The Kilcullen Doctrine
Thomas P.M. Barnett, a friend of this blog, has been articulating a visionary grand strategy since 2004 in a series of books, the latest of which is Great Powers: America and the World After Bush
COIN advocates will have to bite the bullet of working on national strategy and grand strategy, building political coalitions, speaking to the public and wading into geoeconomics and the deep political waters of the long view. For a some time, they have had the excuse that as uniformed officers, such questions were above their pay grade – and this was the scrupulously, constitutionally, correct position, so long as that was the case.
That era is swiftly passing and most of these brilliant military intellectuals now have (ret.) in their titles and wear business suits rather than fatigues. COIN is not an end in itself. The horizon is much wider now and we should all be ready to pitch in and help.
ALSO POSTING ON THIS TOPIC:
SWJ Blog – Weekend Reading and Listening Assignment
Thomas P.M. Barnett – Safranski on Nagl on Kilcullen
The Strategist – Sunday reflection: on “The Accidental Guerrilla”
MountainRunner –Recommended Reading: Kilcullen Doctrine
Abu Muqawama – Dogs and cats, living together. Mass hysteria!
HG’s World – A Brief on the Accidental Guerrilla by Zenpundit
Information Dissemination – New Doctrines Without Strategic Foundations
Galrahn is right, I have not quite fleshed things out in my post and could use the help. He’s also clarified that the discussion needs to shift to the “why”, the objectives, with which I was not particularly clear by the use of “strategy” which means different things to different people, even those versed in military affairs.
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historyguy99:
May 29th, 2009 at 4:47 am
Brilliant piece of writing on your part Zen!
zen:
May 29th, 2009 at 4:51 am
Much thanks HG99 – trying to nudge a discussion into happening 🙂
historyguy99:
May 29th, 2009 at 5:13 am
I just linked it with comment, to draw some attention or fire.
The Strategist:
May 29th, 2009 at 8:49 am
Based on what you’ve relayed about Nagl’s review, it sounds like he’s missed a key point in Kilcullen’s definition of "accidental guerrillas", viz. that many of the enemies that the west has made need not have been enemies if the west had been rather more streetwise in how it approaches campaigns in Afghanistan etc. Western troops turn up uninvited in the territories of the "accidental guerrillas", and this prompts resistance from people who are naturally inclined to resist outside domination with violence.
Conversely, takfiri terrorists are adept at moving slowly and unobtrusively into tribal areas, establishing strong and enduring connections (e.g., through marriage) over a period of years, if not decades, and allying with the locals, even becoming "part of the family".
ZI:
May 29th, 2009 at 9:46 am
". One size does not fit all, and there are many grey areas. A ‘with us or against us’ approach is likely to result in far more people than otherwise being ‘against us’ in these conflicts."
The most terrifying thing in this mess is that the obvious became words of the wisdom. It makes you wonder who really govern the US.
fester:
May 29th, 2009 at 1:13 pm
Zen — good work, I want to riff on your last couple of paragraphs on the distinction between operational doctrine of COIN and how it is actually used to further (currently minimally defined) strategic and political ends. That is the area that I think has the most value as the disconnect between doctrine and ends is extreme.
Moon:
May 29th, 2009 at 2:26 pm
I’m going to “go geek” for a moment and mention that your “first tinker with minimal measures” characterization rings of exploration / exploitation of a local solution space. The unspoken follow-on is that after exhaustion of the local/minimal avenue, occasional and (seemingly) random solutions allow an algorithm to escape the gravity of a local extremum. This might be characterized as “on occasion tinker into moderate measures”. Regarding consilience, how long would it take a John Boyd “synthesist” to properly lasso and tether operational COIN to a strategic framework? (Or, is that what you are indicating Nagl has done with Kilcullen?) Enjoyed your post.
Drew Conway:
May 29th, 2009 at 2:41 pm
I could not agree more. This is an excellent piece that needs to be picked up by the COIN folks at SWJ and Abu M. Well done Zen!
zen:
May 29th, 2009 at 3:10 pm
Hi everyone – much thanks!
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Moon – no Nagl has not yet made that kind of connection yet to an overarching framework
– some areas are probably far from his bailwick, like nuclear warfighting and deterrence, for example. Which is not to say that he could not do so but not yet.
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Fester – Feel free – it is a significant distinction in levels of war. Different purposes, different perspectives.
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Strat – that is an excellent point and one that I missed. I am eager to read Kilkullen firsthand and see how his work in Indonesia affected his views of COIN. As it happens, the closest university to me, NIU, has a major Southeast Asia center and several scholars there do field work on the Indonesian militias in the countryside and I have heard them lecture on several occasions ( which is the extent of my Indonesia knowledge)
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Drew – we shall see. Be interesting to hear an "official" response.
Lexington Green:
May 29th, 2009 at 3:16 pm
I will comment on one detail in this excellent post.
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Some very interesting overlap — or actually convergence — between Barnett and Nagl.
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Nagl is in effect trying to inductively derive a bottom-up strategy, based on the tactical and operational requirements of COIN. Barnett is approaching it from the top down, grand strategy, leading to various strategies that get operationalized and executed tactically, and he does not get that far down into the mud.
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The place that Nagl and Barnett could join hands is at the strategic level, answering questions like: When, Where, Why, With Whom, To What End? Kilcullen has already laid
out a lot of the What and How, based on experience paid for with blood.
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Linking this to a larger direction has yet to be done. Kilcullen’s book ends pretty much on a note of "don’t do these wars, but if you absolutely have to, don’t repeat the mistakes of Iraq and Afghanistan". Good as far as it goes. But there needs to be more.
democratic core:
May 29th, 2009 at 8:01 pm
Excellent review. You have highlighted from a military perspective what I think is the same problem that I (I don’t have a military background) had with the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. I boiled down my uncertainty to the Manual’s definition of "insurgency": "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion
and armed conflict."
What is a "constituted government", and who decides? From the perspective of the Vietnamese, was the South Vietnamese government a "constituted government", or was it merely the puppet of an invader? It seems to me that you need to figure out a way to answer this question for counterinsurgency to work, otherwise, you’re not really fighting an "insurgency" – you’re just fighting locals who are resisting an invader. The Manual doesn’t answer the question, nor can it; as you say, it has to be part of a bigger picture.
Interessantes woanders (2009.05.30) › Immersion I/O:
May 29th, 2009 at 10:16 pm
[…] The Kilcullen Doctrine […]
Arherring:
May 30th, 2009 at 5:25 am
Great Post!
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I’ve just started reading The Accidental Guerilla today and your review has really whet my appetite. Your distictions between Kilcullen’s and Barnett’s operational and strategic doctrines has sparked my thinking along XGW lines and I haven’t even gotten into the meat of the book yet! I think that perhaps there is a 4GW/5GW flavored review in my future.
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