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Friday, October 15th, 2004

MORE PNM THEORY: REVIEWING THE DELETED SCENE ON SYSTEM PERTURBATION – PART I.

A while back I posted on Dr. Barnett’s concept of System Perturbation, coming up with a set of rules I thought such events were likely to follow. Dr. Barnett in turn suggested I review the part his editors left on the cutting room floor – one of his deleted scenes – that he developed from a workshop with a high-powered gathering of formidible intellectuals, strategists and social scientists. The material deserved to be in PNM so I’m hoping it gets fully developed in the upcoming sequel. I strongly suggest you click the link for yourself and, if nothing else, take a quick look at the Powerpoint slides that emerged from the workshop before reading the review.

In Part I. I critique the preparatory remarks that explain Vertical and Horizontal scenarios and in Part II. I will tackle the rules that came out of the System Perturbation workshop themselves. Dr. Barnett’s text will be in bold, my commentary in regular type:



“What I got from the workshop was a ton of disparate ideas about how vertical and horizontal scenarios play out among vertical and horizontal political systems. That was the weird thing about this workshop: I introduced the concept of vertical and horizontal scenarios and pretty soon everyone in the room was talking about vertical and horizontal societies or political systems. I like those phrases better than “authoritarian” and “democratic,” because those phrases come with so much baggage and are so all-inclusive, whereas my workshop participants seemed to use the phrases vertical system and horizontal system with far greater freedom. For example, both China and Russia could be described as having far more horizontal economic systems than political systems, meaning their economies are increasingly built more around ties among firms and among individuals than between the political leadership and firms, or the more vertically arranged patterns of authority and activity under past communist rule. Their political systems may still be quite vertically arrayed, from top to bottom, but their economic systems are far more horizontal.

Dr. Barnett excels at conceptual reorganization and identification of primary characteristics or premises. To an extent this is a process of simplication – something required to communicate concepts used by specialists to a wider audience and a prerequisite for analogical thinking – but it is also a process of clarification. To get complicated ideas down to their irreducible premises makes their logical implications visible.

Vertical and Horozontal are excellent terms for describing the connectivity relationships – basically Hierarchy versus a Lattice – a lattice that contains within it a variety of hierarchies, linear cross-connections and randomly evolving strands. Power, information, resources flow along the lines but in a Vertical scenario the guiding hand of the system is visible and the lines are rigid.



You might ask, Why not just call them authoritarian market economies? Clearly I could do just that, but I prefer referring to vertical and horizontal systems because, that way, I can talk about how different aspects (i.e., economic versus political, or social versus security) of China might respond to a System Perturbation differently. I think China’s economy and society are more horizontal in form than vertical, but I believe the Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army remain extremely vertical in form, so a System Perturbation hitting China hits different sectors differently. Why is that important? Well, here I go back to the dinosaurs and mammals notion: a System Perturbation may disrupt or destroy different aspects of different systems across China. For example, SARS was more challenging for the political leadership than for the economy, which in the end proved awfully resilient whereas the Party looked awfully stiff. The mass media displayed a surprising amount of horizontal form, whereas the military assumed its usual stonewall stance. You get the idea. I just want more flexible concepts because I am still fumbling my way around this new strategic concept



Whenever I read these broad systemic comparisons and evaluations my mind usually runs back to two classic political theorists – Polybius and his Cycle of Constitutions and Baron de Montesquieu’s description of forms of government and their signs of corruption in The Spirit of the Laws. Stiff, incidently is a good indication of a closed society – it is stiff because organizations like the CCP resist information that contradicts their raison d’etre – which is organization for control.



Before I give you the rules, let me spin out this description of vertical and horizontal systems a bit more by offering a series of examples. I will say horizontal systems tend to be replete with elites, meaning they possess multiple types of powerful people: political, business, military, technology, mass media, cultural icons and heroes, and so on. Vertical systems, on the other hand, really only have one elite — the political leadership. You can tell you are in a vertical system when the political leader is also the military leader, is also the richer landowner, is also guiding hand of the economy, and so on. In vertical systems, you have to join the government to have power and wealth, but in horizontal systems, you typically have to leave the government to get wealth.



Vertical systems are by nature despotic or oligarchic which makes them both strong and fragile. Strong because the capabilities of a Vertical system can be marshalled easily in one direction and in that direction have immense strength, like the top of a pillar or the point of a spear. Vertical systems are fragile because they are not designed to receive or respond to blows from unexpected directions. Nor does the Vertical system have as much adaptive flexibility if the guiding hand proves incompetent. The paralysis of the Red Army in the initial days of the Nazi invasion in 1941 come to mind where both Stalin’s dolorous shock and the effects of his maniacal terror on the officer corps resulted in the destruction of whole Soviet armies.



A second difference I have touched upon before: horizontal systems rotate leaderships with routine regularity, while vertical systems tend to have permanent leaderships. As such, horizontal systems tend to feature market-dominated economies, while vertical systems tend to feature state-dominated economies.



Horizontal systems evolve. Vertical systems ossify.

Deng Xiaoping seemed to grasp that Mao’s fanatically vertical state was ill-suited to survive the challenges of the modern world and attempted to resolve the ” succession crisis ” that plagued Communist systems whenever the supreme leader died and left no legitmate, certain or timely way to transfer power. Deng had seen the effects of Mao’s dotage firsthand and navigated power struggles against the Gang of Four and then Hua Guofeng to become Paramount Leader of a liberalizing, modernizing, China. Deng forced mandatory retirement on the cadres to regularly bring up new blood from the ranks ( a policy also employed by the U.S. military to avoid the ancient colonels and venerable majors of the pre-WWII era) while allowing seniors like himself and Chen Yun a graceful exit as elder statesmen and mentors to fifty-something Politburo members who run China day to day. Jiang Zemin recently tried to buck the system and retain his powerful post as military leader and CCP powerbroker but other CCP heavyweights refused to allow Jiang to break Deng’s rule-set and backed Hu Jintao.

Vertical systems were the “natural” structure of the premodern, agricultural world where the emphasis was on subsistence and stability; vertical systems like Pharaonic Egypt could last thousands of years with relatively little cultural evolution. Today they are only well suited to small-scale operations, being too ponderously slow and stupid to react efficiently to all the variables inherent in the modern world on the large-scale of states.



A third package of differences concerns the nature of communications and dialogue. In the horizontal system, you tend to see universal networks, where everyone can connect up to everyone else. This facilitates a question-based dialogue, where basically all subjects are on the table. The government in a horizontal system tends not to make any effort to steer that discourse, but only to deal with downstream behavior that may result. You want to yell “fire” in a crowded theater and people get hurt in the resulting stampede? Well then, you are going to be in trouble.



The critical element here is liberty. The Horizontal system works best by keeping track of relatively few variables and letting the rest interact autonomously so long as the results do not threaten the integrity of the system – in which case the Horizontal system can muster a smothering, comprehensive, response because it’s energies are not being frittered away on trivialities. “Anything not specifically forbidden is permitted” is a far more economical rule set for political power than the reverse.



Vertical systems are just the opposite on communication. Their networks tend to be drill-down networks, or connectivity that runs from the leader to the led. Instead of letting any and all conversations occur, vertical systems typically feature upstream content control, because the dialogues that are permissible are severely restricted in terms of taboos. In short, it is a world of “don’t go there, girlfriend!” I use the feminine here with purpose, since far more of the taboos involve women and restrict their behavior. What do young Iranian women do overwhelmingly when they get on the Internet? They race to Yahoo chat rooms to discuss sex, dating and marriage? Why do they have to go to such effort? These subjects are not discussable in public Iranian society under the mullahs. So what do you talk about in a country like Iran? You mostly talk about what you cannot talk about. That is what I did in the Soviet Union when I lived there briefly: I had lots of conversations with Russians where we talked about all the subjects you could not talk about. We did not actually discuss those subjects, we just talking about Russians’ inability to talk about them. Vertical systems are a sort of strange, Seinfeldian universe in that way: all of your conversations really are about nothing “



This predisposition to create taboos is probably a basic psychological characteristic of all people, Denial, being manifested as a social phenomenon but becomes ruinous when enforced systemically. It short-circuits problem solving and as multiple threats to the well-being of society build, leads to a sense of despair or malaise. The USSR died spiritually long before the bureaucracy gave up the ghost – with true belief among the elite confined to a small number of fanatics around Mikhail Suslov and an elderly generation of pensioners unwilling to believe that the horrifying sacrifices of their lives had been for naught.

Next, in Part II, a look at Dr. Barnett’s Rules of System Perturbations in Vertical and Horizontal scenarios.

ON A RELATED NOTE: TM Lutas is also posting on PNM theory tonight, Gap-Core and the implications of capital flows. Go read him !

Thursday, October 14th, 2004

THE REASON WHY YOU WILL NOT SEE A DEBATE POST FROM ME

Is that I missed most of it and what little I caught was on the radio. Mrs. Zenpundit and I were hosting the Director ofOperations from her corporation and I was enjoying a truly massive slab of prime rib and a baked potato the size of a nerf football at Wildfire. I did catch some interesting radio commentary from Dr. Milt Rosenberg ( Extension720 AM) and his guests – certainly a lot more thoughtful than the banal remarks of network talking heads and celebrity partisan shills.

Mulling over some exchanges I have had via email with Juan Cole and Geitner Simmons and in the comments by Dave Schuyler and Collounsbury, plus a PNM post in the works on deleted scenes and System Perturbation. Will try to get something up tonight.

Wednesday, October 13th, 2004

THE LEFT-WING WAR AGAINST THE LIBERAL HAWKS

Centerfeud had a good post called ” The Democrats: Leftward Ho!” outlining the upcoming campaign by the hard Left, the Antiwar Left and the Blame America First Left to use the 2004 election – regardless of the results – to justify seizing control of the Democratic Party machinery. If Kerry wins it will be because of the energy of the Wingnuts, you see and if Kerry loses it will be the fault of moderate Democrats who support the War on Terror. Trademark reasoning in those authoritarian political quarters.

Well, Anatol Lieven has fired a shot across the bow of the moderates in – no surprise here – The Nation blasting pro-war leftists and liberals as future Neocons and liberal imperialists. Unlike Noam Chomsky, who is more or less seen outside radical circles as a discredited charlatan, Lieven is the hard Left’s intellectual heavyweight and a respectable scholar which gives his critique more traction than if it was penned by one of the Nation’s gang of would-be, trotskyite, commissars. Paul Berman in particular is the subject of Lieven’s wrath ( you can almost hear cries of ” Apostate !” in the Lieven article) – or at least the straw man that Lieven represents as Berman’s argument in Terror and Liberalism.

Hopefully, the DLC and pro-war Liberals and Leftist like Paul Berman are prepared to fight back against what is likely to be a vicious campaign of character assassination intended to drive them out of the Democratic Party and influential liberal think tanks. The wingnuts are playing for power and by definition if their actions also have a negative effect on the war or American national security – so much the better in their view.

The Right needs to have reasonable and responsible critics and the country needs a vital center to win the war. While it is tempting to react with glee to infighting on the Left, Republicans and conservatives need to keep to the long view. A completely defeatist, anti-American, irresponsible, Democratic Party led by socialist zealots hurling embittered jeremiads and actively sabotaging the war against Islamist terrorism is in no one’s best interest.

Wednesday, October 13th, 2004

THIS OLD HOUSE…OF SAUD

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has posted a 160 page work in progress on Saudi Arabian national security problems and socioeconomic challenges in the context of the War on Terror.

I have not yet done more than skim this paper and while I don’t expect any unconventional or radical recommendations from CSIS this paper does represent some very recent data on the Saudis, their capabilities, inclinations and strategic options. Foreign policy and MENA buffs will want to peruse it.

Sunday, October 10th, 2004

OUR MYOPIC FOREIGN POLICY ELITE

“We have to get back to the place we were, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives, but they’re a nuisance.”

– Senator John F. Kerry

Senator John Kerry did not actually inspire this post but I thank him for his timely epitomizing of it.

Of course if Mr. Kerry meant that such a goal is to be achieved through the destruction of al Qaida and the regimes and networks that support Islamist terror, then he has articulated a noble goal – one in fact I can fully support. The problem is it’s highly unlikely that is what he meant. In all probability, Senator Kerry was voicing the derision of our foreign policy elite, who are mostly unanimous against the policies pursued by President Bush, for the mundane and reasonable concerns of the common herd on matters of the war currently being directed at them by Islamist fanatics. Terrorism and dead Americans from flyover country are, you see, to our transatlantic seminar set, merely the cost of doing business as a superpower. Nothing to get excited about really. This war business of Mr. Bush is an old-fashioned inconvenience and an ideological incantation conjured by Likudnik neocons to distract the blue collar simpletons who shop at Wal-Mart and watch NASCAR from really important issues like prescription drug programs and reviving Kyoto.

Our bipartisan, transnational, foreign policy elite leveled much criticism at Mr. Bush on his handling of the WOT and Iraq. Some of the criticism was justified and indeed mirrored that expressed by field intelligence officers, retired generals and even conservative activists. On the other hand, I think it would be both fair and timely to take a look at how our would-be ” wise men ” have spent their time before 9/11. It’s less than impressive. In fact it’s a whole lot less substantive or relevant than the strategy the Bush administration has put forward.

I dug out some old issues of the elite’s flagship publication, Foreign Affairs to see what they were talking about prior to September 11. The key articles for that journal which went to press prior to al Qaida’s grand attack are a good snapshot of what our elite considered to be truly important:

THE WORLD BANK MISSION CREEP – Jessica Einhorn

GETTING DEBT RELIEF RIGHT – M. A. Thomas

PROVIDING UNIVERSAL EDUCATION – Gene Sperling

THE FUTURE AMERICAN PACIFIER – John Mearshimer

Islamism, much less terrorism as a strategic threat did not exactly top the agenda of our best and our brightest, even after a decade where the WTC, our embassises, Khobar Towers and the USS Cole were blown up by Islamist zealots en route to greeting Allah. Of the lot, Professor Mearshimer receives due credit for thinking in strategic policy terms instead of trivialities, social policy or fine-tuning existing institutions. That’s the sort of article FA should be publishing, except Professor Mearshimer, who went on to become a fierce critic of the Bush Doctrine of Preemption, was originally confident of a Bush-led American retreat from world affairs and a menacing rise of China. Not exactly on target.

Over at The National Interest, the more conservative, realpolitik, journal that serves as the foreign policy elite’s minority report, we see in the summer 2001 issue that their primary focus was not potential strategic problems but the vexing difficulties of American primacy:

AMERICA AT THE APEX – Henry Kissinger

THE BALKANS: HOW TO GET OUT – Richard Betts

WILSON’S BELATED TRIUMPH – Michael Mandelbaum

WHO’S AFRAID OF MR. BIG ? – Josef Joffre

DIFFERENT DRUMMER, SAME DRUM – Andrew Bacevich

Dr. Kissinger ironically bemoaned ” That generation has not yet raised leaders capable of evoking a commitment to a consistent and long-range foreign policy”. Of course we did and have since 9/11 – the Bush policy is simply one the elites do not like because Preemption tackles a problem they do not wish to face – as Senator Kerry illustrated with his confession of annoyance to the NYT . Mr. Joffre did have a nice analysis of anti-American ” strategic balancing” by our European ” friends” and – again the irony is rich-

” Saudi freelance bombardier bin Laden “. I must credit The National Interest for swinging into action with their special issue on the War on Terror in the aftermath of September 11, it is in my view, still a must read issue ( which includes an article by L. Paul Bremer who eventually became the CPA chief) but looking at the above advice I must say that our elite seem to be angry at Bush in part to cover the stinging memory of their own blindness. Living in a glass house of detachment from reality they rain a storm of stones at Mr. Bush from the CIA, the State Department, the Council on Foreign Relations, Carnegie and hope no one will notice.

Their record speaks of intellectual self-absorbtion andat least a decade of tasks deferred. Tasks that Senator Kerry wishes to defer further by pretending we are not at war by not reacting – as we did not react throughout two preceding decades – to Islamist terror. Living in a post-Kantian wonderland of unreality is no longer possible but it is now quite apparent that Mr. Kerry will need another 9/11 or two before he draws the same conclusions, if indeed he ever will.

If anyone wonders why, after a million lost opportunities in postwar Iraq, I still can support President Bush and his beleaguered band of neocons, this is it.


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