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WITH THE BOMB, RATIONALITY IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER

Dr. Thomas P.M.Barnett has long advocated a new detente leading to a ” grand bargain” with Iran over its nuclear program to acheive its political and economic reintegration into the world community. This would reestablish the strategic status quo ante that existed prior to the 1979 revolution that destroyed the Shah’s modernizing regime and instituted implacable ideological hostility between Teheran and Washington.

The strategic logic and the cost-benefit analysis here has considerable attraction. So much so that, like Tom, I suspected that the Bush administration might try a ” Nixon goes to China” manuver, particularly after the productive sub rosa coorperation between the the United States IC and its Iranian counterparts leading up to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. However the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the seubsequent power struggle between his ultrahardline faction based primarily in the Pasdaran senior leadership and a minority of senior Ayatollahs to Supreme Guide Khameini’s right and the ” pragmatists” like Rafsanjani and “reformists” led by Khatami to the Left have effectively paralyzed that option.

I have to disagree with Dr. Barnett here however:

“Where is the history of states acquiring the bomb and then using it irrationally? History has consistently proven just the opposite, even with Islamist regimes like Pakistan and quasi-theocracies like Israel. This is just another example of the sad American tendency to demonize all potential foes as irrational. You take down a country on either side of Iran and they reach for the bomb: who’s being irrational or naive on that one?”

The rub here is ” use” and ” rational”.

Yes, the existence of deterrence provided by existing members of the nuclear club has an effect of inhibiting first use nuclear strikes by new nuclear powers. No argument. However there are indirect as well as direct uses for nuclear arms.

The record of serious miscalculation in non-nuclear domains by nuclear powers brought on by overconfidence provided by ownership of nuclear waepons is both serious and long — stretching back to 1945. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes began the tradition of overestimating nuclear status when he expected to use America’s nuclear monopoly to pressure the Soviets to make diplomatic concessions on a range of geopolitical issues, largely to no effect whatsoever, with the lone exception of (ironically) the evacuation of northern Iran in 1946 which the Soviets had, in principle, previously agreed to do.

Some other examples of nuclear overconfidence or hubris causing negative effects short of WWIII:

Stalin, who acquired the bomb in 1949, giving permission to Kim Il-Sung to invade South Korea in 1950.

Khrushchev, who acquired not only the hydrogen bomb but crude ICBMs, provoked repeated crisises over Berlin, Cuba and rattled nuclear sabers over Suez.

Charles DeGualle whose much longed for Force de Frappe led him to pull France out of NATO’s military command, greatly weakening the alliance.

China, which had acquired the bomb in 1964, brought the world to the brink of nuclear war with the USSR over a few tiny islands in the Ussuri river inhabited primarily by trees and polar bears.

By my count I see the possession of nuclear weapons leading statesmen to gamble in a way that almost caused a nuclear war at least twice and a serious conventional war at least once ( without even considering the recent history of the Indian subcontinent).

My confidence in the self-restraint of the current President of Iran is several orders of magnitude below that of Nikita Khrushchev.

RECOMMENDED READING

Fabius Maximus at DNI continues his series with “ Forecasts for the American Expedition to Iraq – the Sequel.Also, Introducing the New Kingmaker in American Politics!”

I note for Dave Schuler that Fabius cites Walter Russell Mead in his essay. Overall, very intriguing though I disagree with some of it – noting for example that democracy and civil war are hardly incompatible. One may kill other or a state of juxtaposition or coexistence may pesist until the LIC civil war simply burns itself out.

Curzon at Coming Anarchy has a “threefer”: two posts on his ” Mapping the Gap” series –
“Mapping the Gap, Part 1: War Risk Insurance“, “Mapping the Gap, Part 2: Homosexuality Laws” and “Discussion: Exxon Sued for Allowing Indonesia Troops to Torture“

“The Strength of Internet Ties” (PDF) by PEW . Examining the internet and social networks. A ” must read” for bloggers and military netwar theorists alike. The survey finds evidence of real empowerment, connectivity and leveraging of resources for sustaining large networks via the internet. The net is a multiplier here and an expander of parameters of influence.

Hat tip to the Eide Neurolearning Blog.

That’s it.

ANALYZING MAZARR’S “EXTREMISM,TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT”

As I mentioned yesterday, Michael J. Mazaar’s article in Policy Review is worth a serious review, particularly the introduction of his concept of Psychopolitik. Other pundits and bloggers have been commenting as well. For example:

Austin Bay:

“…Democracy and the rule of law are ideas –non-utopian ideas– that in substance and form address the issues of opportunity and effective governance. Given the world trends Mazaar describes, dictatorships are ultimately ineffective governance. As for psychopolitik: The “anarchist movement” in the 19th century also involved alienation, identity, and belonging issues. Wars of Identity are not a new phenomenon, either. Tribal identity is a powerful force.

…Mazarr claims the “state is back.” I think Mazarr believes –as I do– that news of its demise was more than premature. This is an argument I’ve made — “complete” states exhibit remarkable strength and resiliency; democratic states in particular exhibit extraordinary flexibility. Ths runs counter to much of the Conventional Wisdom among the “strategic gurus.” Why? Fear and catastrophe sell. I argue that one of the weaknesses in the Westphalian system is that the system has never really existed as a complete system. “Gap states” aren’t new– gaps aren’t new. (”Here be dragons.”) Tribes with flags have UN seats– and are one of the UN’s greatest weaknesses. Fake states aren’t new– consider the Congo. It’s a mark on a map. Mazarr notes that Westphalian rules, however, are increasingly accepted, though notions of what creates legitimacy have changed, to include “no genocide.” That’s why the UN is about to “invade” Sudan’s Darfur region (and based on recent statements by Sudanese leaders there’s a chance the looming UN assumption of Darfur peacekeeping mission may not be as figurative an invasion as my quotation marks around “invade” suggest). The US is not simply arguing that the nation state stands between 21st century order and 21st century anarchy; the US now argues that the quality of the nation state matters. Well, it always has, to a degree. In my own view failed states will either disintegrate (and then re-organize) or they will assimilate”

Solomonia:

“The psychopolitik view is all about balancing all those issues and trying to move the whole in a desirable direction — a necessarily messy, difficult and unpredictable business. We were also stuck already with many of those dilemmas ever since 1991. In psychopolitik, there isn’t a lot new. The “Neocon agenda” (somewhat as the caricature has it) also took a psychological, “root causes” approach — it just came up with different conclusions as to action. What was Mazarr’s prescription for a way forward in the mid ’90’s? We don’t know because it is by no means obvious from his essay what his choices would have been, other than a root cause, “peace, love, cash give-aways” approach. We’ve heard that before, though this essay would seem to argue that, “no, this time there’s a lot of thought behind it,” it strikes me that the end resulting prescription would be pretty well the same, though unlike most who promulgate that view, Mazarr at least has a somewhat more realistic view that the “soft approach” is not always enough.”

I had a number of impressions from reading Mazarr:

First, in his review of strategic schools of thought, Mazarr’s harsh critique of Network-centric Warfare probably far exceeds the claims that Admiral Cebrowski made for it – NCW simply is not and never was a grand strategy( though I will grant that Pentagon proponents of this school have been infuriatingly myopic and excessive in their desperation to corner the last DoD billion for high tech platforms) it does little to inform statesmen as opposed to operational planners and unit commanders. In fact, I’d add as an aside that Cebrowski’s ideas had wide -ranging, horizontal implications beyond warfare that have yet to be adequately pursued by theorists, economists and other scholars.

Secondly, Mazarr’s review of 4GW theory is at times, quite strained in his effort to put distance between his ideas and those of Martin van Creveld and William Lind. Mazarr, like Victor Davis Hanson, argues for the immutable and unchanging nature of war yet he echoes a number of the arguments of the 4GW school even as he rejects the “Decline of the State” thesis. “Psychopolitik” itself is profoundly Boydian, whether Mazarr realizes it or not he is discussing Colonel John Boyd’s Moral level of warfare with perhaps an unconscious homage to Jose Ortega y Gasset.

Third, Mazarr’s interpretation of war as a mere aspect of “conflict” is spot on in the vein of Sun Tzu and his acceptance of the blurring between warfare and more generalized conflict ( something certainly articulated by 4GW thinkers) is also in agreement with Unrestricted Warfare by PLA military theorists Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.

Fourth, “Psychopolitik” is a term with some utility despite being an ugly neologism. A practical problem with the Boydian/4GW use of ” Moral” as a term is that it invites those who are unwilling to comprehend the context for reasons of policy preference are free to inject irrelevant arguments based on other contexts of the word ” moral”. For those audiences who are not versed in Boyd’s ideas, “psychopolitik” at least directs their attention toward mass psychology, perception, legitimacy and the like without inviting quotations from Saint Augustine in response.

Fifth, “Psychopolitik” leads Mazarr, correctly in my view, to grope toward what John Boyd considered “constructive” – a grand strategy to establish shared values, a theme for vitality and growth.

“Attend to identity. The top strategic priority is providing avenues to identity formation — opportunities for people to escape stagnation and despair and to strive toward secure identities. This principle has obvious economic, political and social components “

Yes ! As Dr. Barnett likes to say, ” war in the context of everything else“.

THE MAZARR THESIS OF PSYCHOPOLITIK: THE PREFACE

At the behest of the esteemed Colonel Austin Bay ( a request seconded by Matt at Mountainrunner) I have read and endorse for your perusal “ Extremism, Terror, and the Future of Conflict ” by Professor Michael J. Mazarr, which has been published in Policy Review and posted online at RealClearPolitics.

Mazarr tackles Network-Centric Warfare, Martin van Creveld and 4GW and then offers up the concept of Psychopolitik. Dig into it and feel free to offer up your own analysis; mine will be following on Wednesday.

RECOMMENDED READING

Usually I do these on Sunday but I ran out of steam after three posts yesterday. On the bright side, my sloth has been rewarded by other bloggers posting better things for me to pick and choose.

Curzon at Coming Anarchy – “ Mapping the Gap, Prelude“

Kingdaddy at Arms and Influence – ” Counterinsurgency is easier, part II.”

Dave Schuler at The Glittering Eye – “From Way Up Here“

Arnaud de Borchgrave at The Washington Times – “Turmoil tripwires and byproducts“

Orrin Kerr at The Volokh Conspiracy – ” Rumsfeld v. FAIR” ( Today’s SCOTUS decision)

The next one is a real kicker that demonstrates the schizophrenic nature of the USG in the war on terror. One of the former leaders – yes, that’s right, leaders – of the Taliban(!) is now a student at Yale University. WTF ???? This is like inviting former Nazi gauleiters to come over and visit in 1948. Why is this guy not matriculating in Gitmo ? Who at State and Homeland Security imagined that giving this Islamist totalitarian thug a visa was a good idea?

John Fund at WSJ – ” Taliban Man at Yale“

That’s it.