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Archive for June, 2005

Tuesday, June 21st, 2005

RECOMMENDED READING

President Bush is meeting today with Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai as I discussed earlier and the world is watching to see what position the administration will be taking on Vietnam’s abombinable human rights record that was highlighted yesterday by Congressman Christopher Smith.

Bruce Kesler, a Vietnam veteran, op-ed columnist and conservative activist has been working very hard to raise awareness of the lack of religious and political freedoms in Vietnam, has published two articles in the last few days:

A Test for President Bush on Democracy and Human Rights” in the Augusta Free Press, Kesler writes:

In President Bush’s second inaugural address, he pledged, “All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: The United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors.” President Bush has been stalwart in keeping that pledge. Let’s hope and demand he continues to keep that pledge, to oppressed Vietnamese.

Reporters from Vietnam and Vietnamese say that the thugocracy ruling Vietnam only respond to Western media and political pressure, to free some dissidents and lighten up a bit in their oppression, in order to further their kleptocracy through Western business investment and foreign aid.

Vietnam’s true priorities were expressed when Khai joined with other Vietnam Politburo leaders in rejecting more reforms, when he said: “We need to breathe and have opened our windows and doors to the world but bugs and flies are coming in so we have to stop them from contaminating our society.”

The United States must demand far greater quid pro quo from Vietnam before further entrenching its regime’s oppression.”

And on a related but more partisan topic in ” Same Lies, Different War” at David Horowitz’s Frontpagemag.com , Kesler attacks the analogies drawn between Vietnam and Iraq.

That’s it for now.

Tuesday, June 21st, 2005

PARTLY CLOUDY WITH A CHANCE OF INCREASED BLOGGING

I should be posting some items thoughout the day as free time has unexpectedly appeared on my schedule today, interspersed with the usual mundane trivia to which I must attend. One of the posts will be my Third Rebuttal in the democracy debate with Cheryl Rofer.

Stay tuned…..

Monday, June 20th, 2005

THE SECOND REBUTTAL: HISTORY AND SPREADING DEMOCRACY

As Cheryl Rofer of Whirledview and I continue our debate, I would like in particular to expand on the aspect of spreading Democracy by force, a point of interest in Cheryl’s first rebuttal. Her second rebuttal can also be found here along with Cheryl’s original post. Here are links to my first rebuttal and to Part I. and Part II. of my original post.

Cheryl opened her rebuttal with the following observation, largely an accurate one:

“One reason is that we have different assumptions. Mark seems to accept the Bush administration’s assumption that democracy can be spread at the point of a gun. I may be a bit unfair in stating it that way, but I’m not aware that that theory has been clearly enunciated by those in authority. The examples of Germany and Japan miss the point. World War II was not fought for the purpose of bringing democracy to Germany and Japan. It was fought because those two countries attacked others and occupied them. However, once the war was over, both those countries required significant rebuilding. It made sense to couple physical rebuilding with political rebuilding.”

I have to agree that the Bush administration dangerously attempted to skip over the steps of nation-building that were present in postwar Germany and Japan. The assumption that things would fall into place because Saddam and his sons were the most hated figures in Iraqi history proved to be dangerously wrong. The need for post-conflict, nation-building or what Dr. Barnett more comprehensively categorizes as ” System-Administration” intervention, does not mean that Democracy cannot be spread by force or that we should not try – only that force is the starting point and not the conclusion of the process.

The operative question here is not whether it is possible to spread democracy with a bayonet –it is, at least in terms of the military power starting a substantial nation-building effort by enforcing a change in regime. Nor is the question whether or not force is the ideal way to spread democracy – it isn’t. A foreign invader cannot instantly inculcate the deep cultural support for democratic norms that centuries of political evolution, revolution and civil wars brought to Britain and the United States. They can only force the conquered to start anew on the democratic path and remove forces of coercion that stand in the way of an open society. No, the real question is whether or not spreading democracy, by force if necessary, is the most viable policy for America’s current strategic circumstances.

It would really be nice if the power-wielding elite in the Arab-Islamic world had an empiricist view of political economy and drew the appropriate conclusions from the history of the twentieth century in attempting to reform their societies. Unfortunately, they don’t, being composed of an authoritarian group of rentier autocrats, Islamist theocrats and socialistic nationalists, the Arab-Islamic elite stubbornly hew to the path of state failure and stagnation rather than risk change in a system that has them perched comfortably at the top of the decrepit heap. Liberalization, much less full-blown democracy, endangers their status.

This situation would be tolerable in terms of American security of these Arab-Islamic rulers also managed to exercise full sovereign control over their states but they do not. Instead, fearing their own people because of their own illegitimacy, most ME regimes irresponsibly attempt to export their social and political problems to their neighbors and the West. What they cannot export they try to suppress by force and fear. What intractable problems still remain, they studiously ignore and postpone the day of reckoning.

Then there are a second tier of states like Syria and Iran that are actively hostile in their policies and have a decades-long record of support for terrorism. Their intransigence is active rather than passive. The potential worst-case scenario risk factor of WMD terrorism makes further blanket indulgence of Arab-Islamic authoritarianism politically impossible for the Bush administration. Or for any future moderate Democratic successor that we are likely to see. A President Biden could not ignore the dangers of an Islamic Jihad Egypt or an al Qaida Emirate of Arabia.

After 9/11, the United States will no longer grant these regimes “ plausible deniability” for terrorist acts nor will the U.S. look the other way at NRBC proliferation. These states must either reform (KSA, Pakistan, Egypt), come to some diplomatic accommodation with the United States (Libya) or be forcibly changed (Afghanistan, Iraq). Those states that remain “ on the fence” between conciliation and conflict – Iran, Syria, Sudan – will come under increasing international political and economic pressure to conform backed up by the specter of a potential regime change attack by the United States. American military commitments in Iraq may prevent the U.S. from occupying Syria or invading Iran but there are enough assets available in Iraq and in carrier groups to destroy the Syrian regime or decapitate Iran’s hardline leadership while decisively obliterating key units of the Pasdaran and the secret police.

Spreading democracy as a policy has heavy costs and considerable risks and to a considerable extent the Bush administration has not been completely forthcoming with the public as to what they are. Instead, the administration has pointed, accurately, to the potential dangers of allowing the status quo to fester in the ME, to the positive potential benefits of spreading liberty and to their critics total lack of an alternate strategy for the GWOT. In a sense, this is unsurprising, foreign policy is dealt with in broad strokes when politicians talk to the general public which tends to tune in fully only at a moment of crisis like 9/11. And then only for a short time.

But to be sustained, to become a cornerstone of American foreign policy like Containment requires a deeper campaign of consensus-building for the promotion of Democracy by the Bush administration. The world is watching closely to see if America means it, if we will shy from Democracy abroad when it is inconvenient or potentially anti-American in the short run. Or if the USG is simply as cynical as their own corrupt leaders or the jaded European elite who have to be dragged to seeing genocide in Africa or even in the Balkans.

The Bush administration, in short, now stands at a crossroads and history is going to judge their deeds by their words.

Sunday, June 19th, 2005

REBELLION OF THE BLOGWIDOW Posted by Hello

Mrs. Zenpundit offers a holiday greeting

My better half is reminding me of preparations that need to be urgently completed in time for family activities today and I was just wondering if other bloggers often face the tiny fist of rage from their significant others because of the siren call of the blogosphere. ” But honey….I’ll come to bed in a minute….I just have to finish this post on Clinton’s Uzbekistan trade policy vs. George Bush’s !”.

Happy Father’s Day to all !

Saturday, June 18th, 2005

THE FIRST REBUTTAL: HISTORY AND SPREADING DEMOCRACY

Delayed but not denied, here is the first rebuttal in the Spreading Democracy Debate with Cheryl “CKR” Rofer of Whirledview. CKR’s original post can be found here. Her first rebuttal is here :

I’d like to begin by stating that, speaking as someone trained as a historian, it was a pleasure to read CKR’s first post because she demonstrated an excellent grasp of the field of history. That’s not something I run across every day and it was very nice to see.

CKR drew attention to the methodological core of using history in the formation of solutions for contemporary foreign policy problems:

“As people search for a way to get a handle on large events, historical analogy is not the worst of these tools. The problem with history is that events are never quite the same. It’s essential to look at historical context, but discussion in the US too frequently mixes politics in. The analogies of Vietnam to Iraq frequently display these difficulties. Vietnam was a geographical backwater; Iraq is square in the center of the Middle Eastern oil country. Casualties in Vietnam were much higher than they are in Iraq, and to a conscripted army. Both of those statements have enormous ramifications. Each could be expanded into a book.

Responsible analysis would examine subsets of those ramifications for similarities and differences, then test theory against them. Politicization takes the facts that agree with me and arranges them against the other guy’s argument.”

Jonathan Dresner, a Japan specialist who blogs at Cliopatria, has argued in the past on HNN that historians are well-trained in terms of analytical skills and an appropriately large cognitive base to render judgments about foreign policy. Naturally, I agree with him but forming policy, as opposed to simply critiquing policy, is an action of synthesis which requires a mental shifting of gears by the historian whose habitual cognitive state is analysis. Analysis is a superb tool for deciding how a system works, might work and where it it does not; in other words, for discovering causation and predicting effect. ( Source for Diagram here )

Posted by Hello

This explains why most historians ( and most policy experts for that matter) are best at figuring all the ways a proposed policy will not work. Analysis is fundamentally a tool of criticism and not creativity. Or in the words of John Boyd, you can get in to a mental cul-de- sac of ” Paralysis by analysis”. Synthesis, by contrast, is a horizontal -thinking act of creativity which is what you need in order to devise solutions to policy problems. ( For a diagram that explains creative insight, go here).

Fortunately, historians have, as CKR wrote ” the data”. What they need to be of more use in foreign policy discussions is a change of cognitive perspective. Historians also need to be utilized with some balance in terms of field specialty. CKR wrote:

“The historical view develops a sympathy with people in past times not unlike that required for dealing with other countries and other cultures. They didn’t use words exactly the way we do. Their concepts were different: look at how the definitions of liberalism and conservatism have changed in America since the late 19th century, although not so much in Europe. And their expectations of what made the good life were different. Ask anyone who grew up in the fifties, or even the sixties or seventies.

Unfortunately, politics can make use of history while ignoring or even suppressing this sympathy. Don’t like nuclear weapons? The US never should have dropped the bombs on Japan. Never mind the hundreds of thousands of US deaths, the apparent will of the Japanese to fight up to and beyond an invasion of their islands. Need a club to beat the left? That was some giveaway at Yalta, equivalent to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Never mind that the Soviets already held the territories, the war weariness, the difficulty of driving the Soviets back.”

It isn’t always overt politicization, though that certainly plays a role in public debates over policy. Unbalanced historical perspectives alone can create a lacuna for policy makers without regard to ideology. Collounsbury made remarks to this effect in the comments section of my first post in regards to the historical expertise of Bernard Lewis. Collounsbury has ( if I recall correctly) a degree in history, but more importantly, he is a MENA specialist and is thus a modernist. To him, the limitations of relying on Lewis, an Ottomanist and medievalist, for advice about ME policy was obvious though it would not have been so to a non-specialist( Collounsbury has critiqued the strengths and weaknesses of Lewis at length here). The answer is simply drawing upon a representative range of specialists to exchange views instead of just one or two so that a check and balance exists in terms of perspective.

Though this is supposed to be a rebuttal I am finding myself in agreement with much of what CKR has to say, despite our differing political views and my more hawkish orientation on foreign policy questions. A good outcome, I believe, for Right-Left dialogues of this kind. I’ll have to sharpen my partisan saw for the second rebuttal, just to keep things interesting.


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