Reflecting on Neo-COIN and the Global Insurgency, Part II.
The heterodox Iraqi insurgency of the “surge”, where Neo-COIN found its proving ground, is really the recent historical rule and not the exception that classical Maoist COIN theory might lead you to believe. The theory in other words, is based upon flawed premises of a bilateral conflict. John Robb’s “open–source insurgency” concept gets closer to the probable reality of future COIN wars.
Secondly, the strong dismissal of religious drivers by Nagl under his “Kilcullen Doctrine” is tailor made for “disaggregating” the accidental guerrillas at the tactical level, but it seriously misleads us in understanding or effectively countering the “professional guerrillas” at the strategic or the moral levels of war. Instead, it blinds us by projecting our own elite culture’s secular assumption of religion as merely a cynical and antiquated facet of politics on to adversaries for whom such thought is both fundamentally alien and entirely blasphemous. Such a position is what ideologists of jihad argue that they are taking up arms against in the first place.
Erasing the religious or ideological motivation makes incisive analysis of the adversaries strategic decision-making impossible because it removes the driver for which he left home, comfort, family for the danger and privation of war. How can we walk in our enemies shoes, get inside his head, if we deny what is in his head has any relevance?
This position makes no sense on the strategic level. Ignoring the influence of Islamism is a prescription for errors and missed opportunities. It is a politically comfortable position for COIN theorists because our political elite are deeply enamored of a PC ideology that provides an excuse to punish and destroy the careers of officials who challenge the orthodoxy of multiculturalism with frank discussion of facts. Avoiding the question of Islamism in front of politicians greases the skids for COIN. Have you heard many members of Congress make a robust defense of liberal, democratic, capitalist, open societies as a morally superior alternative to autocratic Islamism lately? No? Well now you understand why the COIN gurus are not doing it either. Powerful people in Washington and the media do not want to hear thart message.
Yet without confronting Islamism and the attraction of its call to a dissatisfied “pious middle class” in the Islamic world, we can hardly hope to bring the war to a satisfactory close, much less victory.
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Larry Dunbar:
March 11th, 2010 at 5:22 pm
"Have you heard many members of Congress make a robust defense of liberal, democratic, capitalist, open societies as a morally superior alternative to autocratic Islamism lately? "
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You got that right. I haven’t even heard them make a robust defense of liberal, democratic, capitalist, open societies as a morally superior alternative to the structure we have in place today, in America. Whatever that structure is, but please go on. what is your strategy in confronting islamism and its attraction in its call to a dissatisfied "pious middle-class in the Islamic world?
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I’ve long held that Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, was the center of a religious movement, but everyone seemed pretty happy when Karsi gave Afghanistan its Islamic constitution. It sounds like you were less satisfied and want to turn COIN into full-blown Modern Warfare.
zen:
March 11th, 2010 at 6:49 pm
Charles Cameron:
March 11th, 2010 at 10:13 pm
Matthew Alexander has a fascinating article titled "Martyrdom, Interrupted" in which he describe the interrogation style of the Indonesian Colonel Tito Karnavian, who "converts detainees to his way of thinking — a modernist interpretation of Islam in which jihad is a nonviolent strugle against evil within oneself" and "rotinely turns former enemies into allies" — I’m leaving out the conjugal visits and other intriguing details — and concludes that "if a man like Karnavian can change the way Americans interrogate detainees" then "we will have another tool with which to win back the Afghans lost to the Taliban, pull back the tide of extremism flowing through our own land and prevcent an uptick in recruits around the world."
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http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22904
onparkstreet:
March 12th, 2010 at 12:37 am
From Raman’s strategic analysis:
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"Question: Is the Indian government growing increasingly frustrated over the Obama administration’s policy of reconciliation with the so called good Taliban? And why or how will this impact India and U.S. relations? What position does this put India in?
Answer:"Frustrated" is not the word. India is increasingly concerned over the US belief that there are good fundamentalists and bad fundamentalists and that it can do business with the good fundamentalists and bring them into the mainstream. India looks upon the "war" against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan as directed not only against these organisations, but also against their ideology of religious obscurantism by projecting before the Afghan people the ideas of a secular and liberal democratic society. If it makes a deal with the so-called good Taliban even if they do not give up their medieval ideas, the US will be admitting beforehand that it has lost the ideological battle. It will not be good for Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. And it will not be good for India, which has the second largest Muslim community in the world."
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Okay, American interests are not Indian interests, obviously, but I thought the point made interesting in light of your post.
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You know what I think is weird? In a way, it is a kind of Orientalism to not take ideology seriously, and actively engage with it. Our policy makers are saying, essentially, "you are not grown men and women who know your own hearts and minds. How can you prioritize what you do? That can’t be right." It’s just weird.
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– Madhu
Stephen Pampinella:
March 12th, 2010 at 4:39 pm
The de-emphasis on ideology may be misplaced to a degree, and yes, we should understand the ideas inside our adversaries heads (ideology) as well as the ideas shared between them that define their social situation (what Kilcullen emphasizes from his anthropological background). But I fear that merely defending our own ideas in opposition to theirs will merely reaffirm (in their own minds) the validity of extreme Islamism. The War on Terror itself can be understood as a dichotomous ideological war between liberal democracy and extreme Islam, and everytime we (or they) articulate and defend our own ideology, we do it against its negative opposite. As both sides make these rhetorical/ideological statements, they only reinforce the opposition between the two ideologies and perpetuate ideological war. Ultimately, this will never lead to the defeat of extreme Islam because many Muslim societies see our ideology (and a society modeled on liberal individualistic democracy) as a threat.What is needed is a third way, a new inclusive ideological foundation that doesn’t replicate the liberal democracy/extreme Islam dichotomy. COIN will never be successful if it seeks to replicate liberal democracy in Iraq or Afghanistan. But, if it seeks to empower the people of those states to form new political ideologies that sit comfortably between both poles of Western liberal democracy and extreme Islam, then that might be successful. Hence, Iraq today may be a procedural democracy, but in no way is it a Western liberal democracy with its respect for individual rights (which would triumph all other identities, like tribal ones for example). At the same time, most Iraqis reject extreme Islamic interpretations whether they are Sunni or Shi’a (and, whether they from insurgent groups from both sects). So yes, we need to understand their ideology, but understanding it in the societal context in which it is embedded will only allow us to develop new ideological conceptions of the world with the indigenous people. These ideas will be the foundation of a common worldview between us (the West) and them (Iraqis and Afghanis) that rejects extreme Islam.
Charles Cameron:
March 12th, 2010 at 6:38 pm
I should probably note that Madhu’s comments appear to have been made in response to Zen’s earlier comment, rather than my own immediately preceding Madhu’s, since mine was still "awaiting moderation" (on account of the inclusion of an HTML link, I think) at the time that Madhu posted.
zen:
March 12th, 2010 at 10:01 pm
Charles,
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I have nothing from you in the the moderation queue. Nor in the spam folder – your comment did not get processed at all
Charles Cameron:
March 13th, 2010 at 5:49 am
Heh: it’s up there now at #3, but for a while (after Madhu’s post appeared) it said it was awaiting moderation. So (a) nothing got lost, and (b) that’s mildly weird. For your interest, I’ll email you a download I made at the time…
Complex? You bet. « Afghan Outsider:
September 13th, 2010 at 5:12 pm
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