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Archive for July, 2006

Friday, July 21st, 2006

ROUNDTABLING ERIC ALTERMAN

This should be a link of interest to readers Left, Right and Center – particularly if political history is their thing.

Eric Alterman is best known for his partisan commentary in The Nation and blogging at Altercation ,but he is also an academic, when not engaged in polemical pursuits, with a Ph.D in History from Stanford. In his scholarly role, Professor Alterman has a new book out, When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and Its Consequences, which has been reviewed by an H-Diplo Roundtable. That in itself is an endorsement of the book’s quality.

I was surprised to learn that Dr. Alterman had studied under the eminent historian Walter LaFeber, which I found somewhat ironic as Eric and I have swiped at each other a few times on H-Diplo, yet my own mentor in history was a friend and classmate of LaFeber’s when both were studying under William Appleman Williams ( as a result I think I read every book and most of the papers LaFeber had published up until the mid-late 1990’s).

The roundtable is a thorough and scholarly treatment of the book from historians across the political spectrum and Dr. Alterman is given an opportunity to resond to criticisms and make extended comments. It’s a good online read ( PDF format).

These symposiums represent H-Diplo at its best.

Thursday, July 20th, 2006

DEVELOPMENT OR CONNECTIVITY?

Tom and Steve were debating changing Enterra’s conceptual brand from “Development-in-a-Box” to “Connectivity-in-a-Box“. After some online angst by Dr. Barnett, it seems DiB won out but Tom is looking to retrofit connectivity in the proper place.

The difference between the two concepts comes down to ends and means.

While it is true that “development” is a actually a process, ” Development in a Box” is a phrase that screams ” Outcome !”. In contrast, ” connectivity” has a range of possile understandings that can indicate only the potential for future exchanges or mass migration or ongoing flows of economic and military might. Therefore, what “Connectivity” yells is “Change !”.

Connectivity is inherently crucial to development – Dr. Barnett mentioned the economic impact of mobile phones in Gap states and as mobile phones effectively transition to mobile computers with wireless broadband, that effect will multiply by orders of magnitude. If anything was ever “outside the box”, it’s the evolutionary, revolutionary, power of connectivity.

Tom should keep connectivity in his mantra and link it categorically and irrevocably with Steve’s DiB.

Just don’t put in a box :O)

Tuesday, July 18th, 2006

EXCELLENT !

From Michael Tanji of GroupIntel Blog, rare good news in the guise of quiet change of practice in the IC:

But the Office of the Director of National Intelligence seems to be casting an unusually wide net as it seeks the best qualified staff it can find in academia and the public interest sector.
Historian Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, a China specialist at Georgetown University, became an Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Integrity in January 2006, and was appointed last month as the first ODNI “analytic ombudsman.” (She also previously served in the State Department…


Trying to get IC leadership to hire people from outside the gene pool is something akin to cold fusion: we’d all like it to happen, but progress has been limited and tainted by hoaxes. A lot of potential hires don’t get accepted because while their real-world experience is stellar, the lack of clearance means tendering an offer is a crap-shoot; maybe they get cleared but it takes a year; maybe a year passes and they fail the poly. “Outsiders” tend to only be strangers from a given agency and inevitably golfing/poker/drinking/academy buddies of the guy running the show. There is a certain amount of tradition to the practice and sometimes it actually works, but there is nothing like creating new high-end gigs and then filling them with your pals to depress the workforce and make them wonder if directorship brings with it ownership papers. Even cross-pollination of disciplines is rare, even when such moves would make supreme sense. “Not invented here” syndrome has a little-known cousin, “Not hired here.”

Counterintelligence security is an important concept but as it was practiced during the Cold War may not be the best practice for the War on Terror in an increasingly open source, high complexity, deep uncertainty, world. No group, however bright and well-trained, can maintain its analytical edge through institutional insularity and isolation.

Opening up to outside “superstars” and mixing them with the cream of the insiders is a must to shake things up in a way that will not be reflected by little boxes and dotted lines on an org chart.

Tuesday, July 18th, 2006

BLOGGING THE LEBANON WAR UPDATE

Some interesting blog posts by

Austin Bay ( Top billing for addressing the Westphalian aspects)

In no particular order….

Caerdroia

The Glittering Eye

Dan of tdaxp

Arcmchair Generalist

American Footprints

Whirledview

Aqoul

Counterterrorism Blog

Tuesday, July 18th, 2006

DUCKWALKING WITH HERMAN KAHN AND NEWT GINGRICH

Rodger Payne at The Duck of Minerva had a clever post “ Ladder of Escalation” that tied two colorful intellects, the late Herman Kahn and the very alive Newt Gingrich, to the stategic implications of the Terror War. On Gingrich’s recent comments, Rodger writes:

“In any case, Kahn is known for a number of interesting ideas, including the so-called “ladder of escalation.” Essentially, Kahn’s term explains gradations of conflict, from “ostensible crisis” up 40+ rungs to “spasm” thermonuclear war.

Such a spasm is to be avoided, obviously.

While Kahn developed the ladder as part of his critique of the “massive retaliation” doctrine of the Eisenhower administration, the notion of “winnable” nuclear war-fighting took on a life of its own during 1970s and 1980s strategic debates.

I’m referencing Kahn because he also reminds us that crises, conflicts and wars can escalate — perhaps in unexpected ways, though Kahn was a game theorist and wanted to think rationally about the unthinkable.

To some extent, Kahn was right. Leaders and scholars do have to think about the possible, not merely the probable.

…I’m not writing this to scare anyone, but I do think it is patently obvious that world leaders ought to be doing everything they can to try to de-escalate the current ongoing crises.”

De-escalation, incidentally, is a major tactical prescription of 4GW school of thought, specifically William Lind’s (I’ll try to find the link), for states in implementing a defensive and isolating strategy against non-state opponents. I don’t agree with isolation in the way Lind used it because it simply isn’t physically possible or economically desirable, but political and moral isolation and de-legitimization of the enemy is another matter. As I remarked in the comment section at the Duck:

“The statements are classic Gingrich; an important and substantially correct analytical perspective delivered in a rhetorically couterproductive manner.

Gingrich is 100 % correct that our bureaucratic response to the geopolitical crisis with Islamism is tardily done and is cognitively inadequate to the complexity of the task at hand. He’s also right that we have an interrelated mix of state sponsors, societal substate sponsors within allied states and non-state actors that confounds our traditional approaches to war and diplomacy.

Unfortunately, the “WWIII” rhetoric that Gingrich is using to accurately denote the *magnitude* of the crisis to an American audience and get people’s attention misfires overseas where we want to isolate and politically discredit the Salafi-Jihadi lunatics from even socially conservative, pious but peaceful Middle-Class Muslims. It is WWIII only in terms of difficulty or importance but not “Us vs. Them ” like with the Soviets.

We need to light a fire under our own side without making our enemies look like the “good guys” to their home audience in the process. Escalate our strategic operational response while de-escalating their emotional response.”

Find another way to light the fire, but “WWIII” or “WWIV” terminology should be junked unless we think that energizing Osama Bin Laden’s base for him instead of demoralizing it is a good idea.


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