Book Review: WAR by Sebastian Junger

June 3rd, 2010 by zen

There’s a peculairly granular quality to Junger’s WAR, the grittiness of the squalid conditions in which soldiers live, the depths of their physical sufferings and mental exhaustion, their primal fear of letting their comrades down in battle and being responsible for getting friends killed. There are also epiphanies of bravery and carrying the day against the odds, men living who but for chance would have died on some rock strewn hill and lusty celebration after the deaths of their enemies. The sort of politically incorrect, atavistic, jubilation that is culturally frowned upon by people who are comfortably safe and far away.

What disturbed me most about WAR was not just how few Americans are carrying the burden of the combat in Afghanistan but how disconnected these few soldiers and their sacrifices are from the rest of the military itself. Junger’s epilogue with O’Byrne, a fine soldier who is a major figure in the book, and his inability to readjust and shift from the battlefield to garrison or civilian life is deeply depressing. “The Army’s trying to kill me” O’Byrne declared, finding a momentary refuge in alcohol, but little help from the military bureaucracy.

Junger attempted to show the war in Korengal as seen from the perspective of the privates, NCO’s and junior officers of Battle Company who lived and died there, from his interviews and his own participation in their patrols as they came under fire or as they gingerly parleyed with Korengali elders in isolated villages. Eschewing theory or a historian’s search for causation, Junger attempts to let the soldiers words and actions drive the narrative.

Sebastian Junger’s WAR is raw and undecorated by sentiment.

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Posted in 2010, 4GW, Afghanistan, America, army, authors, book, COIN, counterinsurgency, cultural intelligence, insurgency, islam.insurgency, islamic world, leadership, military, reading, stoic, Tactics, tribes, veterans, war, warriors | 9 comments

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  1. Not-Schmedlap:

    June 3rd, 2010 at 9:03 pm

    "What disturbed me most about WAR was not just how few Americans are carrying the burden of the combat in Afghanistan but how disconnected these few soldiers and their sacrifices are from the rest of the military itself."
    .
    For those of us who had similar missions in Iraq, that was a common gripe as far back as 2003. I see no chance of that changing anytime soon because the organizational culture within many of the military’s subcultures runs contrary to the alleged "warrior ethos" that they supposedly embrace.

  2. Joseph Fouche:

    June 3rd, 2010 at 9:13 pm

    The immediate cause dates to the World War I experience of Captain Harry Truman. As a U.S. Senator, Truman was instrumental in forcing Marshall to back off on his original 200-division plan, with notable consequences:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Marshall#Replacement_system_criticized

    This was coupled with an overstaffing of the rear that led to only 10% of Americans serving in the armed forces during WWII ever coming under enemy fire.

    This TIME article from 1951 quotes Marshall’s sentiments:

    http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,888875-1,00.html

    When members of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Preparedness finally straggled in and the hearing got under way, General Marshall formally laid down the Pentagon’s plan for the nation’s first universal military service and training program (TIME, Jan. 15). It was a plan calculated to supply the nation’s military manpower needs, not just for the moment, but at least "into the next decade." Marshall wanted authority to draft all able-bodied youths for 27 months of service when they reached the age of 18. After active duty they would be enrolled for another three years’ service in the organized reserves or for six years in the inactive reserves.

    Said Marshall: "Men of 18, 19 and 20 make our finest soldiers. The excellent Marine divisions are made up largely of men in these age groups." He stated bluntly that universal military service and training would have saved months of preparation in World War II, might have staved off the Korean war entirely, saved countless billions of dollars.

    The larger causes are an intrinsic part of American military practice dating back to colonial times.

  3. John Curtis:

    June 4th, 2010 at 8:57 pm

    Regarding the disconnect between those involved in the actual combat and the remainder of the military: 

    The system isn’t necessarily designed badly.  You need professional soldiers who perfect the art of recces, section (and larger) attacks, military engineering, armour, fighting and maintaining weapon systems (aircraft and ships), AND you need officers sufficiently focussed to constantly improving these arts.  A maintainer, for example, can’t have the skills to remove a large aircraft landing gear assembly, and be able to participate in a company-level attack, and be knowledgeable enough to contribute to improving the maintenance system.  The improving the system part is important because if it doesn’t adapt, it breaks.  You also need these individuals within the military so that you can order them to deploy when you want, and they won’t require extra escort like civilians do. 

    The problem is the bureaucracy in the system.  There is insufficient stimulus, either positive or negative, from whether the war is won or not.  Your average military bureaucrat is more concerned about their personal career than actually doing what is necessary to win the war.  Often empire-building is given priority over improving organizational effectiveness. 

    On the other hand, personal mistakes (within reason) aren’t tolerated.  Individuals and small units aren’t given the freedom to learn and adapt, thus contributing to actually winning the war.  Enabling this freedom takes courage and trust.  The higher commanders are more focussed on using IT systems to improving their ability to reach down and direct individual soldiers’ actions than to, say, enable cloud information access that would enable small units to make good decisions faster. 

    When I was over there, we joked about the reporting cycle driving the war as opposed to the war driving the reporting cycle.  Maybe we need to change from top-down, stove-piped hierarchies that push orders, information and supplies.  Perhaps the on-the ground commanders, the battle-space land-owners, should have better "pull" authority for information, supplies, and assets.  This idea comes courtesy your link to David Siegel’s http://vimeo.com/11117216 .  But that certainly wouldn’t stroke the egos of the type-A generals, admirals, politicans etc.

  4. Karaka:

    June 4th, 2010 at 10:55 pm

    Good review, zen.
    .
    What did you think of the narrative’s relationship with time? Junger was only partially linear–he would describe events in a chronological fashion, but then jump back or forward to describe things that happened at another point.

  5. onparkstreet:

    June 6th, 2010 at 4:55 pm

    Second karaka. Good review.
    .
    – Madhu

  6. zen:

    June 7th, 2010 at 1:45 am

    Hi John,
    .
    "The problem is the bureaucracy in the system.  There is insufficient stimulus, either positive or negative, from whether the war is won or not.  Your average military bureaucrat is more concerned about their personal career than actually doing what is necessary to win the war.  Often empire-building is given priority over improving organizational effectiveness. 

    On the other hand, personal mistakes (within reason) aren’t tolerated.  Individuals and small units aren’t given the freedom to learn and adapt, thus contributing to actually winning the war.  Enabling this freedom takes courage and trust. "
     .
    I think you nailed that very well.
    .
    The Germans have a word, "etappe", which was borrowed from the French a long time ago and the exact meaning is not translatable but it is a perjorative term that conflates "rear echelon" with the bureaucratic obstruction and self-seeking of complex military systems. That’s sort of what is happening in the lack of freedom and punitive/rote response toward the "front line" troops from staff officers, FOBbits and bureaucrats in WAR
    .
    Hi Karaka,
    .
    The time sequence didn’t bother me as Junger mentioned early on that there were multiple embeds and -if I recall correctly- he was also traveling around other provinces of Afghanistan part of the time.

  7. Chicago Boyz » Blog Archive » Restrepo:

    July 2nd, 2010 at 10:32 pm

    […] The film was made by the noted author Sebastian Junger, and the photographer Tim Hetherington. (Junger wrote a book entitled simply War about his experiences being embedded with the troops, which Zen reviewed here.) […]

  8. historyguy99:

    July 4th, 2010 at 4:07 pm

    Zen,

    Just started my embed with the men of Battle Company as I read the first chapters of War.

    My first reaction was of the common thread of life on the firebases, and how it hasn’t changed much since Vietnam.

    Secondly, the quote from Captain Kearney about the enemy, and the terrain; "I’d never seen or read of heard about in my entire life."

    The description of the terrain, to my history clogged brain, reminded me of the Modoc War in the Lava beds of Northern California, where the Army fought a bitter war against the plunging fire of Captain Jack’s Modoc warriors, and the fighting around Monte Cassino during World War II.
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modoc_War

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Monte_Cassino

    And the Korengal Valley itself, and our now abandoned firebases, reminded me of Red Cloud’s War 1866-1868, where after losing the war, the U.S. Army abandoned the posts along the Bozeman Trail.
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Cloud's_War

  9. zen:

    July 5th, 2010 at 4:06 am

    Wow! Did not know you were in Afghanistan! I look forward to reading your embed posts and remember to stay safe.