Cameron on Conflict of Commands – A Guest Post Series
Please note that as an appendix, I have attached two quotes that only indirectly address the issue of conflict of commands — a white nationalist quote, immediately followed by a principled quote about militia movement members “disgust at the genocidal fantasies in white supremacist discourse” — because I believe it is important to be aware just how far the rhetoric of hatred can go, and just how firmly it can be rebutted.
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The double trouble of Sgt. Hasan Akbar and his influence on Major Nidal Hasan is worth exploring in a little more depth, because Sgt Akbar, who tossed grenades into a tent in Kuwait killing two officers, seems to have been something of a research project for Major Hasan, who apparently asked about Sgt Akbar in an intercepted email to Sheikh al-Awlaki in Yemen:
One e-mail in particular is getting attention from investigators now.
In that e-mail – which the Washington FBI office didn’t see – Hasan mentioned the case of Sgt. Hasan Akbar. He is the Muslim soldier who threw grenades at fellow troops in Kuwait at the beginning of the Iraq war. The attack killed two soldiers and wounded 14 others.
In the e-mail to the imam, Hasan asked whether Akbar would have been considered a shaheed – or hero – for his actions. Given what happened later at Fort Hood, investigators say this e-mail now appears suggestive. But at the time it was not conclusive. Investigators in San Diego weren’t alarmed by the query because it appeared to be consistent with research Hasan was doing at Walter Reed. The Akbar case was thought to be at the center of his research.
For an Army psychiatrist counseling soldiers returning from, or about to enter, combat in Iraq and Afghanistan — and perhaps with a heavier than average caseload of Muslims, with whom he would share a common language — researching jurisprudential aspects of the Sgt Akbar case would be natural.
As Juan Zarate, Bush’s deputy National Security Advisor quoted in the article cited above pointed out:
It is very difficult in the moment I think for analysts and agents and his cohorts and coworkers to piece this together and see they had a ticking time bomb on their hands.
In fact, as we’ll see in the third post in this series, Major Hasan needn’t have troubled the Sheikh in Yemen for an opinion. The State Department had posted a note on this very topic in October 2001.
But he did contact the Sheikh, and the Sheikh presumably eulogized Akbar’s action, as he was later to eulogize that of Maj. Hasan.
And as I suggested recently in a comment on David Ronfeldt’s fine blog, we can see with the 20/20 hindsight that Juan Zarate also mentioned, that whatever was true regarding the double chain of command that Sgt Akbar was under, which Maj. Hasan was on the face of it legitimately studying, might also hold true for Maj. Hasan himself — for whom the issue was both a research topic and a personal dilemma.
So the FBI gives a pass to the research topic — and the personal dilemma gives rise to the tragic shootings at Ft. Hood.
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One final point:
The problem of conflict of commands has its origin in religion, so it makes sense to take quick note of the theological basics.
The shema or daily faith statement of the Jewish people states “the Lord our God, the Lord is one”, while the first Commandment in the Jewish scripture, the Torah, declares “You shall have no other gods before Me”. The central tenet of Islam, similarly, is tawhid, the unicity of God as expressed in the first part of the profession of faith or shahada, “There is no God but God” — while to treat any person or other part of creation with the respect due to that God is shirk, the unforgivable sin.
From a secular perspective, these may seem high-flown philosophical and devotional matters, but for the believer they may also have “real-world” consequences, in a way that is prefigured in Christ’s observation, recorded in Matthew 6.24, “No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other…”
But here we are entering the terrain of Part II of this essay: the collection of quotes.
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Bryan Alexander:
March 10th, 2010 at 11:41 am
Fine topic, Charles.I wonder if we could use this concept as a lens through which to peer at the rise of secular societies. Assuming theocracies have the two-masters situation under control, what does it take for a culture to, well, switch masters?
Fred Leland:
March 10th, 2010 at 11:41 am
Internal human friction and its effect on command is a great topic to explore. It has a profound affect on decision making during and in the aftermath of conflcit and violence. thanks for taking this topic on. it is well worth discussing. i look forward to your other 2 parts and the dialog here.
Charles Cameron:
March 10th, 2010 at 5:47 pm
Hi Bryan, Fred:.Thanks. I should probably say that my series of three posts hews pretty closely to the topic of the conflict of commands as it affects the individual. That’s my own focus here, but I’m happy to see there may be rich and divergent discussions that come out of it..What’s going on in Iran may provide one answer to your question about an entire culture switching masters, Bryan, and the Ayatollah Montazeri’s comment in Part II is to the point here — but I’d note that the switch there, if it happens, may be from clerical dominance to clerical influence, rather than from theocracy to secularity.
Arherring:
March 10th, 2010 at 6:33 pm
I saw the 5GW tag that you put on the post and now I feel compelled to ask what 5GW aspect of this you might have had in mind as I have considered something that may be related.
zen:
March 10th, 2010 at 6:51 pm
I tagged it 5GW, not Charles, due to the juxtapositions/contradictions/synthesis of ideas coming later – sorry for the confusion
Charles Cameron:
March 11th, 2010 at 1:23 am
Am I reading you right, then, Zen — is it the style of presentation I’m using in Part II that seems 5GW related? Perhaps you could say more, either here, or when Pt II is posted, there.
Arherring:
March 11th, 2010 at 1:47 am
No confusion, I was just thinking of a sort of 5GW utility coming from the idea of manipulation by evoking a target’s indentification with one role or group over another role or group.
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To use the example contained in the first post, something fundamental made Hasan and Akbar consider their primary identity as Muslim and that required a duty (in their mind) to act in a certain way. These actions were directly opposed to their identity as military service members but they acted against that role anyway.
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Very much looking forward to the rest of the posts.
Charles Cameron:
March 11th, 2010 at 9:45 pm
I’d like to add a word of caution here — it’s not Muslim identity in general (and indeed not even Salafist identity) that is opposed to military identity in these cases, but a form of Muslim identity which specifically concludes that jihad against the Americans is an obligation (fard ‘ayn) — that’s what distinguishes the "jihadis" from their "purist" and "politico" brothers, to borrow the terminology Quintan Wiktorowicz developed in his 2006 "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement", in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:3, 207 — 239.