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A DAILY DEMARCHE FROM THE GLITTERING EYE

Dave Schuyler’s list of predictions prompted some extended discussion from Peter Rice a.k.a. -Dr. Demarche on the counterfactual wisdom of having eschewed invading Iraq in favor of a massive military campaign in Afghanistan. The latter was raised by Eric of TIA but it is an alternative reality favored by Juan Cole and a number of prominent Democrats in criticizing President Bush’s handling of the GWOT.

Dave thinks such a course of action would have invited disaster. I agree. Dr. Demarche had this to say, among other things:

“I believe that the biggest problems were the USA to have used massive force to invade Afghanistan would be two:

1.Logistics, and the ease of Afghans and others to cut the supply lines.

2. The love of fighting and the hatred of outsiders by the Afghans, and that this would be directed at a large American force.



I believe what we have is about all that we could have in Afghanistan, several thousand troops (many NATO) in and around Kabul (protecting the Afghan Govt.), troops at a small number of other locations for logistic support and aircraft (attack and transport), and a very small number of SAS/special forces/CIA personnel who work with Afghan forces to seek out and attack al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.”



As for the Pakistani reaction:

” The Pakistani masses know that their country is run by the elite, and that the elite of the elite are the commissioned officers of the Pakistani Army (the Navy & Air Force are less relevant). What these commissioned officers think is very important, and they are VERY dissimilar from the Pakistani masses. The commissioned officers are based on the Indian Army model (the Indian Army was split in August 1947 and the Indian and Pakistani armies for the most part are very similar) with English being the language of the Army (ditto for the Navy and Air Force) and most having grown up speaking English and thinking in many regards like an Englishman (of 1947). If these officers oppose an American invasion, then the Pakistani Govt. would oppose it. These officers believe that their prime directive is to protect Pakistan from invaders, mainly the Indians. If we were to invade Afghanistan via Pakistan with the permission of the Pakistani Army, there ought to be few problems with the masses and the Muslim leaders. And the few problems would be resolved by having the police be a bit strong armed with those causing problems. “



My comments are as follows:

Most of the criticism of of the variety that Peter and Dave are responding to is simply partisan B.S. Many of the same characters offering the retrospective advice to plunk down 200,000 GI’s in Afghanistan were the ones making ominous warnings about ” quagmires” in the pages of the NYT. Had Bush gone in to Afghanistan as they now suggest he should have and a struggle ensued like we are seeing in Iraq as Pushtuns rallied to calls for a jihad, these critics would be saying he should have gone in stealthly in a limited engagement.

The rest of the critics are probably sincere but their arguments are poorly reasoned or uninformed.

First of all, in a large scale-operation there would be no way to deal decisively with the Taliban-al Qaida alliance without invading the NW provinces of Pakistan. The Taliban was a Pushtun phenomenon as much as an Islamist one and outside of Pushtunistan – which exists on both sides of the border – the writ of Mullah Omar only extended as far as the immediate reach of his forces. In the north and east the Taliban had to co-opt local Dari-speaking ethnic warlords by letting them retain their profitable local sway in order to fight the Northern Alliance. The same warlords who switched sides later on during our invasion and who would switch again if Karzai looked doomed. Tribalism, not central authority, is the rule in Afghanistan’s governmental history though there were a few exceptions.

The border is relatively meaningless. Historically, the Pushtuns consider themselves to be ” the Afghans” and Pakistan’s NW territory was part of historical Afghanistan until the British empire was forced to patrol it regularly to prevent raids into India. Talibs and al Qaida terrorists are as much ” at home” in Waziristan as in Paktia. To occupy Afghanistan en masse, as the critics argue but stop at the Khyber Pass is to accept the same strategic situation that prevails today in Afghanistan except with vastly higher costs and more troops. This assumes that the presence of so many foreigners would not provoke an insurgency of course. We have gotten by without one mainly because most Afghans do not see too many Americans on any given day.

What exactly is the strategic gain these critics are looking for ?

COMMENTING ON A CONNECTIVITY STRATEGY FOR SMART REGIME CHANGE IN TEHERAN

I thought I would pull a few pertinent points from the CPD proposal and add my two cents to the commentary already given in reaction to the original post. CPD text will be in bold italics, mine in regular font.

“If there were in place an international clearing house and monitoring system for using existing enriched uranium for peaceful purposes only, countries seeking it for such a purpose would not have to develop their own enrichment capacity”

An extremely wise proposal that also helps with the ridiculously dangerous state of nuclear affairs in Russia while identifying programs like those in Iran for what they are – weapons programs.

“Iran under Khameini continues to be world’s foremost state supporter of terrorism, offering financial and logistical support to both Shi’a and Sunni terrorist organizations..”

There’s a lot of dispute about Iran and a devil’s bargain with radical Sunnis in terms of supporting terrorism. Certainly there are elements in the radical Sunni world that are – like the Taliban – hostile to Iran and Shiites. On pragmatic grounds, in terms of the perspective of an Iranian professional intelligence officer, it would seem to be fairly a fairly significant handicap if they were not allowed to work with secular Sunnis or moderate Islamists in carrying out terror operations in the ME. Likewise, terrorists I believe start as violent political extremists who get indoctrinated and more pious over time. My guess is they work with whomever can help them in furthering Iranian state objectives on an operational basis- including al Qaida – and deal with the troublemakers who get in their way. Strategically, Teheran would see an al Qaidaist State as a threat to Iranian security.

“Opening up dictatorships is the key to forcing change…”

Agreed. The caveat though is that this oligarchical-shizoid state’s clerical rulers still have the nerve to shoot down their own people so long as they have thugs who will carry out the orders. Even in Poland, labor unrest went on for two decades before the old regime lost its will to power and surrendered. This will not be a quick strategy.

” We should announce our willingness to reopen our embassy in Teheran…”

Everything should be done to put the regime on the moral, intellectual, diplomatic and legal defensive. It’s a safe offer because its one Khameini will not dare accept anyway. Plus it will help shut up the Euro-Left if hard measures need to be taken ( ” Look, we’ve tried everything Gerhard but…”).

” We must make clear that we will not accept Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon…”

As in, if you pursue it, this means war. We’d better mean it if we are going to say it and we’d best have a way to carry out the threat if we mean it. This is not something to bluff about or to try to ” wing” by the seat of our pants. If Khameini with a nuke is a clear and present danger to the U.S. – and I think it is – then expect to inflict and take serious casualties in the process of removing the threat.

An invasion is out given circumstances in Iraq which leaves us air power. With air power we can try to destroy the nuke program or the regime itself. We’d probably have a better chance of wiping out the regime’s elite guardian forces and levers of power with a sustained air campaign than rooting out a clandestine nuke program scattered across a country the size of Iran.

Either Iran’s program is stopped by diplomacy or by force of arms. Watchful waiting will result in accepting Iran as a member of the nuclear club. Those are our choices. Deus ex machina in the form of a popular rebellion is not likely to save us before Iranian scientists can finish a nuke.

I endorse all of the ” soft” tactics of connectivity in the CPD report. They won’t hurt and they can be of considerable help in discrediting the regime, strengthening civil society vs. the mullahs and empowering the reformists. All we need is an Iran that we can live with – not a Persian version of the United States – we don’t need Iran for anything other than not being a destabilizing influence, If we end up with a democratic Iran, great but I’ll accept any positive change in the status quo.

RAISING MY HEAD ABOVE THE BLOGOSPHERIC GRASS

Zenpundit has made the cut to be on Richard Kimber’s Index of Political Blogs. It’s under “Philosophy and Politics” at the bottom of the page.

CALLING FOR A POLICY OF SMART REGIME CHANGE

Former Reagan administration Secretary of State George Schultz eyes Iran for a kinder, gentler regime change. A call for restoring diplomatic relations with Teheran and a “Ukraine strategy”.

The full report can be found here(PDF). I will have comments after I finish reading it.

A GOOD WAY TO JEOPARDIZE THE GWOT AND A FUTURE WORTH CREATING

Here’s a trial balloon the supporters of the GWOT need to shoot down immediately before it can endanger our security, hamstring our war effort and jeopardize the entire strategy of ” Connectivity” upon which a future worth creating depends.

Daniel Pipes ( hat tip Collounsbury) has written a controversial column implicitly endorsing internment for American Muslims. Perhaps I have misinterpreted things, if so, I invite Dr. Pipes to clarify. I’ll post his rebuttal.

I’m not exactly soft on the Terror War. In many instances – notably on Gitmo detainees where I think we should have proceeded directly to war crimes trials for al Qaida members and upon conviction, imposed the death penalty – I’m to the right of the Bush administration. I’ve vigorously supported the idea of making the financial and clerical supporters of terrorism legitimate military targets. I have criticized highly placed idiots like Norman Mineta for impeding reasonable security precautions rooted in common sense counterintelligence principles on PC grounds of ” discrimination”. I’m all for prosecuting Muslim extremists like Sami al-Arian for supporting terror groups at war with this nation. Acting against individuals who conspire against the United States government or taking reasonable security precautions in war time is perfectly proper.

By juxtaposing the internment of Japanese-Americans during WWII with the above measures Dr. Pipes has sought to legitimize the idea of doing the same thing to American Muslims because they are Muslims.

Morally, this would be an appalling injustice – citing Michelle Malkin’s book does not justify this crackpot scheme whatsoever. Economically it would be a massive waste of resources to round up and incarcerate millions of innocent people. Strategically, there really wouldn’t be a better way to turn the United States into an international pariah. It would be another Abu Ghraib but tenfold in magnitude. Talk about disconnection ! What Western government – never mind an Arab one – would be on our side after that kind of policy is established ? To what extent would an attempt to campaign for this Pipes Plan aid the loony Left and the Islamist lobby in blocking and discrediting reasonable counterintelligence and security measures that protect all Americans ?

There are dumb ideas and then there are stridently dumb ones that manage, through a sheer audacity that fascinates onlookers, to disguise the degree to which they represent an impending disaster.

Daniel Pipes just gave us one of them.