Follow-Up on the “Astrategic” Discussion
Regarding Joseph Fouche’s comment on frameworks, he has a logical point regarding strategic theory that works….in theory. By that I mean that I don’t disagree, he’s right in the abstract sense that such a comprehensive and consistent structure would be preferable. My impression though – and I think this is in line with what he is arguing above – is that strategic theory as a field itself may not be quite up to the high standard to which Fouche aspires. Strategic theory in practice, rarely demonstrates the concise elegance of Newtonian physics. In terms of explanatory power, strategic theory used by practitioners or created by modern day theorists rarely rises beyond being situationally “good enough” for the problem at hand. An intellectual tool, like a sharp rock or a pointy stick in the fist of a paleolithic hunter-gatherer. For that matter, if strategic theory proves to be situationally accurate and useful, that is often a cause for celebration!
Going beyond “good enough” to “universally” or “generally” applicable strategic theory is an intellectual feat of the first order. That kind of system -building is usually the result of a life’s work and cannot be called into being on a moment’s notice. Aside from the fact that most people are not capable of rising to becoming a Clausewitz or Sun Tzu, the time constraints make it impossible for state decision makers to think and act within such a framework unless they have arrived into office with one already inculcated as part of their worldview (and even then, it is of great help if they spent years out of office thinking through real and hypothetical problems using that framework, internalizing the principles without losing the ability to observe and think critically). This is why in matters of strategy, our decision makers are usually wielding the intellectual equivalent of stone tools – the statesman with the cognitive flintlock musket or strategic steam engine is few and far between.
So, we are often left with a fractured mess, analytically speaking. Entrails to root through, looking for signs from the gods.
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Pundita:
June 23rd, 2011 at 4:36 pm
I don’t know what it is about this conversation that caused me to recall Rajeev Srinivasan’s inspired (or catty, depending on your view) analogizing of Barack Obama to Chance the Gardner in the movie Being There.
Newton Feels Up a Liver « The Committee of Public Safety:
June 23rd, 2011 at 9:45 pm
[…] Quoth Zen: Regarding Joseph Fouche’s comment on frameworks, he has a logical point regarding strategic theory that works….in theory. By that I mean that I don’t disagree, he’s right in the abstract sense that such a comprehensive and consistent structure would be preferable. My impression though – and I think this is in line with what he is arguing above – is that strategic theory as a field itself may not be quite up to the high standard to which Fouche aspires. Strategic theory in practice, rarely demonstrates the concise elegance of Newtonian physics. In terms of explanatory power, strategic theory used by practitioners or created by modern day theorists rarely rises beyond being situationally ”good enough” for the problem at hand. An intellectual tool, like a sharp rock or a pointy stick in the fist of a paleolithic hunter-gatherer. For that matter, if strategic theory proves to be situationally accurate and useful, that is often a cause for celebration! […]
seydlitz89:
June 24th, 2011 at 12:55 pm
Interesting post. "Astrategic" seems to have fallen by the wayside, but I think there’s a bit of confusion as to what exactly "strategic theory" is. For me Clausewitzian strategic theory is strategic theory and it is essentially retrospective, a tool for historical analysis, but not a guide for action. While strategic theory principles can and should be used in military/strategic planning, they have little predictive capacity – simply provide a framework of ways/means/ends. The complexity of two or more political communities in an organized struggle is simply too great to be able to predict the sequence of events in any useful or consistent way. Attempting this is what the great Clausewitzian theorist Svechin labelled "charlatanism".
Adam Elkus wrote an interesting post late last year which describes the distinction between strategic theory and what I refer to as "doctrinal speculation" . . . http://rethinkingsecurity.typepad.com/rethinkingsecurity/2010/12/boyd-and-clausewitz-their-interaction.html
False Prophets, Manly Empathy, and Eyes in the Darkness | Fear, Honor, and Interest:
June 30th, 2011 at 6:07 am
[…] Quoth noted Clausewizian seydlitz89: …I think there’s a bit of confusion as to what exactly “strategic theory” is. For me, Clausewitzian strategic theory is strategic theory and it is essentially retrospective, a tool for historical analysis, but not a guide for action. While strategic theory principles can and should be used in military/strategic planning, they have little predictive capacity – simply provide a framework of ways/means/ends. The complexity of two or more political communities in an organized struggle is simply too great to be able to predict the sequence of events in any useful or consistent way. Attempting this is what the great Clausewitzian theorist Svechin labelled “charlatanism”. Adam Elkus wrote an interesting post late last year which describes the distinction between strategic theory and what I refer to as “doctrinal speculation” . . . […]
A comment on a comment on a comment « Grand Strategy: The View from Oregon:
July 11th, 2011 at 4:13 pm
[…] Fouche’s Newton Feels up a Liver, which was a response to Mark Safransky of Zenpundit’s Follow-Up on the “Astrategic” Discussion, which was in turn a comment on Citizen Fouche’s comment on Zenpundit’s post Not so […]