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Archive for May, 2006

Monday, May 8th, 2006

RECOMMENDED READING

Trying to make a few topical connections today with these:

On the Atomic Bomb:

Marc Schulman at American Future -” The Decision to Use Atomic Weapons Against Japan (Updated) ” and Phil Carter at Intel Dump -” The Making of The Atomic Bomb“.

Christopher Hitchens vs. Juan Cole :
( ok,ok,ok, – totally frivolous subject,but it’s Sunday, my head hurts, and I found it amusing)

Jeff Medcalf at Caerdroia -“Hitchens v Cole” , Snarksmith -“He Scooped Me On My Own Stuff!” and The News Blog -” Why do people keep fucking with Juan Cole?

The al Qaida Tapes:

Colonel Austin Bay -” Al Qaeda’s Ideological Crisis“, Abu Aardvark-“AQ’s media strategy: strength or weakness?“, Collounsbury -” Al Qaeda & Media, a quick reflexion on Bou Aardvark” and finally Curzon at Coming Anarchy – “How do you shoot this thing?

Nanotechnology & War :

Curtis Gale Weeks at Phatic Communion– ” Unto the Next Generation

That’s it.

Saturday, May 6th, 2006

TRYING TO ” GOSS” OVER PROBLEMS AT THE CIA [ UPDATED]

A brief comment on the departure of Porter Goss:

Goss meant well and worked very hard but he was caught between a rock and a hard place after the Intel reform bill.

The CIA career senior management ( above station chief level) who were fired/resigned since Goss arrived as DCI are usually portrayed as ” anti-Bush”, technically that is true but their motivations did not originally come from partisan politics. They are the generation of the Pike-Church hearings and the Schlessinger-Turner DCI era and as a matter of professional practice are exceptionally risk-averse. They don’t like HUMINT, they don’t like covert ops, they don’t like bold judgments in NIE documents and they employ lawyers at every step of the process to ensure that nothing actually gets accomplished.

It was inevitable that this bureaucratic cohort was going to oppose a forward role in the war for the CIA or a revitalization of covert ops. They dragged their feet in the Clinton era when that administration wanted action but clashing sharply with the Bush agenda was a given, though the levels of rearguard intrigue these employees mounted against administration policy was unprecedented in American history. Firing the malcontents was the best service Goss rendered during his tenure as DCI as covert intelligence agencies really can’t be in the business of sabotaging the directives of their democratically elected superiors.

The intel reform bill that created the DNI position was also a recipe for bureaucratic conflict since it more or less took the DCI role away from the DCI while leaving the DNI line of authority exceptionally vague. Negroponte, moreover, is a very smooth, very effective, troubleshooter who has been involved in the intersection of the covert ops, diplomacy and military intervention since the 80’s. Success here as DNI meant steamrolling over Goss and establishing the authority of DNI over the IC, so that is what Negroponte did. He simply outclassed Goss by several orders of magnitude as a bureaucratic insider and did not have any baggage to defend or distractions weighing him down that hobbled Goss ( the fact that Goss was reportedly spending up to 5 hours a day on the PDB was a sign that there were major problems happening, the DCI should briefly do the ” final edit” not be deeply involved in drafting the PDB itself) .

The only way the DCI-NDI relationship will work is if the DCI becomes effectively the DNI’s main deputy for HUMINT as the NSA head is for SIGINT which is why Hayden is going to be the new DCI, he’s already in the deputy position and owes the CIA bureaucracy nothing ( unlike Goss who had, despite his feuds, deep institutional loyalties).

ADDENDUM:

Colonel Lang’s view.

I’m pretty sure the DIA was already freelancing HUMINT to some degree during the 90’s due to the total disinterest of the Clinton administration in the IC and their general incomprehension of how the Defense Department functioned. Rumsfeld is simply greatly expanding on a precedent.

ADDENDUM II:

This could not have helped either. Guess Earl was on to something.

ADDENDUM III:

Ultraconnected David Ignatius at The Washington Post has released a new meme of Porter Goss as the Les Aspin of the IC:

“What may have hurt Goss most inside the White House was sharp criticism from a hush-hush group known as the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This blue-ribbon group is headed by Stephen Friedman, a former chairman of Goldman Sachs and former White House economic adviser. Because its members include many prominent business executives, the board could offer a nonpartisan, CEO’s view of how Goss was running the agency. I’m told some of the board’s judgments on Goss and his management team were devastating.”

This very well may be true but I think the abrupt timing of Goss’ departure was his choice, not the administration’s and everything including the kitchen sink is going to be thrown at the man. As an aside, I like having figures with experience in international markets on the PFIAB but I’d be uncomfortable of that is the entirety of the membership.

ADDENDUM IV:

Bloggers commenting on Goss/CIA:

Collounsbury

Captain’s Quarters

Kevin Drum

The Glittering Eye

Whirledview

Nadezhda New !

Friday, May 5th, 2006

360 DEGREES OF LEADERSHIP

Perhaps those readers who are fans of The Sling and the Stone recall that the author, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, was a passionate advocate of fundamental reform for the military’s personnel system for review and promotion. One of his suggestions in his critique was the adoption of a 360 degree system of review. I found the concept intriguing since it has obvious application for any complex organization – corporations, universities, government agencies, public schools – any entity where the old, bureaucratic, “zero-defectsreview system has run its course.

After yesterday’s post, I decided to go find out more about the 360 degree concept and picked up this:

This isn’t a scholarly book – mostly of the business self-help variety – and it looks like a quick read. Enough for a general overview or introduction at least. If the arguments in here are persuasive enough to merit a second look, I’ll root out some of the academic psych literature behind it.

Friday, May 5th, 2006

LEADERSHIP, RESILIENCE AND OSSIFICATION

To be a leader of any group, organization or movement of a significant size is to be in a position at the top, out in front and ahead of the curve. Leaders have their own perspective – they see farther, beyond the horizon and think outside the box. When this visionary perspective
is wedded to the ability to persuade and harnessed to ambition and persistence, there exists a leader who can move mountains. Real leaders are change agents.

The intrinsic disadvantage of leadership is the tendency toward isolation. As leaders acquire followers dedicated to helping the leader make the vision a reality, their very dedication causes a number of distortions to be introduced into the nascent system that in time may begin to increasingly affect the leader’s own perception of reality – followers and, in particular, bureaucracies, create ” noise” as a byproduct of their positive functions as well as from operating from the basis of a different position and perspective. Some examples.

1. Framing: Ideologically charged organizations are prone to pre-screen and self-censor the information flow on a conscious and unconscious level to fit the values propagated by the movement.

2. Status anxiety: As organizations become larger and more complex they tend to lose their early, collegial or informal character and begin a process of social stratification by creating an administrative hierarchy. Status in the organization provides an incentive for intriguing, office politics, rivalries, infighting and a host of behaviors which distort information flows.

3. Bureaucratization: The need to make the organization efficient, predictable and reliable leads to a standardization and uniformity of procedures within the organization. The cost of this efficiency is passive resistance to change on the part of the bureaucrats – partly because the prodedures are themselves a cognitive Frame and partly out of sloth and a preference for the easy and familiar over the hard, untried or new.

There are many other potential distortions and when taken to an extreme, these byproducts help produce such obvious irrationalities as “cherry-picking“, “stovepiping”, magical thinking” and “group think” that sabotage effective leadership and isolate the organization from reality. Their OODA loop is thoroughly corrupted to the point that the existence of a problem in the collective cognitive pattern may not even be recognized (or if suggested, rejected with great hostility). A classic historical example of this phenomena would be the Politburo of the Soviet Union which deliberated in grand, self-imposed, isolation. Such a system, it may be fairly said, was not resilient but ossified. Rigid, frozen and hard but also brittle.

Ossified systems cannot adapt to change because they do not produce leaders per se but rather managers and bureaucrats. Managers and bureaucrats are different from leaders in that while they too can become isolated, the nature of their role is invested in the culture of the system they inhabit and its rule-sets and procedures. They are creatures of the status quo and when holding power, rule from the center and seek to extend and enforce the authority of the system. While useful functionaries if kept within limits, when managerial or bureaucratic class preferences dominate an organization, then the organization loses resiliency becoming increasingly unable to adapt creatively to changing conditions.

How do you keep an organization or system resilient ? Some possibilities:

Continuous Engagement: One of the reasons I find Development in a Box” concept of Steve DeAngelis so intriguing is the real-time connection and adaption link between the organization and the environment in the “third stage” of DiB. The engagement between institutional memory, rule-sets, self-monitoring and changing conditions does not break or stop. Change becomes part of the institutional culture.

Modularity: While organizations move faster when they are ” flatter” you reach a point of diminishing returns with decentralization where the organization becomes amorphous and unable to sustain a concentrated effort or flow of resources. Embedding nodes of hierarchy in a relatively decentralized network – modularity – allows for greater cohesion and “local’ leadership.

Continuous Learning: Not simply ” training” but genuine learning should take place as the organization invests in its own members. The aggregate increase in new skill-sets and experiences infuse the organization with new ideas while increasing the parameters of possibilities.

Velocity: Borrowing a term from economics, on average, the people in a complex organization should move positionally at a certain rate. New people should be brought in and old ones given sabbaticals ( recall Continuous Learning) for a time to change their intellectual environment completely. Ideally, the organization would acquire a membership where most could demonstrate at least competency at several disparate critical tasks and excellence in an area of specialization.

The 21st century is shaping up to be the century of the network, the market-state and the emergence dynamic – leaders who do not cultivate resiliency in this era build upon sand.

Thursday, May 4th, 2006

LIGHT POSTING

Work and familial responsibilities are limiting posts this week – working on several interesting topics. Hope to have something new up on Thursday evening but I will be incommunicado most of the day, unfortunately.


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