Thucydides Roundtable, Book I: How Group Dynamics Brought Sparta and Athens to War

“This approach, developed at the RAND Corporation during the cold war, mixes the virtues of individual decision making with social learning. Individuals offer first-round estimates (or votes) in complete anonymity. Then a cycle of re-estimations (or repeated voting) occurs, with a requirement that second-round estimates have to fall within the middle quartiles (25%–75%) of the first round. This process is repeated—often interspersed with group discussion—until the participants converge on an estimate. A simple (and more easily administered) alternative is a system in which ultimate judgments or votes are given anonymously but only after deliberation. Anonymity insulates group members from reputational pressures and thus reduces the problem of self-silencing.”

One is left to wonder what might have happened if the ephor did not manipulate the voting method to push the Spartans toward war. Could the Peloponnesian War have been avoided? Or could the Spartans have bought more time and better prepared for the conflict with Athens? This vignette from Book 1 serves as a warning for leaders who attempt to make critical decisions based on the consensus of groups. Understanding these dynamics is the best way for leaders to safe guard against the pitfalls of group think.

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  1. Neville Morley:

    Interesting. It could be objected that Thucydides *doesn’t* say that Sthenelaidas changed the voting method in order to manipulate the result of the decision – T says that S claims that he can’t tell which shout is the louder, not that that he actually can’t tell – but that he did it in order to get the Spartans to own their decision. Possible contrast with some of the things that Athenian orators (e.g. Cleon) say about their own people, that they don’t take responsibility for what they decide but blame it all on their leaders? I do think you’re absolutely right that T is interested in processes of deliberation and decision-making, and why they frequently fail.

  2. zen:

    This is a good point Neville. However, Cleon was a breaker of rhetorical customs in the Assembly. He was the first (according to Thucydides) to engage in undignified dramatics to egg on the mob, something of which Thucydides disapproved. He seems to likewise disapprove of Sthenelaidas, having attributed a motive to his action. This may have been true or simply Thucydides assumption but Sthenelaidas short diatribe was more in keeping with Sparta’s “laconic” style than Archidamus’ reasoned advice

  3. Grurray:

    ‘Increase their ardor for war’ means manipulation any way you slice it, but in the Spartan police state that was probably seen as the standard way to do things. Considering all we know about Sparta, we would expect the Ephors and a few strong, well-positioned Whips (to use our modern term) in the room herding the rest into place. And as David pointed out in one of the other comments, the Spartans possessed a much more well defined social solidarity and unity that naturally brought them into alignment with the goals of their leaders.
    .
    In some parts of Switzerland they have local councils with open votes of a show of hands or voice vote. It’s often been criticized over the years, but it has lasted the test of time. It could help that the people show up with their firearms, swords, bayonets, etc, so that might give them a sense of duty and empowerment. Or maybe that sense of duty in the first place compels them to show up armed to voice their opinion.

  4. Pauline Kaurin:

    Great piece. Do you see contemporary analogies? And what are they? I was thinking of the 2003 Iraq War but….

  5. T. Greer:

    Other option–it was useful to make the majority clear, for later on when the war got tough people would need to be reminded that the war was not forced upon Sparta by a war party, or anything of that sort. It did not just make the decision for war public, but also the commitment to the war public as well.