standard. The reality, as noted in the piece, is that you have to train on what you provide, so we’ll have people on the ground (besides the CIA already there). If things go really sour, then we burn that bridge when we come to it. But this is not a logical showstopper. A Libyan long divided in two and suffering civil conflict will do the same – or far better – for AQIM than a concerted arms push to dethrone the guy. So, again, factor them in as the cost of doing any sort of business here, but do not elevate them into the decision-tilting bogeyman, because they’re not, and speculating in the press doesn’t make them so.
Going the Reagan Doctrine route was my original preference on Libya and I am still in favor of sponsoring an insurgency war against Gaddafi, with a couple of caveats.
First, SECDEF Robert Gates’ strong aversion to doing this gives me some pause, given his background as a former head of the IC and his access as SECDEF to our best current intelligence (which, admittedly, may not be that much). His judgment should be given considerable weight. Secondly, where are the Arabs? A hundred or so experienced NCO’s and junior officers from Egypt and KSA would be of immense help in establishing unit discipline and basic training for the rebels. The Saudis very well might be contributing substantial amounts of cash but that’s no longer good enough. The Arab League needs to show it’s alleged support for helping the rebels and removing Gaddafi with boots and not just empty words.
Reflexively, American policy makers face a great temptation to “own” the crisis and micromanage the Libyan War against some impossibly unrealistic standard of success. Let’s resist it. We should help drive nails in Gaddafi’s coffin but we don’t need to be the main hammer. Sometimes less is more and the Libyan rebels getting rid of their tyrant badly is better than us doing it for them well.
April 1st, 2011 at 10:32 pm
Zen-
A lot of what I’m reading sounds like tough guy posturing . . . I’m not ready to include you in that, but overall, I’m not too impressed with the arguments against the Libyan intervention.
I’ve supported the intervention from before it began. Call it a "Yugoslav moment" for me since I’ve got a history. Let me make a few points:
First off, there was never much of an attempt to sell this to the public. The American people got some information, but not much on why we should be involved in Libya and what was at stake. Compare that to the drum beat for Iraq in 2003 . . .
Second, the intervention had to operate in real time, had to react against the grain of what was going on which was honestly non-intervention and stalling, until either Obama "turned on a dime" or the French called his bluff, whichever you prefer. Nobody was talking about this a month ago, there is no relation between this and the slow-burn quality of the Iraq war, which should say a lot, but who mentions it?
Third, we can’t get involved in Libya since we have to focus on our two lost wars (from a strategic perspective) in Iraq and Af-Pak . . . How many good people have died for essentially nothing, or is anyone here going to argue that either of these were a success for the US? How much $$$ have we sunk into these pits? Bob Gates, contrary to your view imo, still as Sec of Def says it all.
The US comes out a paper tiger in this Libyan deal while it stumbles off back to its two quagmires. MQ sits pretty in Tripoli, the Arab Spring withers, and the Chinese have a good laugh . . . that’s what it comes down to imo and yes it is avoidable, just a question of our will since the people in Libya are willing . . . but then that would require us to actually learn something from our own history.
April 2nd, 2011 at 3:56 am
Hi seydlitz,
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I’m not anti-intervention, just worried about the USG officials investing way too much in terms of resources into the situation yet not taking any kind of decisive action that would bring matters to a conclusion – turning the situation into a running sore, or worse the US into an occupying power. In this situation, having limited interests, I’m for helping others to best help themselves.
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Regarding your points:
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"First off, there was never much of an attempt to sell this to the public. The American people got some information, but not much on why we should be involved in Libya and what was at stake. Compare that to the drum beat for Iraq in 2003 . . ."
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"Second, the intervention had to operate in real time, had to react against the grain of what was going on which was honestly non-intervention and stalling, until either Obama "turned on a dime" or the French called his bluff, whichever you prefer. Nobody was talking about this a month ago, there is no relation between this and the slow-burn quality of the Iraq war, which should say a lot, but who mentions it?"
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The Bush crowd had, in their lights, a strategy. They thought a war with Iraq was in the national interest, that Iraq had active WMD and that Saddam was an intransigent menace and getting rid of him would yield strategic benefits. They were wrong about many things and executed more incompetently than anyone would have believed possible but invading Iraq was not a spur of the moment decision and the country backed them through a long debate and a formal Congressional sanction.
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The Obama administration, in my view, seemed initially strongly disinclined to intervene in Libya. Gaddafi’s bloodcurdling speech, mental instability and proven track record of violent mayhem allowed advocates of intervention to change the policy without building an internal consensus within the administration. Nor did the administration make any effort to bring Congress or the public on board or obtain Congressional authorization. The policy is ad hoc and ill-defined and is being made/unmade in conjunction with the British, French, NATO and some Arab states in the backchannel. There is no strategy and no certainty about desired ends in Libya among the coalition. The situation with Libya policy seems to me to be as fluid at this moment as the one with Iraq seemed rigid in 2004.
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"Third, we can’t get involved in Libya since we have to focus on our two lost wars (from a strategic perspective) in Iraq and Af-Pak . . . How many good people have died for essentially nothing, or is anyone here going to argue that either of these were a success for the US? How much $$$ have we sunk into these pits? Bob Gates, contrary to your view imo, still as Sec of Def says it all. "
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Not sure what you would have had Gates done, the SECDEF position lacking monarchical powers, but set that aside. I don’t want to see a deep military involvement or American occupation inside Libya but I think there’s a lot of room between ground invasion and doing nothing to acheive minimalist-defined ends but there will be immense pressure, externally and internally from certain quarters, to try to get the US to shoulder the entire burden or removing Gaddafi and re-ordering Libya. We need to break that habit of expectation – Libya will be better off and our relationship with the Arab world will be better if Libyans are assisted to liberate themselves and assume responsibility for their own fate
April 2nd, 2011 at 5:16 pm
Obama’s Libyan Strategery
For those who study history
And military strategy,
A new approach to waging war
In ways that were untried before,
Is rarely seen or heard:
The old ways are preferred.
But in these times of global strife,
With sounds of drum and notes of fife,
A new man joins the hall of fame
Of leaders who receive acclaim,
For strategy in war,
Too brilliant to ignore.
With Hannibal, Napoleon,
And Kahn, the great Mongolian,
With Brennus and with Pericles
With Sun Tzu and Eurybiades,
Our President does share
A real strategic flair.
He joins in war, almost too late,
Makes public his withdrawal date,
Commences action from the air,
Then makes his enemies aware
He’ll not attack on land,
Across the desert sand.
Within just days, perhaps a week,
His reputation and mystique
For managing the world’s affairs
Achieves its peak when he declares
He’ll bomb the rebels too,
For things that they might do.
Perhaps another Nobel Prize
Our friends from Stockholm could reprise,
For excellence in strategy
While waging war on Tripoli.
It’s merited, at worst,
As much as was the first.
April 2nd, 2011 at 8:24 pm
Zen-
"The Bush crowd had, in their lights, a strategy. They thought a war with Iraq was in the national interest, that Iraq had active WMD and that Saddam was an intransigent menace and getting rid of him would yield strategic benefits."
With all due respect, we need not go any further . . .
Do you actually believe this? That Bush had a "strategy", as we would define it? That they saw a threat in Saddam and not a very obvious opportunity at little risk? That they were operating in good faith with the American people, and didn’t lie repeatedly and intentionally, essentially treating the American people as a bunch of witless chumps . . . ?
I mean, are we on different planets? ;-)>
Just for clarity, I’ll mention this as well . . .
"Not sure what you would have had Gates done, the SECDEF position lacking monarchical powers, but set that aside."
Actually I would have had Gates looking for a job in January 2009, which is what I meant. Why exactly keep Gates? It’s not like the GOP had any particular expertise to show in foreign affairs or defense matters at that point in time, especially after a Democratic victory brought on by Bush disasters.
I was a Wesley Clark Democrat . . .
April 2nd, 2011 at 9:43 pm
"Do you actually believe this? That Bush had a "strategy", as we would define it?"
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Seydlitz, I didn’t write that. I said "by their lights" – meaning, as far as I can determine, they – at the political level – thought they had their game plan and ignored all advice and evidence to the contrary. This is a historical question not a moral one. If you asked me "Did their strategy comport with reality in terms of ends, ways, means or probable outcomes?" I’d say "No." Would I devise such a strategy myself? No. But let me say, from having read *many* presidential primary sources, FRUS docs, transcripts of tapes and phone calls – good, professionally designed and executed strategy is not the rule. It’s a rare exception. What is most commonly revealed in presidential docs is "crisis management" style "winging it", experimenting, infighting, reacting to events based on misinformation and hoping for the best. That is the norm.
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April 2nd, 2011 at 9:47 pm
"Actually I would have had Gates looking for a job in January 2009, which is what I meant. Why exactly keep Gates? It’s not like the GOP had any particular expertise to show in foreign affairs or defense matters at that point in time, especially after a Democratic victory brought on by Bush disasters. "
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Gates did not create these disasters, he was part of the clean-up crew and by all indications, intended to leave and was courted to stay. Why was he so badly wanted by Obama over a Dem nominee? Hard to say. That goes to intra-Democratic politics as well as political calculation unrelated to defense per se, IMHO.
April 2nd, 2011 at 10:06 pm
Zen-
"from having read *many* presidential primary sources, FRUS docs, transcripts of tapes and phone calls – good, professionally designed and executed strategy is not the rule."
We don’t have to go back to Nixon . . . Either the Bush II administration was very probably lying through their teeth, or not . . . what is your position?
April 2nd, 2011 at 10:12 pm
Zen-
"Strategy"?
April 2nd, 2011 at 10:51 pm
"Either the Bush II administration was very probably lying through their teeth, or not . . . what is your position"
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Not sure why lying or not lying is evidence of having or not having a strategy. What if your strategy is contingent on employing deception? But since you asked….
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I assume you are refering to WMD. The Bush administration did not present an accurate picture of what it knew about Iraqi WMD programs ( Muddying the picture, the government Iraq did not either, until just before the deluge. Then they tried to come clean). It was spun heavily towards worst case scenarios, improbable contingencies and unverified sources, so that is "lying". They were also happy to "ride" politically on popular misconceptions about Saddam and al Qaida and to imply the evidence of occasional contacts between the two was greater or more cooperative than warranted. That was not quite lying outright, but it was deceptive.
April 2nd, 2011 at 11:07 pm
So a tripwire so to speak, so why didn’t you say so . . . ?
It has nothing to do with strategy . . .
April 3rd, 2011 at 1:21 am
Seydlitz89,I could not agree more that we should extricate ourselves from Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been strategic defeats. Yet your answer to that quandary is to get involved in another war? I went over to your blog, and it seems your reasoning is that a victory over Libya will give Obama sufficient political capital to retreat from those countries. Why do assume that he could not do that now, and needs a bankshot win over a seventh rate military to do it? Prior to the Libyan intervention, I would have thought it politically wise for him to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan: 1) He wins back support from his base; 2) it could exacerbate divisions within the Republican party between fiscal conservatives (since I read a blog post in the Weekly Standard attacking Mitch Daniels for being insufficiently hawkish, I’ll call these guys Mitch-ites), and the John McCain type "National Greatness" conservatives. Plus, well, the war in Afghanistan is rather unpopular, and if he wants to be re-elected tossing out a "peace dividend" could help.
April 3rd, 2011 at 5:37 am
Strategy there is. . Even in disarray. . On Tripoli’s shore.
April 3rd, 2011 at 5:40 am
This Kings of War post: .http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/12/creating-power/.Linked to an interesting talk by Lawrence Freedman.http://media.podcasts.ox.ac.uk/histfac/ccw-freedman-2010-11-29.mp3?CAMEFROM=podcastsGET.On the somewhat adhoc nature of strategy.
April 3rd, 2011 at 1:03 pm
Zen-
"Libya will be better off and our relationship with the Arab world will be better if Libyans are assisted to liberate themselves and assume responsibility for their own fate."
I very much agree with your conclusion here. It is important that our center of gravity be MQ’s political base and not shift to destroying his military forces, although that influences the political base as well. We need to avoid this campaign becoming too "military heavy" Galula’s 80/2o mix if you will.
Chris-
Good questions and thanks for reading my post/blog. It’s something new for me since I don’t normally come out in such a polemic way on subjects of this sort, like to discuss this in terms of strategic theory. As you can guess I was against overthrowing the Taliban in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but support the Libyan intervention.
If it were so easy for Obama to pull out of Af-Pak and Iraq why hasn’t he done so? I think it because he wishes to avoid being tarred with having "lost both wars" which sounds preposterous, but how else would you explain it? The wars have thus become solely domestic political issues, since the strategic rationale for both has long since passed. This also fits in with Bacevich’s view of the "Washington Rules" which in my mind explains a lot.
I got in a conversation with the new US ambassador to Portugal, where I live. He was recently appointed by Obama and had had a conversation with the president in the oval office which greatly impressed him. I asked him about the reason for retaining Gates and he admitted that it was done for domestic political reasons to "keep us from being criticized for being soft on defense/defense issues".
!!?? Yes, that’s right, after eight years of Bush screw ups they were afraid of being called "weak" by the same bunch responsible for perhaps the worst strategic disasters in our history (the verdict is still out as to the damage we have inflicted on ourselves).
It is with this in mind that I argue that Obama would need the political capital of a military success to pull the plug on our two lost wars. This is assuming he has the intention of even doing it instead of following his pattern of kicking the can down the road.
April 3rd, 2011 at 7:06 pm
Seydlitz89,.I read through the comment thread on that post (pretty decent group of commenters you have-even if I doubt I would agree with them on anything but withdrawal from our various foreign adventures). Thus, I won’t belabor the points here that were aired there. I’ll simply say that I think you get the worse of the exchange. .I do think, however, that you are too harsh with regard to Gates. I don’t assign him any blame for the 2002-2006 series of reverses. The degree to which he can receive credit for improvements in the Iraq situation is an open question (I tend to think that prior ethnic cleansing having run its course and Al Qaeda brutality are the primary causes). That said, he has demanded accountability, to include firing a service secretary. He has made at least some progress towards a leaner DoD (killing JFCOM). I think his picks for Service Chiefs (transport pilot for USAF and aviator for USMC) are useful shakeups to sclerotic Old MOS boy’s clubs like the fighter pilot mafia. I was a fan of Peter Singer’s Wired for War, so Gates’ demands for more Unmanned Aircraft strike me as a good thing too.
April 3rd, 2011 at 8:51 pm
Chris-
Hey, it’s more important to get through with your flags flying . . . I was arguing an unpopular position, a worthy cause, something I believe in! And yes the guys know their stuff . . . which made it all the more interesting . . .
I’m not trying to make Gates into a bad guy. Compared to the person he replaced . . . Rather, the Demos had won an election promising change, so why no change in this very important aspect? And it ain’t like the Demos don’t have a good man in Wesley Clark . . . so why continue with lost policies?
Gates, given all his positives, has been all about continuing on what was already in the works . . . essentially the two lost wars. I don’t see how you can be against that and still think highly of Gates.
He’s a bureaucrat, a good Bush family company man, but new ideas? Real Change? Forgetaboutit.