Thucydides Roundtable, Book I: Reflections from a Clausewizian Strategic Theory Perspective
Strategy seeks to relate actions to policy. A policy outcome is ultimately an impression upon an audience. It can be a physical impression, which in war would typically be defined in terms of death and destruction. It can simultaneously be a psychological impression, typically defined in terms of an evolution in political alignment, not necessarily by consent. For strategy to connect actions to policy it must therefore invest them with a great meaning in relation to its audiences, both prospectively and retrospectively. page 179-180.
This narrative should be realised in a coherent set of actions which give it expression . . . strategic narrative is not just concerned with audiences exterior to one’s side, or coalition. One of the key functions is to achieve unity of effort, ideally to give coherent expression to that side’s will, as Carl von Clausewitz would put it. page 182.
A strategic narrative that is seen as incoherent or contradictory by the various audiences, or becomes incoherent over time, will obviously fail in its purpose.
James Boyd White (“the other Boyd”) devotes an entire chapter to Thucydides in his When Words Lose Their Meaning. The tight fit between the speeches provided by Thucydides throughout The Peloponnesian War and the strategic narrative then in effect act as an indicator of how these various strategic narratives develop or decay over time. The words also act as reflections of the loss of moral and material cohesion within the various political communities depicted as the war progresses. Boyd White describes accurately Thucydides world as related in Book 1:
. . . this was a highly structured world, rich in resources for argument and action. The very fact that the cities could jockey for position as they did, each seeking to place the other in the wrong, shows that they operated on terms established by a shard and comprehensible discourse and that each was acting in part for an audience, internal or external, who would use that discourse to judge what it did. Thucydides now gives us the opportunity to learn something about the nature of that discourse, for at this moment Corcyra sends a delegation to Athens to ask for an alliance, and Corinth sends a representative to resist them. Thucydides presents their speeches in considerable detail.
This is a highly literary moment, of which we can ask: Of all the things that might be said here, what will the speakers choose to say? How will they try to persuade the Athenians to do what they want them to? To what values will they appeal, for example? What pleas, what charges, what veiled or explicit threats or promises, will they make? Will they call on the gods, on compassion or justice, or on tradition of the law? Will they appeal to the Athenians’ economic or military self-interest, and if so how will they define these things? Or will they appeal to the Athenians’ sense of their own character, say, as virtuous or brave or generous, and how will they do that? In what terms will they tell their stories? page 62
Book 1 fittingly ends with Pericles’s speech to the Athenians (1.140-144), where he lays out clearly the strengths and weaknesses of the two sides. He accurately depicts Athens’s advantage at the onset and rightly fears the potential blunders of his own side over the strengths and strategy of the enemy. Given her position among the Greeks, Athens has no choice but to fight.
On to Book 2.
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Joseph Guerra:
October 25th, 2016 at 12:57 pm
The second link in the post is to the book, “Thucydides on Strategy”, which includes a useful Appendix that lists a series of strategic concepts and where they come up in “The Peloponnesian War”.
T. Greer:
October 25th, 2016 at 1:59 pm
One of the themes that arises from LE London’s book on the war, Song of Wrath is just how sensitive the Greek polis were to rank. Much like high school students scanning instagram, everyone was aware of what everyone was doing, just as aware of what everyone else was thinking about it, and locked in an eternal popularity contest to be thought better of than every one else. This quest for fame and rank was culturally determined. Like you say, it was a matter of narrative.
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But it was not an eternal narrative transcending time and place. The visceral need for international esteem has afflicted some cultures and some international systems more than others. It drove everything the Greeks did. I am less sure it drives everything we do now.
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There are obvious implications of this, esp re: whether or not metaphors between our day and Thucydides’ hold water.
Joseph Guerra:
October 25th, 2016 at 2:08 pm
No narrative would be able to transcend time and place, they are all specific to their historical and cultural contexts, but the concept of strategic narrative . . . that’s something else . . .
zen:
October 25th, 2016 at 2:34 pm
I think the “rank” to which T. Greer refers is a reputation first for “arete” and to a lesser extent and certainly applied to the Athenians “metis” – which is a two-edged quality not entirely complimentary. One the Spartans generally lacked, though not, perhaps, Lysander.
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Excellent post, Seydlitz. Very much liked your introduction with the relationship between On War and The Peloponnesian War to a theory of Grand Strategy
Neville Morley:
October 27th, 2016 at 12:25 pm
Interesting comparison. Do you know Ned Lebow’s ‘Tragic Vision of Politics’ book, which devotes first third to Thucydides and second to Clauswitz (with Morgenthau bringing up the rear), arguing that they offer a similar vision of how to make sense of war and inter-state relations?
Joseph Guerra:
October 29th, 2016 at 11:50 pm
Nice catch. Yes, my comments on Lebow will come up later . . .
Lynn C. Rees:
October 30th, 2016 at 2:13 am
Joe’s touched on Lebow before. Two I remember: 1 here, 1 elsewhere.