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Archive for January, 2006

Sunday, January 15th, 2006

CULTURALLY -INFLUENCED COGNITION AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Myke Cole, an analyst at CACI and one of the more interesting and thoughtful up and coming writers on security policy, has a noteworthy article on terrorism profiling in On Point:

The Taxonomic Obsession: Profiling as a 4GW Tactic” by Myke Cole

Cole argues that the standard counterintelligence practice of profiling for al Qaida or Islamist terrorists based on a model that represents Salafi-Jihadi characterisics is a serious and potentially dangerous error given what we know about 4GW opponents like al Qaida. The evolutionary adaptability of such loosely organized, networked opponents makes, in Cole’s view, the use of standard profiling tactics an effort in self-imposed blindness. ( Dan of tdaxp, in his review, offers a counterpoint).

On the evolutionary margin – where operatives for the next catastrophic terrorist attack are likely to be found – Cole is in my view quite correct. Not only for Muslims who do not fit the Arab Salafi-Jihadi profile such as Western converts, SEA nationalities, Women, Black Africans or Bosnian Slavs but those terrorists who are non-muslims altogether. Future strategic partnerships at the operational level between radical Islamists and Neo-Nazi racial extremist groups in Europe and the United States ( who often express admiration for al Qaida) or the radical Left should not be preemptively ruled out, as slavishly adhering to profiling would have us do.

On the other hand, the inchoate nature of the Salafist-Jihadi demographic means that the itinerant, amateur, self-trained, Islamist terrorist who acts out from inspiration gathered largely from the internet or the downtrodden immigrant who becomes radicalized in the ghetto mosques will fall largely into the standard profile. We need to watch the mediocre quintiles of the terrorist bell curve as well as for the superior ones.

I would like to highlight Cole’s perceptive observation though, because the implications run deeper than just profiling:

The western cultural tendency to rely on taxonomy to classify everything it encounters, from cuisine to terrorists, greatly weakens our position to combat the threat.

… The western desire to fit things into neat boxes works against us as we attempt to gain an understanding of how terror groups organize command and control. 4GW theory, supported by our experiences in and , enforces the idea that the sub and transnational opponents we face today operate in cellular fashion; loose networks that move independently guided mostly by an understanding of the overarching strategic goal.

Given this understanding, it seems odd that we attempt to impart a corporate, hierarchical structure to terrorist organizations from the outside. Confused by the fact that they do not function as we do, we attempt to picture them functioning as we do anyway, and the result is debilitating to our national counterterrorism effort.”

True.

As difficult as it is to step into another man’s shoes it is impossible if you begin your thought experiment with a visualization of the other man wearing one’s own boots. What appears to be a logical potential move for your opponent from your perspective is not the most probable course of action if you are ignoring the opponent’s internal logic. Our national security bureaucracy needed almost two decades after the end of WWII to get a reasonably nuanced, accurate and widespread ” rough sketch” comprehension of the Soviet strategic decision-making process. I hate to say this, but our understanding of the internal dynamics of Islamist terrorism stands at a point equivalent not to 1949 but to 1917.

Our governmental experts and linguists are too few and are generally not of a background that emphasizes experience gained from long cultural immersion but knowledge gained from a point of scholarly removal of the most reductionist, compartmentalized, vertical thinking kind. As a result, expertise in Islamism at the higher reaches of the IC is not only relatively scarce but most likely to suffer from the blindness of “Educated Incapacity” and a lack of imagination. Our taxonomic, model-based, extrapolative, thinking process is a legacy of Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes and Newton and has been a tremendous boon to the West. In terms of mental efficiency, specialization, accumulation of knowledge and creative invention it is a robustly dynamic culture of cognition but it has a few drawbacks.

First, we Westerners tend to naturally underrate interconnectivity and are psychologically intolerant of paradox and ambiguity. Secondly, while much of the world has been forced to adapt this Western cognitive model in science, commerce, diplomacy and so on, it does not mean that ” the other” naturally thinks in such a way as to arrive at similar perceptions of events, much less to the same conclusions, that we do. Abandoning our accustomed cultural thinking patterns, in order to emulate a foreign ones for the purposes of analysis, is an exceedingly difficult enterprise.

Yet, it must be done.

Saturday, January 14th, 2006

FPRI: COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE-PART II.

This post is a continuation of Part I. and I find myself in greater disagreement with the author here; particularly in regard to DHS. Without slamming any individual employee or alphabet agency of that vast department, the whole concept needs to be rethought with a clear focus on counterintelligence and counterterrorism with an eye toward radical streamlining.

Foreign Policy Research Institute
50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
1955-2005 www.fpri.org

COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE

by Frank G. Hoffman

January 6, 2006

Continued from Part I.

U.S. NAVY

The recently retired Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
Admiral Vernon Clark, admitted the Navy is neither balanced
nor optimal for the ongoing GWOT or against future irregular
adversaries. The capabilities found in today’s 300 ship
fleet makes it extremely potent for conventional fights in
deep “blue water.” America’s carriers can threaten four
times as many deep strike aim points than a decade ago, and
the strike potential of the total fleet has increased three
times over. Yet,the Navy continues to add to its combat
punch. The fleet has too much strike capacity, paid for at
the expense of expeditionary and littoral combat assets that
are more relevant againstá irregular maritime threats.The
outgoing CNO was right, we do not have a balanced fleet.

The Navy’s Mahanian lusting for a future Trafalgar or Midway
is reflected in its devotion to large, expensive ships.
This creates an unaffordable shipbuilding plan with a new
$14Bá aircraft carrier, the CVN-21, and Virginia-class
submarines estimated at $2.5B each, and a DD-X destroyer
that costs around $3B.á The Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) fits the bill with innovative hull designs, modular
mission packages, and superior speed (up to 50 knots). Just
as important, theLCS or Street Fighter provides the
requisite capability packages to á deal with irregular
threats, at one-tenth the cost of a DD-X. Accordingly, in a
world withoutá a blue water opponent, this analysis leans
towards the LCS as the new platform of choice. The DD-X
however, is retained as the sole frame for surface
combatants.

The Navy should reduce its focus on aviation-based power
projection andá emphasize littoral and expeditionary forces.
Reducing carrier battle groups from 11 to 9, while
preserving a robust amphibious force as a maneuverable form
of presence and cooperation is a good way to posture U.S.
forces for irregular contests.It should also increase the
number of LCS and other innovative hull forms for “green
water” operations against irregular forces increases the
utility of the Navy.

The Navy’s new shipbuilding plan for 333 ships is like the
Army’s plan, too conventional and completely unaffordable.
The alternativeá outlined here is fleet is achieved, and
better shaped for littoral warfare, countering anti-access
threats, interdicting criminal activity and suppressing
piracy and interference toá sea lines of communication. It
provides both the green and blue water platforms the United
States needs to counteract irregular warfare at sea. Just
as important, this fleet provides both persistent and
periodic forms of presence, maneuvering at sea, without
absorbing the political and military vulnerabilities of
fixed ports and airfields.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

One of the most cost effective and relevant capabilities in
America’s arsenal is the elite “quiet professionals” of U.S.
special operations forces (SOF). While the U.S. SOF
community has been augmented, much more can be done. Its
current optempo is too high. We currently have 80% of our
assets iná two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, which former
SOF veteran Mike Vickers calls “a two-country solution to a
60 country problem.”To address the lack of robust
capability, we should:

* Increase the SOF by three battalions

* Increase SOF’s organic intelligence and UAV assets

* Increase SOF’s HUMINT resources by 33%

* Increase SOF’s organic stealthy aviation assets

In world of persistent conflict, we should consider
further institutionalizing SOF as a distinct Service-the
Special Operationsá Force (SOF). Creating a Service, to
include JCS representation, would further strengthen its
representation in key planning circles in Washington. Most
importantly, it would give SOF ownership of the personnel
policies, career patterns, promotion paths, and other
incentives within its own unique culture. SOCOM’s
headquarters could be better used as a regional command for
Africa (AFCOM).

DOMESTIC SECURITY

It is patently obvious since Hurricane Katrina that many
homeland security deficiencies remain. The Department of
Homeland Security’s (DHS) requires significant and dedicated
resources. Its budget of roughly $30B has to be increased
twenty percent. It also needs to be reinforced by
transferring the National Guard to DHS (less 15 Guard combat
brigades). This would provide DHS with the leadership,
command and control, transportation, medical and manpower
assets to prepare and respond to both man-made and natural
disasters.

The Coast Guard also needs to be retooled.Its aging ships
and helicopters are not up to the task posed by new modes of
warfare.The Integrated Deepwater System, the Coast Guard’s
modernization program,á should be accelerated. This program
will provide modern cutters, aircraft, and refurbished
helicopter fleet. The program should be funded at $1.25B
per year to accelerate its achievement in 10 vice 20 years.
The Coast Guard’s end strength should be increased from
38,000 to 55,000.

CONCLUSION

Complex Irregular Warfare presents a mode of warfare that
contests America’s overwhelming conventional military
capability. It attacks the hubris behind the notion we
could “redefine war on our own terms.” The impact of the
9/11, 3/11 and 7/7 attacks have not gone unnoticed by
tomorrow’s enemies. Nor has our bloody experiences in Iraq
which offered a rich laboratory for their education.
Because of their success, protracted irregular conflicts
will not be a passing fad nor will they remainá low-tech
wars. Our opponents eagerly learn and adapt rapidly to more
efficient modes of killing.We cannot continue to overlook
our own vulnerabilities or underestimate the imaginations of
our enemies. In a world of Complex Irregular Wars, the
price for complacency only grows steeper.


END PART II.

Friday, January 13th, 2006

FPRI: COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE – PART I

A good article from FPRI via Younghusband that I am posting in its entirety after my friend and former FPRI man Bruce Kesler helpfully pointed out that I should read the distribution rights fine print :o)

I am breaking this in two parts. I disagree with some of the author’s normative choices but think, in general, that he has a very solid point. Given that he is surveying the spending priorities of all the services, some quibbling could hardly be helped.

Foreign Policy Research Institute
50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
1955-2005
www.fpri.org


COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE
by Frank G. Hoffman

January 6, 2006

Frank G. Hoffman is a Researchá Fellow at the Center for
Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) in Quantico, VA,
and is a non-resident Senior Fellow of the FPRI.The views
represented here are the author’s alone and
do not represent the views of the Department of Defense or
the U.S. Marine Corps.

The U.S. National Defense Strategy identifies
irregular challengers as an increasingly salient problem.
The ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was expected to
shape America’s capacity to deal with nonlinear and
irregular warfare, as well as balance the Pentagon’s
overdrawn checkbook But like the last two evolutions, this
QDR will probably be a dud.It is mired by major programs
the Services cling to, despite their high costs and
irrelevance in an era of intra-state warfare and global
insurgency. OSD’s leadership cannot convince the Services,
Congress, or swarming army of lobbyists that we need to
shift the Pentagon’s budget towards more irregular threats
and away from a rigid focus on conventional warfighting.

This essay outlines the emergence and implications of
Complex Irregular Warfare.This mode of warfare builds upon
and exploits nontraditional modes of warfare.The rise of
Complex Irregular Warfare is the natural reaction to
America’s overwhelming military superiority. The United
States has pushed future opponents to alternative means that
are purposely designed and deployed to thwart Western
societies. This mode of warfare exploits modern
technologies and the tightly interdependencies of globalized
societies and economies. A more appropriate alternative to
America’s current overall security architecture and its
national security investment portfolio is offered to shape
America’s military against this threat.

The nature of tomorrow’s irregular wars is not completely
clear. Most likely it will evolve into “War Beyond Limits”
as described by a pair of Chinese Colonels in a volume
entitled “Unrestrictedá Warfare.” It certainly will not
break out as described in the Pentagon’s strategy, with
enemies choosing discrete options between conventional,
irregular, catastrophic or disruptive strategies.We will
face hybrid forms purpose built to exploit U.S.
vulnerabilities. This would include states blending high-
tech capabilities like anti-satellite weapons, with
terrorism and cyber-warfare directed against financial
targets or critical infrastructure. They will surely
involve protracted and extremely lethal conflicts like the
insurgency in Iraq. Such wars will be neither conventional
nor low intensity. Above all, the enemy will be protean.

The posture of U.S. military forces under such a strategy
requires greater nuance and more of an indirect approach
than yesterday’s Garrison Era. Forward presence will be
costly but invaluable, shifting rather than fixed, depending
on the current context. Forces will have to be designed to
maintain American interests across a broader array of
missions and against more adaptive enemies.The following
constitutes an outline sketch of the changes needed.

ARMY
The evolution of the Division-based Army to one centered on
modular BrigadeáCombat Teams (BCTs) is spot on. These are
more self-contained,cohesive, and faster to deploy. But
the Army’s plan to transition the Army’s 10 Divisions, (33
BCT equivalents)into 43 smaller BCTs needs reexamination.
Creating the overhead costs for theá new BCT cuts out real
combat power, and the proposed mix of Heavy (armor), Medium,
and Infantry á brigades (19/6/18) is too conventionally
oriented.

The “modularity” concept offers less than meets the eye.
The claim that the proposal increases combat power by 30
percent measures only a 30 percent increase in the number of
brigades, and not true combat power. The Army plan
decreases the number of Total Force maneuver battalions from
201 to 161. More thaná 20,000 “trigger pullers” have been
sacrificed to produce larger number of arguably weaker
units until the Future Combat System is fielded. In theory
the FCS will use better computers, sensors, and networks to
compensate for traditional firepower, but the program will
not deliver anything until at least 2015.

To rebalance the Army for an era of Complex Irregular War, 7
heavy brigades should be traded for more medium and infantry
BCTs. Adding 3 Stryker Brigades and third infantry
battalion to the 18 IBCTs provides more balance for
irregular warfare. In effect, by reversing the shift to
create additional brigades and their overhead, a net total
of 13 maneuver battalions can be created, within the Army’s
current manpower totals.This would represent a significant
increase in true combat power, adding “boots on the ground,”
and enable “full spectrum operations” and the ability to win
the peace as well as the fighting phases.

AIR FORCE
America’s airpower dominance will have to be reshaped to
provide relevant strategic and operational effects. This
will require the Air Force to expand its missions in space
and cyberspace, as well as provide a modernized strategic
strike capability. The $200 million F-22 “Raptor” may be a
technological marvel, but it’s an investment that reflects a
misappropriation of funds for an irregular world.Thus, it
should be cancelled with its funding shifted to new long-
range bombers. A bomber with a range in excess of 2,000
miles is needed. The Air Force buy for the Joint Strike
Fighter can be cut in half, and those funds shifted towards
investments in the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles.

MARINES

To adapt for the 21st century, the Marines should shift its
orientation from major combat operations and amphibious
assaults to focus on protracted Small Wars. They should
achieve more modularity by shifting away from the separate
Marine Division and Aircraft Wings to standing Expeditionary
Maneuver Brigades,with roughly 15,000 Marines each. Each
of these would be supported by new units for Information
Warfare, Special Operations, andá Security
Cooperation/Foreign Military Training tasks.

Considering the nature of a second Small Wars era, the Corps
should terminate or sharply reduce plans for the V-22 Osprey
and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). The tilt-rotor
Osprey is too expensive and too fragile for expeditionary
employment. The Marines are making too many operational
compromises in their ground systems to get around the
limitations of the $80 million V-22. The $8 million EFV
affords seamless high-speed transition from sea to deep
inland objectives for forcible entry operations. It is too
optimized for very rare ship-to-shore maneuver, and is not
adequate for tactical maneuver of Marines during Small Wars.
The resources allocated to the V-22 and EFV programs should
be applied to simpler, less vulnerable, and more rugged
modes of air and ground mobility.

END PART I.

Thursday, January 12th, 2006

A TOUCH OF STYLE

This blogger knows a quality look when he sees it :o)

Thursday, January 12th, 2006

CIVIL WAR WITHIN AN INSURGENCY?

From Memeorandum:

The New York Times has an article discussing the increasing clashes between Sunni nationalist insurgent groups and the well-funded Islamist terrorist group, al Qaida in Mesopotamia, run by Musab al-Zarqawi.

While we should not overestimate this, the story is highly plausible given the extremist ideas of Zarqawi which are far more takfiriKharijite oriented than even the ideology of the main branch of al Qaida run by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. The predominance of Saudis and Saudi money in al Qaida Iraq squares with the earlier analysis by the Jamestown Foundation and a more recent one.

A point which indicates that the Saudi security services are either tasked beyond their means by the magnitude of pro-Jihadi sentiment in the population that their own Wahhabi-Salafist ideology has stoked or very little effort is going to stem the flow of volunteers and cash northward (most likely because, as with the previous exodus to Afghanistan, Saudi authorities are happy to see the troublemakers go. Some won’t be coming back).


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