What does all this mean for the future of warfare? Several things: while violent conflict may be localized, if there are fundamental ideas underlying that conflict (as opposed to, say, local resource scarcity), the ideas will not be localized in the slightest. Walling off any one part of the world in the hopes that it will not impede upon the rest will prove useless.

Moreover, if decentralization is the order of the day, then the states that allow their functions to be decentralized will probably retain more power than those that continue to try to control their tasks via rigid hierarchies.

Finally, networked global actors, whether states, non-state groups, religious organizations, criminal enterprises, or basically any other formal or informal group of people, will continue to be dramatically more nimble than their hierarchical counterparts and competitors.

In many areas of warfare, theorists are attempting to understand and work within the ethic of decentralization. Philip Bobbitt in The Shield of Achilles, creates the concept of the market-state. Though he does not express it in the terms of hierarchy and decentralization used here, the goal of the market-state is to perform the functions of the state through decentralized and networked means — markets, whether via privatization or other sorts of proto-markets. Some examples he offers are security warranties through which one state might offer a sort of guarantee to aid another that is more akin to an insurance policy than an alliance. Bobbitt also mentions programs such as “lease-hire security insurance, licensing some forms of defense technology and emphasizing the U.S. role in providing information, missile defense, and even intervention for hire.”

Whereas Bobbitt is a strategist by training, David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla study networks and networked forms of warfare at the tactical and operational levels. In works like Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy and Swarming and the Future of Conflict they discuss the advantages and disadvantages of networked forms of organizations and their preferred tactic, swarming. One development that seems to be influenced by the RAND researchers is the Marine Corps’ experiments with a form of networked ground warfare called USMC Distributed Operations, which is about

enabling the ground elements to conduct successful NCW [network-centric warfare] against an adaptive, asymmetric enemy.

It is important to remember that no new programs develop from scratch. The US military’s officer and NCO corps will have to undergo a variety of changes if distributed operations or other networked forms of battle organization and doctrine are to be adopted. Those systems, that of officers in particular, rest upon ancient ideas of aristocracy and noblesse oblige. Can the US military perform what might seem to be a subversion of this storied hierarchy?

It should be noted that whether it can or not, many private organizations may be able to do so with ease. The growing private military industry is as capable as any state of creating and provisioning the types of security markets that Bobbitt envisions and the types of decentralized tactical units that are foreseen by Arquilla and Ronfeldt. If the US military, or other state militaries prove too hierarchical to adapt to the decentralized, globalized world in which we live, other actors now waiting in the wings, many of them private, will rise to fill the void.

Such a vision of the future of warfare seems dark and mysterious, one in which the Leviathan of the state could easily break down. Perhaps. But a future in which anyone can publish anything might have once seemed frightening, just as a future in which anyone could worship as they pleased still does to many. There is just enough reason to believe that the future decentralized security market, both private and public, will serve its ultimate citizens – or consumers – just as efficiently as other new markets serve us today.

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  1. IJ:

    Some feedback. More detail is provided in this Chester post.

    The argument seems to be that nobody wants war; and only connectivity via globalisation will prevent war. Agreeing rule-sets for globalisation, that can be enforced, is then a key problem. The UN system, especially the International Monetary Fund (and the ECB?), is making some progress on financial rule-sets but not on international auditing.

  2. IJ:

    Furthermore, this recent paper from the Washington based Institute for International Economics shows that the members of the IMF are preventing global rule-sets.

    It starts:
    “The world needs a strong and effective IMF as the principal multilateral institution responsible for international economic and financial stability. A consensus on the role of the Fund and the scope of its activities in the 21st century is needed to achieve this objective. However, such a consensus does not exist today in official circles or among private observers. Consequently the IMF, once the preeminent institution of multilateral international financial cooperation, faces an identity crisis.”

  3. Dan tdaxp:

    Josh,

    Thank you for the post. If I may add two comments

    1. Westernization doesn’t have to mean “pop Westernization.” Algeria and India faced their strongest Westernization under the FLN and INC. The competitive horizontal environment of globalization evolves things into a Global mold, though the details are not preordained.

    However, while this cultural hegemony does make things “Western,” other genetic factors conspire to make things “human.” The greatest force for traditional cultures, for example, has always been the birthrate. No matter which culture is setting the pace, reality has a vote, too.

    2. I don’t think you explained how globalization will not reduce state power. Saying “successful states are… plentiful” and that there are “faces of state power that are not about to crumble” is like telling an amputee “there are successful amputees — and think of how many limbs you have left!”