Strategy, Dilemmas and Choices

Lexington Green:

November 2nd, 2009 at 3:53 am

The very word "Pakistan" should be put in scare-quotes.  It is probably not a sufficiently unitary actor to be dealt with as a single bargaining agent.  Its sub-parts have lives and minds and secrets and agendas of their own — and we should probably be trying to identify and work with or work against these sub-parts.  Whether the USA has the capability to wade that deeply into the weeds is not something I have any knowledge of.  I hope so, but it is usually turns out that things that it seems obvious that the government ought to be doing are not being done. 

zen:

November 2nd, 2009 at 4:33 am

Probably, yes on the scare quotes. Pakistan’s birth welded together very different peoples who had in common Islam and a fear of Hindu domination. Several sections are tribal and much of Pakistan was desperately poor. Not a great basis for a modern state and the glue was the Anglophiliac officer corps that is turning Islamist from the bottom up.

Joseph Fouche:

November 2nd, 2009 at 5:42 am

If the solution to the dilemma or wicked problem that is "Pakistan" involves nuance, subtlety, ability to work without publicity, deftness, a light touch, strategic imagination, or skill at Oriental intrigue, then this country has already lost.

If the solution involves either hugging Pakistan with the full ferocity of unconditional American love or hitting it repeatedly over the head with a blunt instrument until it surrenders, then you’re on the way to a solution.

We have met the enemy and it is us.

TMLutas:

November 2nd, 2009 at 8:43 am

We lack an institutional capability to deal with fake states. If we were to develop that, Pakistan would be a cinch. What does an american method for dealing with fake states look like? That might be a better question. It would be something convenient for us, that US public opinion could understand. It would also be more honest and genuine, something that would be uncomfortable for the people interested in promoting the false image of these fake states. 

Steve Metz:

November 2nd, 2009 at 9:51 am

I like your phrase, "sullen and coerced client."  I’m writing an article called "The Trouble With Allies" for World Affairs and may quote that.

J. Scott:

November 2nd, 2009 at 1:48 pm

TMLuta, I tend to agree with your assessment and would take it further. From an institutional perspective the American government has a terrible record of communicating to voters and the world the end game—except in flowery diplomatic language that means nothing to most. US public opinion cannot be gained without clarity of mission; clarity dispels ambiguity, and when the CINC can’t explain the "why’s" to the very people volunteering to shed blood, there should be little surprise that reluctance is the end result. The inertia of public opinion is turning against our enterprises in the Afghan/Paki region because no one (this includes the last administration) has stated clearly the mission and the means in terms of victory—btw, all those must have the backing of real resources, not threats and apparent waffling on strategy. If this were an OODA exercise, my guess is we’re still in the "observe" stage—the action on the ground is to be commended by our troops across the border, but our enemies smell weakness and indecision—and in a fight that guy is playing catch-up to the one with initiative.Bob Kaplan in his Warrior Politics work predicted (hope I’m recalling the right book) that the American people would need a strong stomach for the war on terror—to strengthen their resolve they need clarity and they need a vision with integrity that is credible—rhetoric, even flowery rhetoric means nothing when the enemy is determined more to destroy/discredit you, than you him. As a disclaimer: strateegery in this arena is not an area of expertise, and these comments reflect my gut…Good post!

zen:

November 2nd, 2009 at 2:42 pm

Hey Gents,
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Big Steve,
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That would be excellent, quote away! BTW John Lewis Gaddis had a concise summary of the past half-century of noncompliant client state behavior in his last book, The Cold War: A New History. Some nice examples of ingratitude/tail wagging the dog.
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Joseph Fouche,
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I agree that our statecraft has long since lost the capacity for skillful intrigue or even, at times, perceptive assessment of long term interests. That capacity requires officials who have a certain mindset of advancing the national interest, long term service in particular slots to acquire the requisite experience and a possession of a high degree of trust within both the domestic political system and within the society of states. We rarely have officials anywhere in the USG who have that kind of tenure, with Robert Gates being the only example that comes to mind and in general, we need lower level figures who do day to day work of this kind.
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TM,
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I would also add "cheap" or at least, more "efficient". We need to better correlate the costs with the actual value of what what are doing.
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Scott,
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"the American people would need a strong stomach for the war on terror—to strengthen their resolve they need clarity and they need a vision with integrity that is credible—"
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Well said.

demcoratic core:

November 2nd, 2009 at 3:51 pm

While Pakistan has some aspects of a "fake state", it is much less of a fake state than say Afghanistan or Yugoslavia.  The overwhelming majority of the population is comprised of Punjabis and Sindhis, who control the government and the military, and while these groups have differences, there has never been much suggestion of a civil war between them.  It is certainly conceivable to think of a confederation of Punjabis and Sindhis that would be relatively democratic and that would be a good addition to globalization’s "core" (to use the Barnett terminology).  The more troublesome groups are the Pashtun and the Balochis, but the Balochis are far too few to be a very significant factor in Pakistan’s politics, and the problem with the Pashtun is that they were artificially divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan (gotta love the Brits).  I keep coming back to the similarities between the national psychologies of Pakistan and Israel – both are obsessed with fears of encirclement by religious rivals.  They both need to wake up – they’ve got nukes, they aren’t facing existential threats, and they should be more bold about jumping into globalization’s world.  I think the only way for the US to deal with Pakistan is (1) strengthen our ties to India and China so Pakistan understands that we’re not going to humor their paranoia; (2) keep doing what we’re doing in Afghanistan only more so, so as to force the Pakistan military to take on Pashtun religious extremists (e.g. the Taliban), which will ultimately give rise to a faction among the Pashtun that can be made to fit into globalization’s world.

demcoratic core:

November 2nd, 2009 at 10:28 pm

I think you misconstrued Barnett’s comment.  He said that he would take advantage of this fiasco and push for a shift to Pakistan "if" he was advising Obama to shrink our effort in Afghanistan.  I think would have been clearer if Barnett had used the subjunctive, but I think he was talking about how folks like Biden are likely to use this turn of events, not necessarily what Barnett himself would advise.  The fiasco happened when a decision was made to go ahead with the elections in August, instead of postponing them until some security could be achieved.  Better to get this over with rather than proceeding with the agony of a run-off; a coalition between Karzai and Abdullah wouldn’t be any better since it would just fortify the perception of the government as the Northern Alliance with virtually no Pashtun participation.

onparkstreet:

November 3rd, 2009 at 12:23 am

Well, Pakistan (or elements, thereof) is all about strategic depth, re: India.
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So, what’s our strategic depth, re: South Asia? I’d go with what democratic core says above (India, China). Also, why are we always so binary in our thinking? There are elements that are sort of an ally, and elements that are definitely not, and it’s all mixed-up, and the answer is simultaneously yes, no, maybe and ‘who knows’ to the ally question! I’d say South Asia does not benefit from binary thinking, or so it seems to me, as a member of the Indian diaspora, which kind of means nothing, really. It just makes you feel, superficially, as if you know the place.
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Also, and I said this at Abu M, Pakistan’s about as stable as a spinning top, so pushing on it only moves the spinning top in unpredictable directions. The right and left, both, approach the subcontinent with a certain amount of magical thinking. It’s disheartening.
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So, yeah, basically I have no idea what to do about Pakistan. Except, how about, encircle it! Afghanistan, China and India! Oh, I dunno.

– Madhu

Ed Beakley:

November 3rd, 2009 at 2:32 pm

Interesting in this "wicked" dilemma context:

The Shadow Course of Action or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NSC-68 By Jeremy Kotkin Major, United States Army (http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/2009/10/21/how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-nsc-68/)… Rather than “CT+” or “COIN+,” U.S. policy and subsequent strategy for the 21st century should be “Containment+.”… While the deliberation over COIN tactics and enemy networks and leadership have been paramount to current policy discussions, a refocus on sound strategy is urgently important. Not a new window dressing or rearranging of deck chairs; a new understanding of the limitations of current plans and the strategic framework wherein they nest; a reassessment of what are vital national interests which demand different types of implementations of national power.
and

Obama and the U.S. Strategy of Buying Time, By George Friedman at STRATFOR (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091102_obama_and_us_strategy_buying_time?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=091102&utm_content=readmore)… But the Romans and the British lost that option when they achieved the key to their own national security: enough power to protect the homeland. Outsiders inevitably came to see that power as offensive, even though originally its possessors intended it as defensive. Indeed, intent aside, the capability for offensive power was there. So frequently, Rome and Britain threatened the interests of foreign powers simply by being there … The elephant in the room cannot stop being an elephant, nor can the smaller animals ignore him. No matter how courteous the elephant, it is his power — his capabilities — not his intentions that matter.

Larry Dunbar:

November 3rd, 2009 at 6:08 pm

No, Pakistan is not our enemy. The enemy is behind the leader and not in front of the leader. Pakistan is in front of our leaders. For that matter, Afghanistan is in front of our leaders. Our leaders are being played by the Afghan guys. The country has a bunch of nothing until the invader guys move in. Then bunches of resources finds its way into Afghanistan, and ultimately into the hands of the guys running Afghanistan. This has been true for thousands of years and is behind much of the strategy of Pakistan. Afghanistan is a big sinkhole, where resources go in, only to die, but not quickly. It happens in generations—suddenly the hole opens up and that generation is gone. Anyone moving into Pakistan would disappear inside Afghanistan first.
*

Those in front of the leader are the potential energy of a displacement of energy. They are the force vector that "charges" those behind the leader. In the case of the US, we are putting that charge on the Asians. Afghanistan is, after all, in Asia? *Madhu mentions some Asians: Afghanistan, China, and India, but forgot about Iran, which is telling. I guess McCrystal’s question might be:  just who do I hand it off to, unless he doesn’t know what he is talking about? 

onparkstreet:

November 3rd, 2009 at 6:19 pm

Ooh, you’re right, it is telling I didn’t mention Iran! Hmm…
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I agree with your point about ‘sink holes’ and being gamed, but I don’t understand your first sentence/s about being in front of the leader? If you are being gamed, why is that person your friend or ally? Which is not the same as enemy, I know, but I’m still confused? What am I not getting?
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-Madhu

– Madhu

Larry Dunbar:

November 3rd, 2009 at 10:06 pm

"but I don’t understand your first sentence/s about being in front of the leader?"

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I used the term "in front" to mean two different things. The first reference was more explicit position as in "leader of a group"; the second reference was about one person being implicitly ahead of another, perhaps in a game.

*

I think it was Nicholas Wapshott, the author of the new book, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: A Political Marriage, that said Reagan knew that the enemy is in front of the leader, not behind.  * The leader has force of command, and mainly uses that force against those behind him/her. Those with velocity of control are behind the leader and together with the leader, create the logic of the system.  In warfare, one system is putting a force on another system, but the force either side is able to produce depends on the force the leader is able to put on those in control of the velocity of the movement to either generate diversity or enforce conformity.  

*

Power is energy per second, which is the resource’s a country is able to command and control at any moment in time. When those in power are unable to command and control resources anymore, the war is over.

Larry Dunbar:

November 3rd, 2009 at 10:11 pm

"that said Reagan knew that the enemy is in front of the leader, not behind. "

*

Ya, I worded that back ass-ward. He said, "Reagan knew the enemy is behind the leader and not in front."

Larry Dunbar:

November 4th, 2009 at 6:53 pm

Of course Zen could tell us about historical enemies and we can compare their relationships with Pakistan’s and the USA’s. *  In the book about the rise of Xenophone, for instance, the Sparta King was an obvious enemy to the King of Persia. The King of Persia, by his own doings, or perhaps more accurate his un-doing, entered Greece’s Observation, or other words, its environment.  An environment that had Oriented itself around Greece, more accurately Sparta. Sparta had just destroyed Athens, Generationally. This should have given the King of Persia great concern, he should have raised son or daughters aware of Greece, if he knew about it. If the King of Persia didn’t understand how Sparta fought, and only Observed a technological superior military, he would have had very little to worry about. He had plenty of people between him and Sparta, let them come. And, in a way, he was right. Keeping his own kin from killing him should have occupied much of his thoughts, he ruled like a tyrant, without any vision, at least that is my definition of a tyrant.