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THE FOUR HOUR DRIVE HOME FROM WORK

Chicago, snow and idiots licensed to drive.

Yes, I am having a drink ( Old Grandad)

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND BERNARD FALL

Continuing its evolution as a superb resource and site for discussion on military history and policy issues The Small Wars Journal has put up a transcript of an address by Bernard Fall entitled ” Counterinsurgency: The French Experience” (PDF). An excerpt:

“…There is a hard fact of military life which is very often forgotten, and that is you usually learn much more from defeat than from a victory. Victories are particularly dangerous in terms of lessons. For example, the French came out of World War I absolutely persuaded that the key to victory is a strong, deep, defensive system. The Germans, who lost World War I. precisely against the deep defensive system, came out perfectly persuaded that the way to win the war is with deep, air-supported, armored penetrations. It took us five years of bitter fighting to beat them at their own game. “

Hat tip to Jedburgh.

RECOMMENDED READING

Some good things here:

Dr. Thomas Barnett has blasted the attempt by the Pentagon to gut what military manpower remains in order to preserve all the ” big-ticket” items. (He was beaten to the punch here by Brad Plumer)

Dr. Chet Richards at DNI unveiled the intro to his new book

NYKR in DC has an interesting post on “ open source cyberjihad “

The First Iraq discusses ” Fingerprinting the Human Voice” – which reminded me of Solzhenitsyn’s characters in The First Circle

Friend of Zenpundit Myke Cole is back from Taiwan and has an article coming out in The Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International – which is not readily available online but some of you have university library access.

Bruce Kesler slashes at “Democrat Infamy” – he’s correct that the Democratic Party is basically in a state of moral collapse over the war. A collapse that Howard Dean’s recent comments, in my view, badly aggravated without even satisfying the party’s antiwar wingnuts.

Dr. Nexon at The Duck of Minerva opines on the State and Westphalia ( while beating the Belmont Club about the face and head). I would however have liked to hear Dan’s take on the underlying post by Josh Manchester, particularly the network aspect.

That’s it !

THE WAR MAKES FOR ODD BEDFELLOWS

In the past month, Zenpundit Iraq posts have been linked to by, surprisingly, Mother Jones ( courtesy of Brad Plumer) and today by The Spectator. Not certain what this political juxtaposition means, but I’d like to welcome any new readers !

ADDENDUM:

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WIN, LOSE OR (WITH)DRAW IN IRAQ

John Robb has an important post up on Iraq at Global Guerillas entitled ” Nation-State Strategy:Clear And Hold“, one that follows up on the article by Martin van Creveld that predicted an outcome somewhere between MacArthur’s retreat from the Yalu and the Roman Legions of Crassus in Parthia for the American military in Iraq. I have to wonder though if van Creveld’s deep antipathy for the Bush administration might not be coloring his formidible powers of analysis. The United States is doing poorly in Iraq in part by its own self-imposed political restraints and not entirely by the ” natural” dynamic of battle or the inherent military excellence of the insurgent groups.

The insurgents are definitely ” a thinking enemy” but much of their thought has gone into crafting tactics contingent on the continuance of our odd ( from an Iraqi perspective) practices and routines of the U.S. military, many of which were developed in response not to the conditions of the Iraqi battlefield but to the pressures emanating from the domestic American political arena. Those constraints are within our power to change which could improve our position to better respond to those factors which are not.

Nevertheless, should we continue along on our merry way as we have been doing, Robb’s scenario looks bleak:

“What this means

The likely outcome will be that the US will have little real value (a decrease in violence) to show for its efforts over the next year. If we do it flawlessly (which is going to be very difficult given a thinking enemy), the controlled chaos may hold long enough for the US to get most of its troops out. Here’s what it means:

Moral collapse. There will be intense pressure from US voters to exit Iraq prior to the US elections next year. This is the last plan that the US public will allow without serious repercussions for the American political leadership. It’s a one way ticket.

Unexpected events. A rapidly evolving plan like this creates the potential that unexpected events may cause serious disruption. For example: the expansion of the conflict to a new area (the US?) and/or a major overrun (we almost saw this in the attacks on the Baghdad hotels in October/November) where a large group of Americans are killed and taken hostage. Either event could cause a radical policy collapse ”

I think Robb’s critique should be taken very seriously as an argument for changing the strategic game plan in Iraq from trying to achieve maximum objectives into guaranteeing minimum results – which in my view would mean:

1. Qualitatively building up the military capabilities of the Peshmerga to several orders of magnitude above all their other militia rivals or the insurgents -i.e. accept reality that the Kurds are the only reliably pro-American and effective indigenous military force in Iraq.

2. Aim for an Iraqi army that can hold Baghdad – by that I mean just the government buildings, the airport and the road connecting the two. Beyond that, a capability to temporarily swarm an area in force to demonstrate the central authorities’ ability to punish, if not occupy. Taking over the duties of American troops is a fantasy we ought to just drop. Good security in Baghdad beats bad security everywhere .

3. Recruit the services of Shiite militias to keep order in the South with financial subsidies but do not upgrade them significantly in terms of training or arms. Their reward is conceding de facto dominance on their home turf

4. Draw down to an airpower/socom heavy, ” hammer” force to back up operations of the Iraqi government and the Peshmerga.

This is ” The Syrian Scenario” answer to the ” Lebanon Logic” problem in Iraq. We remain an 800 lb gorilla and paymaster but a less targetable one and accept a much higher level of chaos in return for keeping Iraqi democracy on life support, letting the Kurds continue to nation-build their autonomous proto-state and avoiding the position of being overwhelmed by a civil war despite our best efforts. (We need to be honest about the degree of ” victory” we wish to pay for in Iraq. Total victory ? Ok – lets talk about a 20 division U.S. Army because that would go a long way).

Unless the Iraqis themselves settle politically, civil war is going to happen in Iraq and the parties involved won’t negotiate in earnest until they see the light of the train rushing at them.

If then.